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Abstract 
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Save the Children Fund (SCF) was at its foundation in 1919 a value-driven organization. 
The values, or guiding principles, of the founding generation are the lens through which I 
look at the history of SCF, and the associated histories of war and peace, human rights and 
NGO-state relations. These guiding principles are identified as universalism, utilitarianism 
and optimistic pacificism. They can be understood as a paradigm to which the social 
community which made up the founding generation of SCF gave their assent. 
The first chapter locates the founding generation within the political culture of the anti-war 
movement. Succeeding chapters detail the metamorphosis of SCIF from a'contentious 
social movement into a respectable national organization. As soon as the organization 
adopted a national rather than a universal orientation, the coordinates of all its guiding 
principles shifted. In particular the optimistic pacificism of the founding generation was 
replaced by pessimistic defencism. It was not until after the Cold War that SCIF began to 
realign itself with its original guiding principles. 
The three guiding principles are found to be of continuing relevance. Universalism has 
been reasserted as a positive creed leading SCF to seize political opportunities to reach out 
to children from all sides. The organization has adopted a utilitarian perspective that 
affirms the dynamic role of young people in generating their own futures. Lastly, the 
primacy attached to peace by war-affected people has underlined SCFs urgent mission to 
uphold an optimistic belief in the possibility of peace. 
iii 
Contents 
Dedication v 
Acknowledgements vi 
Abbreviations and Acronyms vii 
Figure 1. viii 
Introduction I 
Chapter I The founding generation 12 
Chapter 2 Within the lifetime of Eglantyne Jebb 39 
(1919-1928) 
Chapter 3 An organization in retreat from idealism 61 
(1929-1939) 
Chapter 4 The Second World War and the National 88 
Point of View 
(1939-1945) 
Chapter 5 The early Cold War 114 
(1945-1959) 
Chapter 6 Decolonization: the gap widens between 143 
relief and development 
(1960-1975) 
Chapter 7 Rolling back the darkness 176 
(1976-1989) 
iv 
Chapter 8 After the Cold War: the continuing relevance 216 
of organizational values 
(1990-1999) 
Conclusion 268 
Appendix 283 
Bibliography 284 
For my grandmother 
vi 
Acknowledgments 
was fortunate to be the holder of the Vera Steele Studentship in Peace Research within 
the Department of Peace Studies. I was also very fortunate to have Andrew Rigby as my 
supervisor. This thesis would not have taken the shape it has without the benefit of his 
principled vision and candour, or been completed without his generous encouragement. 
Nick Lewer has given his insight and assistance in the final stages. 
This thesis has its origins in my involvement with young people in Palestine, Afghanistan, 
Tajikistan and the UK through work with Quaker Peace and Service, Minority Rights 
Group, SCF and Asylum Welcome. I am grateful to these young people for their example 
of energy, resilience, and courage. 
Susan Sneddon, SCIF Archivist, brought the history of SCF alive for me during my visits to 
the archives. Mary Hawkins and Frances Moore were Particularly helpful in their 
discussions with me of their part in that history. Staff of the Refugee Studies Centre 
Documentation Centre and the Bodleian Library could be relied upon to find additional 
sources. Tom Buchanan generously gave of his time to read and comment upon the thesis. 
Penny Maddrell and Dennis Bailey were helpful proof-readers. 
Thanks also to my parents, Jill, Laura, Eric and Kwame. 
Vil 
Abbreviations and Acronyms 
ARA American Relief Administration 
COBSRA Council of British Societies for Relief Abroad 
DEC Disaster Emergencies Committee 
GPS Global Programme Strategy 
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross 
INTRAC International NGO Training and Research Centre, Oxford 
lUCW International Union of Child Welfare 
LUCW Lebanese Union of Child Welfare 
NMWM No More War Movement 
OAU Organization of African Unity 
OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
SCF Save the Children Fund (UK) 
TASIF Tajikistan Social Investment Fund 
UISE Union Internationale de Secours aux Enfants 
UNHCR United Nations High Commission for Refugees 
UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund 
UNRRA United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration 
UNWRA United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the 
Near East 
WILPF Women's International League for Peace and Freedom 
WHO World Health Organization 
viii 
THE QUESTION OF THE HOUR. 
vt 
WONDEA IF 
THAT I'M ilir FU-rUpr-, 
ýr 
it 
Specially drawn for Tia. Rr. coRD [)ý* DAVII) the t%orld-famed political 
caricaturist. 
From The Record of the Save the Children Fund, Vol. I No. 18, August 1921,283. 
Figure 1. 
It is our intention to enter into the domain of war and to labour there 
till in the course of generations we have extinguished it. ' 
Introduction 
In 1919 two sisters, Dorothy Buxton and Eglantyne Jebb, founded Save the Children Fund 
(SCF). The aim of the organization was 'to attack the vast mass of child suffering which 
exists in the world today as a result of war and economic distress'. 2 In the year that the 
Versailles Peace Treatywas signed, SCF made grants to nine different European countries. 
The following year it made its first grant to refugees in Constantinople and to famine relief 
in China. In 1921 as civil war wreaked havoc with the Russian economy, it launched its 
appeal for Russian famine relief, and committed itself to feed 250,000 children. 
Eglantyne Jebb realized at this stage that SCIF could not continue to conduct a series of 
large relief actions. What was needed was 'a co-operative effort of the nations to safeguard 
their own children on constructive rather than charitable lines'. 3 By 1923 SCIF had 
published a draft Declaration of the Rights of the Child. In 1924 delegates of the newly 
formed Union Internationale de Secours aux Enfants [International Union of Save the 
Children] successfully persuaded individual heads of state, as well as the Assembly of the 
League of Nations, to adopt it. 
1 Schreiner, 0.1978. Woman andLabour, London: Virago, 178. First published in 1911, this was a dramatic 
appeal for the participation of women in all forms of activity. This quotation is taken from the chapter on 
'Woman and War'. 
2 Advertisement appearing in the Save the Children journal, The Record, Vols 1-3,1920-1922. 
From these beginnings the history of SCF has remained indelibly linked with the history of 
war and peace, human rights, and NGO-state relations. 
At its foundation SCIF was a value-driven organization. The values, or guiding principles, 
of the two sisters and their associates are the lens through which I look at the history of 
SCF, and the associated histories of war and peace, human rights and NGO-state relations. 
I have identified these guiding principles as universalism, utilitarianism, and optimistic 
pacificism. They can be understood as a 'paradigm' or a set of related concepts to which 
the social community which made up the founding generation of SCIF gave their assent. 4 
Universalism is the guiding principle most often associated with SCF. The Declaration of 
the Rights of the Child was intended to safeguard all children 'beyond and above all 
considerations of race, nationality or creed'. 5 This universalism was reflected in the 
importance attached by SCF's founders to the organization's secular approach and its 
evolution into an international union. 
However, for Eglantyne Jebb saving children was not only an end in itself, it was also a 
means to safeguard the future happiness of the greatest number. It is crucial to hold on to 
this utilitarian aspect of her thought, because it counterbalances the Christian humanitarian 
emphasis on the vulnerability of the individual child which has underlined the position of 
3 SCF Archives reference SC/SF/l 7,24 January 1923. 
4 Kuhn, T. S. 1970. The Structure q Scientific Revolutions, Chicago: University of Chicago, 174-2 10. if 
5 From the preamble of the Declaration of the Rights of the Child adopted by the International Union of Save 
the Children in Geneva, 17 May 1923. 
children as victims of war. In Eglantyne Jebb's view all children were potential adults and 
actors in a social world. In a biography Dorothy Buxton described the utilitarian 
perspective her sister had of work with children. 
The care of the famine stricken children is a world responsibility, in that the whole 
world stands to lose if the children of any nation are allowed to grow up degenerate 
and demoralised through hunger, and the whole world stands to gain if they grow 
up strong and healthy, able and willing to work for the good of their fellow men. 6 
Lastly, the founders of SCF were optimistic that the suffering they had witnessed in the 
aftermath of the First World War need never be repeated. They believed as idealists in the 
possibility of a positive and lasting peace. How far they were also realist, believing that 
certain circumstances required defensive war, is unclear. Eglantyne Jebb was certainly 
scathing in her dismissal of what she called the 'impossibility argument' put forward by 
the pessimistic realists who disputed the possibility of eliminating war and distress. 
Clearly there is no inherent impossibility in saving the children of the world. It is 
only impossible if we make it so by our refusal to attempt it. 7 
This constellation of beliefs, values and techniques of persuasion adopted by the founding 
generation of SCIF was mapped out in the many writings of the two sisters, as well as the 
early activity of SCF. However, after the death of Eglantyne Jebb in 1928 SCIF was subject 
6 Buxton, D. and Fuller, E. 193 1. The White Maine: The Story ofSave the Children Fund, London: 
Longmans, Green and Co., 34. 
to competing beliefs, values and techniques of persuasion. This case study of SCIF is a 
historical enquiry into the rhetorical and ideological underpinnings of succeeding 
generations. 8 
The first chapter locates the founding generation within the political culture of the anti-war 
movement, and details the emergence of the three guiding principles. The anti-war 
movement brought together people of very different inspirations and orientations. It 
included pacifists, who believed that war was the ultimate evil. It included pacificists, who 
believed in the possibility ofjust war and in the possibility of lasting positive peace. It also 
included defencists who rejected aggression but denied the possibility of lasting positive 
peace. 9 The greatest number of SCIF supporters could be described as pacificists of a 
religious, humanitarian or socialist inspiration. They could have either an internationalist 
or patriotic orientation. 
Chapter 2 describes the extraordinary speed and scale of the founders' translation into 
action of the three principles of universalism, utilitarianism and optimistic pacificism. 
During the period up to the death of Eglantyne Jebb in 1928, SCF provided assistance to 
children not only in the defeated nations of Europe but also in the Russian Civil War. 
Much of this action was contentious in that it fundamentally challenged the government 
policy of the day. However, SCIF made direct and repez! ted appeals to people in power, 
7 Jebb, E., 'Impossible', The World's Children, Vol. 7 No. 10, July 1927,142. 
8, Objectivity in historical and moral enquiry can be found not by denying our perspectives or locations but 
rather by interrogating their epistemic consequences. ' Mohanty, S. P. 1997. Literary Theory and the Clainis of 
Histo)y: Postmodernism, Ohjectivity, Multicultural Politics, Ithaca, New York: Comefl University Press, 
234. 
ranging from Lord Robert Cecil, the Minister responsible for the blockade, to the Pope, in 
order to win acceptance at the highest level for their claims. It made unprecedented use of 
the media, creating opportunities for itself to frame the issues of war and economic distress 
in a way which won support for its work. Above all it tapped the emotional energy of 
people disturbed by the suffering of children and offered them a way of converting a 
passive response into action. 
The following chapters chart to'what extent SCIF upheld these guiding principles 
throughout the rest of the century. Chapter 3 describes how Eglantyne Jebb's successors 
had to identify the appropriate role for SCIF in response to outbreaks of war in China, 
Abyssinia and Spain. In the 1930s, they also had to cope with a worsening economic 
situation and the fall of SCF's income to its lowest figure ever: just over E20,000. While 
Eglantyne Jebb had nurtured an ambitious vision of a life-saving movement for children 
the world over, her successors struggled with a popular demand for aid that was often 
parochial and party political. During the economic recession of the 1930s, SCF's 
supporters in Britain were keen that charity should begin at home amongst economically 
deprived children in Britain. At the outbreak of the civil war in Spain, the divisions on the 
left and the right of domestic politics governed the delivery of humanitarian assistance. 
While both these efforts were driven by sympathy for the needs of particular children, 
neither of these aid efforts reflected the universalist vision of SCF's founder. 
9 See the typology adopted by Ceadel, M. 1989. Thinking about Peace and Mar, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. He identifies two further types which I do not find present in the founding generation of SCF: 
crusaders and militarists. 
Chapter 4 covers the period from 1939 to 1945 when Britain was at war with Germany. 
However, I deal here too with the response of SCIF to refugees from Germany prior to the 
declaration of war. As Ruth Fry, a contemporary Quaker relief worker, pointed out war 
was 'only the active stage of a state of mind which is but too often found in peace-time'. 10 
With the exception of the Inter-Aid Committee for Children from Germany, where SCF 
was represented by Dorothy Buxton and worked in partnership with the Quakers, SCF 
during this period was patriotic, rather than international, in its orientation. The original 
utilitarian vision of young people as a radical lever to transfon-n the world, was reduced to 
a vision of youth related to 'the purposive life of the nation'. " During this period SCF shed 
its pacificist identity and became a respectable part of the British war effort. In 1942 it was 
the more radical founder members of Oxfam who challenged Winston Churchill's policy 
of total war and comprehensive sanctions upon the civilian populations of German- 
controlled Europe. 
After the First World War, non-govermnental organizations took the initiative and raised 
the funds to provide relief in the defeated countries of Europe. By contrast, after the 
Second World War SCIF drew up plans in cooperation with government and implemented 
them alongside the military. This had significant consequences for SCF's organizational 
identity. It acquiesced in the government policy of distinguishing between political 
refugees, internally displaced people and the indigenous population, and abandoned the 
10 Fry, R. 1926. A Quaker Adventure: The Story offfine Years ofReliefand Reconstruction, London: Nisbet, 
xvii. 
1' 'Warphans', The World's Children, Vol. 22 No. 3, Autumn 1942,6 1. 
universalist principle of providing relief to those in greatest need. Cold War political 
barriers, bom of a pessimistic defencism, also prevented this generation from putting into 
practice the universalist principles of SCF's founders. This chapter coincides with the 
withdrawal of SCIF from Yugoslavia and Hungary after thirty years of continuous work, 
and relates how during the Korean and Vietnamese wars, SCIF worked alongside UN and 
US troops on the anti-communist side only. Paradoxically, this was also the period when 
the Declaration of the Rights of the Child, with its universalist principles, was adopted by 
the UN General Assembly. In 1959 children's rights provided an issue on which most UN 
members, from both East and West, could agree. 
Chapter 6 is pivotal for it is at this point, fifty years after the foundation of SCF, that the 
institutional memory of the organization was at its weakest. The organization had now 
outlived all of its founders, its income was rising to levels comparable with the heyday of 
1922 as it benefited from the increased affluence of the 1960s, and new people joined its 
ranks. By the late 1970s, there was a very large proportion of ex-military staff in the 
overseas division of SCF. They had a reserve of logistical experience which was useful in 
meeting the immediate material needs following natural and human disasters. However, it 
could be said that SCF's capacity to mount a relief operation, conducted with near-military 
precision, delayed recognition of the need for a political response. This is most clearly 
illustrated by the gap that SCIF had allowed to open between its relief and development 
work. During the period of decolonization SCF adopted distinct peacetime and wartime 
approaches. In countries where the transition to independence was not accompanied by 
armed conflict, it encouraged the development of local organizations. In countries where 
the transition to independence was marked by armed conflict, SCF responded with rapid 
relief. These two approaches reflected a dualist understanding of peace and war contrary to 
the continuum described earlier by Ruth Fry. An analysis of SCF's relief operation during 
the Nigerian Civil War illustrates the political shortcomings of this dualist approach, and 
links it to the organization's departure from the three guiding principles of universalism, 
utilitarianism and optimistic pacificism. 
In the absence of an institutional memory reaching further back into the past, the Nigerian 
Civil War became a reference point for a whole generation of people involved with relief 
and development. SCF's long-term travelling companions, the International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC), the Quakers and Oxfam were present, but so too were the future 
founders of Midecins sans Fwnfi6w and journalists from the print and television media. 
Many of the people coming to the apex of their careers in relief and development at the end 
of the century were first confronted by the implications of armed conflict during the 
Nigerian Civil War. At this critical juncture, a number of factors combined to push SCIF 
further from its original founding principles. The habit of unquestioning deference to the 
position taken by the British government first adopted during the Cold War meant that it 
made no independent assessment of the conflict and failed to develop a value-driven 
response. Although donations from the public to SCF were at an all-time high, the 
organization had little influence over the motivations behind the donations. Public opinion 
was formed by media with which SCIF had few links. These media emphasized the 
universal vulnerability of children, but at the expense of the utilitarian view of the child. 
The powerful techniques of persuasion open to television obscured the way in which 
children were being manipulated by the protagonists of the conflict. While the Biafiran 
child succeeded in capturing the imagination of the British public as a starving child, it did 
not appear as a child belonging to a larger family or community or as a child with a role to 
play in the Africa of the future. This image was entirely at odds with Eglantyne Jebb's 
utilitarian perspective. 
In Chapter 71 deliberately seek out signs of the survival of the guiding principles. By 1981 
annual income exceeded f 10 million and by the end of the decade it had reached over f50 
million. 12 From the wide range of different programmes financed during these years of 
prosperity I focus upon the example of Lebanon for within SCF's programme in Lebanon 
the guiding principles began to regain ascendancy. The Lebanese war was a precursor of 
the protracted social conflict which would characterize much of the post-Cold War world. 
SCF in Lebanon, under the direction of Frances Moore, adopted a positive interpretation of 
universalism reaching out across political, social, and economic divides, rather than the 
narrower definition of politically neutrality. At the same time the identification of the 
family as the locus of change signalled the need for a cross-cultural understanding of 
children's rights rather than externally imposed set of rights. In Lebanon SCIF broke with 
its historical association with the young child only and began to accompany that young 
child into its teenage years. The orientation of SCIF in Lebanon was optimistic in terms of 
the potential of the child and of the immediate community the child belonged to. However, 
the work was limited to preparing the child and community to cope better with the 
consequences of war, rather than preparing for positive peace. 
10 
the final chapter I argue that if this reorientation were carried further, it would lead to a 
rediscovery of the three guiding principles. Cross-cultural understanding of children's 
rights is vital to confer universal legitimacy on those rights. A utilitarian perspective 
reveals that the conditions of young people are the most critical indicator of the success of 
conflict mitigation, for it is young people who are the generation of and creators of the 
future. The primacy of peace as the goal of young people living with armed conflict 
requires that international agencies adopt an optimistic perspective with regard to the 
possibility of peace. I discuss the role of SCF in Afghanistan and Tajikistan in greater 
depth in order to test whether a reinstatement of the guiding principles would be of 
relevance today. 
I conclude that the guiding principles have an abiding relevance for the practitioner. The 
values that drove the founding generation of SCIF were utopian, however the moral 
example they left of their engagement in and with the world provides the key to 
understanding the power of the early movement. The very ambivalence of Eglantyne 
Jebb's commitment to the guiding principles led to acute tensions but also a creative 
pragmatism. This creative pragmatism should not be mistaken for lack of principle. She 
clearly identified her most powerful opponents as the supporters of the National Point of 
View and her international point of view is still contentious today. There are 'certain 
fundamental duties which we owe to mankind, and which, when they appear to clash (it is 
12 1980-1981: f 14,480,650; 1989-1990: E52,196,368. 
always in appearance only) with our duties to our national states, should, nevertheless, take 
precedence'. 
13 
And yet the organization she founded is not nowadays perceived as contentious. If it is in 
contentious social action that the power of social movements lies, at what cost has this 
transformation from nascent social movement of 'eccentrics' to respectable organization 
taken place? 
13 Jebb, E., 'The World Policy of the Save the Children Fund', in Fuller, E. 1928. Tile International 
Handbook of Child Care and Protection, London: Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd and the Weardale Press, 
564. 
12 
Chapter I 
THE FOUNDING GENERATION 
The entry of Britain into war on 4 August 1914 brought questions of war and peace into 
every home. The consequent upheaval to civilian life, and in particular the introduction of 
mass conscription in 1916, forced people in Britain to rethink their attitudes and actions. 
Priorities became more acute, and fields of action widened as women, as well as men, 
found themselves in new wartime roles. Out of this heightened sense of principle and 
potential for action SCIF was bom. 
The publication of 'Notes from the Foreign Press': a contentious political act 
SCF bound people together in sustained collective action on behalf of children. This 
collective action grew out of a contentious political act that fundamentally challenged the 
British government. In early 1915 Dorothy Buxton began translating extracts from foreign 
newspapers and publishing them under the title 'Notes from the Foreign Press' in the 
Canibridge Magazine. She included newspaper articles from allied, neutral and enemy 
countries, and presented the injustices of war in a way that implicated all their 
governments. The radical appeal of the publication was made greater by her own links with 
people in the British government. 
13 
Together with her husband, Charles Roden Buxton MP, ' in 1915 Dorothy Buxton visited 
David Lloyd George, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, to persuade him to allow her to 
import enemy newspapers. She received a special licence from the Board of Trade for the 
purchase of twenty-five enemy newspapers. These enemy newspapers included three from 
Hungary and the rest from Germany and Austria. Articles of a mainly military interest 
were excluded, but the articles selected did deal with the aims and causes of the war, peace 
discussions, reprisals, treatment of prisoners, atrocities, neutrality questions, and the idea 
of the League of Nations. Among reports of the impact of the war on social conditions, 
were descriptions of starvation among children of Vienna, sent in by Dr Frdddric Ferrifte, 
Vice-President of the ICRC. 
Mosa. Anderson 2 worked first as a Russian language translator with Dorothy Buxton, and 
then moved to Manchester when 'Notes from the Foreign Press' was taken over by the 
Manchester Guardian. She stressed the significance of Dorothy Buxton's initiative: 
England was indeed blockaded against the truth. The credit of having broken that 
blockade and shown that a common humanity bound all the nations together and 
1 Charles Roden Buxton (1875-1942). In 1914 he founded the Union of Democratic Control, which affirmed 
the need for open diplomacy and condemned the making of secret treaties, with Ramsay MacDonald, Charles 
Trevelyan and E. D. Morel. In the same year he left the Liberal Party and joined the Independent Labour 
Party. 'For [Dorothy Buxton], humanitarian questions took precedence of politics while for Charlie it was the 
other, way about. ' See biography by his sister: de Bunsen, V. 1948. Charles Roden Buxton:, 4 Afenioir, 
London: George Allen and Unwin, 159. 
2 Mosa Anderson (n. d. - 1978) was a member of SCF Council from 1933 to 1967. She organized relief in 
Poland in 1946. 
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that the same aims, whether noble or selfish, were to be found in every land, 
belongs to Dorothy Frances Buxton. 3 
Dorothy Buxton's work was not Unique: Mary Sheepshanks 4 has been credited with a 
similar achievement as editor of Itts Suffragii. 5 Throughout the war she consistently 
published as much news as possible from the two opposed sides to present the human face 
of the 'enemy' to all women readers whatever their nationality. 
We appeal earnestly to readers in neutral countries to furnish news and articles, 
especially news of women's doing in Gen-nany and Austria, and if the paper 
reaches our German and Austrian subscribers, we appeal to them not to attribute 
the dearth of news from their countries to anything but its true cause, the 
impossibility of obtaining news. 6 
Where Dorothy Buxton's initiative differed from Ius Suffi-agii was that she had succeeded 
in pitching her information at a politically powerful audience. 'Notes from the Foreign 
Press' was regularly read by members of government, and Dorothy Buxton and the rest of 
the editorial team had strong personal connections with people in power. 
3 Quoted in Wilson, F. M. 1967. Rebel Daughter ofa Counny House: A Life ofEglantyne Jebb, Founder of 
the Save the Children Fund, London: George Allen and Unwin, 169. 
4 Mary Sheepshanks (1872-1958), suffragist and pacifist. See Oldfield, S. 1984. Spinsters ofthis Parish: The 
Life and Times ofFIAL Alayor and Afaiy Sheepshanks, London: Virago. 
5 his Suffragii [The Law of Suffrage], monthly paper of the International Women's Suffrage Alliance. 
6 his Suffragii, I October 1914, quoted in Oldfield 1984,185. 
15 
The Fight the Famine Council 
After the conclusion of the Armistice, Dorothy Buxton and others were concerned that the 
war, while no longer being fought by military means, was still being waged by economic 
means. They determined to continue her information campaign but this time through the 
channel of the Fight the Famine Council. The Fight the Famine Council was formed in 
January 1919 with Lord Pannoor, 7a former Conservative MP and champion of the League 
8 
of Nations, as its chairman, and Dorothy Buxton as secretary. She shared the secretarial 
duties of the Council with her older sister, Eglantyne Jebb. 
The Council resolved upon the following objectives: 
1. That the Council assures the Government of its cordial support in any humane 
measures they may propose, for the purpose of relieving distress in the famine 
districts of Europe, including such continuation of food control in this country as 
the needs of Europe may require. 
2. That the Council is of opinion that it is desirable to relax the Blockade, with a 
view to the restoration of normal industrial channels as a means to the supply of 
food and other commodities, not only on the ground of humanity, but to prevent the 
dangers of continuing unrest. 
7 Lord Parmoor (1842-194 1). See his autobiography: Cripps, C. A. 1936. A Retrospect: Looking back on a 
Life ofmore than Eighty Years, London: William Heinernarm. 
8 Mary Sheepshanks succeeded Dorothy Buxton as secretary to the Fight the Famine Council in August 1919. 
9 The Famine in Europe: The Facts and Suggested Remedies, Being a Report ofthe International Economic 
Conference Called by the Fight the Famine Council and Held at Caxton Hall, lVestminster, London, on the 
4'h , 5th, and 61" ofNoveniber 1919, London: Swarthmore Press, 1920. 
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3. That in urgent cases the necessity for immediate relief should be recognised, 
whether or not the peoples concerned are in a position to make payment. 
4. That a principal object of the Council is to collect and supply infonnation, in 
order that public opinion may be informed, so far as possible, of the true 
conditions, and may be encouraged in every way to support necessary measures of 
relief. 
Early on in the debates of the Council it became clear that there were two distinct tasks in 
hand: the immediate relief of the famine-stricken areas, and the longer tenn task of laying 
the foundation for a new Europe. 
SCF has often been known simply as 'The Fund'. It was formed on 19 April 1919 to raise 
funds to be passed on to agencies already working in the famine-stricken areas. The first 
appeal was made at a public meeting in the Royal Albert Hall in London. This meeting was 
timed to coincide with the Peace Conference in Paris. 10 After speeches about conditions in 
Vienna, Robert Smillie, President of the Miners' Federation of Great Britain, " moved a 
resolution: 
This meeting urges the necessity of pressing fanvard every measure of effective 
relief to meet the appalling conditions of the famine districts, and especially to stay 
the mortality among the children. 12 
10 Neither Soviet Russia nor Germany were represented at the Paris Peace Conference. 
" Robert Smillie (1857-1940). See Smillie, R. 1924. Aly Lifefor Labour, London: Mills and Boon. 
12 Freeman, K. 1965. IfAny Man Builri. The Histwy ofSave the Children Fund, London: Hodder and 
Stoughton, 2 1. 
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With a dramatic sense of urgency, Dorothy Buxton held up a tin of condensed milk, and 
made her case: 'there is more practical morality in this tin than in all the creeds'. 13 
SCF and its parent organization, the Fight the Famine Council, were organizations with a 
definite purpose related to a particular moment in history. The Fight the Famine Council 
was a magnet for a range of people who wanted to air their objections to the terms of the 
peace treaty that closed the First World War and promote their vision of a future European 
order. SCIF tapped into the emotional energy of those people who wanted to make an 
immediate practical difference to the lives of children suffering the consequences of war. 
Lord l? armoor recalls three international conferences of the Fight the Famine Council in 
the period from 1919 to 192 1. They won the support of university professors such as 
Gilbert Murray, writers such as John Masefield, Olive Schreiner and Jerome K. Jerome, 
economists such as William Beveridge and John Maynard Keynes, 14 and advocates of 
women's role in peace-making such as Maude Royden 15 and Emily Balch. 16 The latter was 
detennined to discuss not only the famine in Europe, but also the necessity of avoiding 
future war. In her report on the condition of the milk supply in Europe, she stated: 
13 This is one of the most frequently quoted episodes associated with the founding of the organization. See 
for example Freeman K. 1965,2 1. 
" John Maynard Keynes (1883-1946), adviser to the Treasury during the First World War. He was so 
appalled by the onerous war reparations imposed on Germany at the Paris Peace Conference that he resigned 
from his position as a representative of the British government. 
15 Maude Royden (1876-1956), Congregational Minister and pioneer advocate of the ordination of women in 
the Church of England. 
16 Emily Greene Balch (1867-196 1) was Professor of Politics at Wellesley College, USA, until she was 
dismissed because of her opposition to US entry into the First World War. She helped Jane Addams found 
the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom and acted as secretary from 1919 to 1922. In 1946 
she was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. 
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To the query as to the cause of the deplorable situation no one answered 'War'. No 
one thought that necessary, and the answers relate to the different specific effects of 
war, including the blockade and the compulsory delivery of milch cattle as required 
by the Peace Treaty. 17 
As well as inviting British and other allied participants, the Fight the Famine Council 
broke new ground by requesting permission from the government to invite fon-ner enemy 
delegates to speak at its First International Economic Conference. This attracted criticism 
from the press. 
A year later, the Fight the Famine Council retreated from questions of war and peace and 
the decision was taken to concentrate on the investigation of economic conditions. Lord 
Parmoor wrote that 'meetings and propaganda work on foreign policy were being 
undertaken largely by the Trade Unions and concentration was necessary'. 18 By 1922 there 
had been another shift in alliances. The third and last conference was jointly promoted with 
the Peace Society 19 and its title was changed to the 'Third International Conference on 
Economic Recovery and World Peace'. According to Lord Parmoor this 'enabled a 
programme to be formulated emphasizing the essential concordance between economic 
17 Quoted in The Famine in Europe: The Facts and Suggested Remedies, Being a Report ofthe International 
Economic Conference called by the Fight the Famine Council and held at Caxton Hall, Westminster, 
London, on the 4"', 5"' and e ofNoveniber, 1919, London: Swarthmore Press, 1920,7 1. 
'8 Cripps 1936,162. 
'9 The Peace Society, %vas founded in 1816 as the Society for the Promotion of Permanent and Universal 
Peace. It lost influence in 1914 because of its failure to condemn war, but is still in nominal existence. See 
Ceadel, M. 1996. The Origins of War Prevention: the British Peace Movement andInternational Relations 
(1730-1854), Oxford: Clarendon Press; Ceadel, A 1980. Pacifism in Britain (1914-1945): The Defining ofa 
Faith, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
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and moral questions'. 20 Both the Peace Society and the Fight the Famine Council then 
became moribund. 
Save the Children Fund: a nascent social movement 
SCIF by contrast grew from strength to strength. The power of this nascent social 
movement lay in the networks and symbols of the political culture of the anti-war 
movement, the emotional energy of individuals disturbed by child suffering, and the 
organizational vision of Eglantyne Jebb. 
There were at least three groups of people within the anti-war movement who came 
together in collective action in support of SCF. They differed in their inspiration and 
orientation. Some were people who located the causes of war in the human conscience and 
were concerned with spiritual and moral conversion. Others were moved to protest against 
the war on political grounds. The third group had experience of patriotic humanitarian 
action. To say they were all anti-war is to camouflage their eclectic range of ideas about 
peace and war. The credit. must go to Dorothy Buxton for galvanizing these people into 
action, but it was the energizing role and vision of Eglantyne Jebb, that persuaded these 
groups to come together, with other individuals troubled by child suffering, in sustained 
collective action. She ensured that SCIF was both value-driven and able to seize political 
opportunities. In order to understand how she did this, I examine more closely the 
collection of people she bound together, and the leadership roles of the two sisters. 
20 Cripps 1936,162. 
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In their quest to understand the phenomenon of the war in Europe, some people located the 
cause of war in the human conscience. The horrors of the 1914-1918 war served to 
underline their belief in the need for personal transformation. Both the Fight the Famine 
Council and SCIF were to find support among Protestants and Catholics, Jews, and 
Quakers, as well as the more newly formed movements of the Theosophists, 21 the Baha' i'22 
the Spirituali StS23 and the Rationalists 24 . For those pacifist or pacificist members of the 
anti-war movement who located the cause of war as internal to human beings, experience 
of war quickened their conviction of the necessity and efficacy of an appeal to the 
consciences of others to reject war. 
Christians who held this view were disappointed not only with the role of the governments 
prosecuting the war, but also with the established church. Both members of the Church of 
England and Nonconformists felt uneasy with the moral leadership of the church and the 
support of institutional religion for the war. Lord Parmoor remained within the Church of 
England during the war but compared the isolation in which he found himself with the 
position of earlier Christians such as Sir Thomas More, Erasmus and Dean Colet. On 20 
October 1914 he wrote in his diary: 
21 Dr Armstrong Smith (1867-1953) theosophist, visited Budapest in 1919 and reported on the situation to the 
Theosophical Society. Dr Smith then became SCF Continental Organiser, supervising the work all over 
Europe. Later, as Overseas delegate, he travelled across Australia and New Zealand. He founded the Padlock 
Society, against idle gossip, which regularly advertised for pledges in SCF'sjournal The lVorld's Children. 
22 Lady Sara Blornfield (n. d. -1939) was a member of the SCF Council and one of the leaders of the British 
Baha'i movement. 
23 Arthur Conan Doyle (1859-1930) was a convert to Spiritualism. As well as being the creator of Sherlock 
Holmes, he served as a physician in the Boer War and wrote a pamphlet, The IYar in South Africa, in 1902. 
He is cited amongst early supporters of SCF in Fuller, E. 1950. The Right ofthe Child. ý A Chapter in Social 
History, London: Victor Gollancz, 5 1. 
24 Gilbert Murray (1866-1957), Greek scholar and Chairman of the League of Nations Union (I 923-38),,. vas 
instrumental both in the foundation of SCF and later in the foundation of Oxfam. 
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Each day the weakening influence of Christianity becomes more clear. Its real 
failure is that national animosities have been aroused, and that religious 
communities, instead of preaching Christ's Gospel of World Peace and Goodwill, 
do often encourage a war spirit as popular in the country to which they belong. It is 
in this way that Christian Churches and communities lose their real power, and 
become weakly opportunist. 25 
On the same day he wrote how he was optimistic that contact between Gen-nan and English 
soldiers would be a source of peace. This faith in the positive nature of international 
encounters was to be a cornerstone of SCF. 
.. I think that the best chance of a just peace, ie just to our enemy as well as to 
ourselves, comes from the anny. The soldiers can and do report the action of brave 
adversaries, and both German and English do their best to relieve misery in 
attending to the wounded on the other side. 26 
In his autobiography he attributed his political beliefs to the influence of his grandmother 
who was brought up a Quaker. 'I learned through her much of the rule of conduct which 
subsequently influenced my life. 27 
25 Cripps 1936,110. 
26 Cripps 1936,110. The benevolent attitudes of soldiers who actually met the enemy contrasted with the 
public who had no contact with the enemy. 'After the First fforld War] there was a degree of loathing of the 
enemy countries, or the ex-enemy countries, which extended to every man, woman and child. ' Save the 
Children Oral History, Interview with David Buxton, 22 June 1993. 
27 Cripps 1936,6. 
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Two other key figures in the early life of SCIF actually took the decision to leave the 
Church of England and become members of the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers). 
Dorothy Buxton and her husband Charles Roden Buxton joined the Quakers in 1917. 
However, even within the Society of Friends there were divisions as to how, in conscience, 
Quakers should respond to the war. Some served in the armed forces; some engaged in 
humanitarian activity; others were absolute in their conscientious objection to the war and 
went to prison for their beliefs. 28 
The network of Quakers who chose to engage in humanitarian activity had the greatest 
impact on SCF. Members of the Friends Ambulance Unit (FAU) gave humanitarian 
service to wounded soldiers as a practical expression of the Friends' peace testimony. As 
representatives of the Society of Friends Emergency and War Victims Relief Committee, 
Dr Hilda Clark and Edith Pye helped women and children war victims in France, setting up 
emergency maternity hospitals inside the French war zone itself. Immediately after the war 
it was often the Quakers who were the first on the ground in the famine-stricken areas. The 
Emergency and War Victims Relief Committee was the conduit for grants totalling more 
than E250,000 from SCIF 29 and Dr Hilda Clark acted as an experienced mentor for the new 
organization. 30 
As well as thosewho objected to the war on religious grounds, within the anti-war 
movement there were also those who objected to the First World War on political grounds. 
28 Ceadel 1980,41-42. 
29 Breen, R., Rebuilding a Ruined World: Save the Children's beginnings in Vienna, 1919, SCF Archive 
Paper No. 7, October 1995,9. 
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Liberals protested against mass conscription and the power wielded by the state. 31 
Socialists promoted war resistance as a response to what they saw as a capitalist war. There 
is a particularly strong current of socialist pacifism running through the early days of 
32 33 SCF. Dr Hector Munro, Bradford GP and Independent Labour Party candidate, 
persuaded Robert Smillie, President of the Miners' Federation of Great Britain to make the 
opening appeal. The Miners' Federation then made a donation of j 10,000.34 
Combined with these liberal or socialist values was a growing sense of internationalism. 
Liberal supporters of the League of Nations had strong associations with SCF. These 
included Gilbert Murray, future President of the League of Nations Union. 35 The 
pacificism of these liberal internationalists contrasted with the pacifist socialist 
internationalists, as is clearly shown in this letter from Gilbert Murray written to Eglantyne 
Jebb when she was secretary of the Fight the Famine Council. 
Would you be so kind as to let me know what signatures you have got before you 
print my name as signing the Blockade Memorial. Certain complications have 
30 Clark, H., 'Notes on Principles of Relief Work-', Bulletin ofthe Save the Children Fund: Central Union 
(Union Internationale de Secours aux Enfants), Vol. I No. 17,30 June 1920. 
31 'The severity of the punishment inflicted by successive terms of imprisonment is in sinister contrast with 
the national appeal for a higher standard of right and justice, and negatives any claim we may make to 
maintain the supreme test of Civil Liberty, vis., the determination to give full protection to an unpopular 
minority at a time of national excitement. ' Cripps 1936,121. 
32 It is hard to distinguish between socialist pacificists and pacifists. Ceadel suggests that 'the distinction lay, 
in effect, in differing conceptions of socialism. In contrast with the materialistic philosophy of the war- 
resister, who saw the socialist cause in terms of a struggle for social and economic power, the socialist 
pacifist believed that a socialist brotherhood would necessitate change in individual moral values. It was at 
this more fundamental level that -%var was incompatible with socialist values. ' Many socialist pacifists were 
Christian rather than political in their inspiration. See Ceadel 1980,47-49. 
33 Dr Hector Munro (1869-1949), opposed the war and set up a private ambulance service in Belgium 
ferrying wounded soldiers from the front to field hospitals. He was SCIF representative in Hungary and 
Austria. 
34 This was later increased to a total donation of f 30,000 to SCF. 
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turned out concerning the League of Nations, in regard to which, as you know, I 
occupy a semi-official position. I do not want to take a line on the blockade which 
would seem to place me in what is called the extreme pacifist group. I can express 
my opinion privately, but members of the Union have a right to object to the 
chainnan taking a very strong line in public on controversial politics. 
If I have to withdraw my name from the Memorial I will write a separate letter to 
the press protesting again the blockade in my own language, so that even at the 
worst I shall not entirely leave you in the lurch. 36 
The 'extreme' pacifist group was most strongly represented by some of the women who 
gave SCF their support. Members of the Women's International League for Peace and 
Freedom (WILPF) had not only encouraged the free circulation of information between 
women during the war, but also tried to meet directly with women from allied, neutral and 
enemy countries. In the midst of the war they had staged a Women's Peace Congress at 
The Hague where a few women from allied countries met with women from Germany and 
Austria on the neutral territory of the Netherlands. 37 The first message to be delivered at 
the Albert Hall meeting of the Fight the Famine Council was from Jane Addams 38 sent on 
behalf of the second Women's Peace Congress taking place in Paris. 
35 Established November 1918, see Birn, D. S. L. 1981. TheLeague ofNations Union, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press. 
36 Letter to Eglantyne Jebb, Secretary of the Fight the Famine Council, SCF Archives reference SC/EJ. 238, 
15 June 1919. 
37 Winston Churchill at the Admiralty 'closed' the North Sea to British shipping for the whole period of the 
1915 Women's Peace Congress to prevent any British women from attending. Oldfield 1984,192. 
38 Jane Addams (1860-1935), founded Hull House in Chicago, where she worked to secure social justice in 
housing, factory inspection, female suffrage, and the cause of pacifism. She was awarded the Nobel Peace 
Prize in 193 1. 
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Mary Sheepshanks, fon-ner editor of Itts Suffragii, served as secretary to the Fight the 
Famine Council after Dorothy Buxton. She had kept faith with internationalism throughout 
the First World War. In her signed editorial for Ius Suffragii of October 1914 she wrote: 
What is the boasted patriotism which started and supports the European war? First 
of all, pride. Each Great Power has encouraged national pride at the expense of 
humanity; each big nation feeds its children on pride in its fancied superiority in 
intelligence, culture, freedom or tradition. To assert and spread this superiority by 
39 force becomes a national ideal... 
Both Dorothy Buxton and Mary Sheepshanks came from a different tradition within the 
anti-war movement from the majority of women associated with the founding of SCF who 
were proud patriots. The pre-war movement for women's suffrage had been split between 
the internationalists and the patriots. 40 The latter considered the war to be just and were 
keen to apply their skills to the national war effort. A number who gained wartime 
experience of relief work later formed a cadre of trained workers for SCF. I describe them 
as patriotic humanitarians. 41 The most prominent among them were members of the 
Scottish Women's Hospitals for Foreign Service. 
'9 Oldfield 1984,18 1. 
40 This tension has attracted a great deal of scholarly interest, see for example Vellacott, J. 1988. 'Women, 
Peace and Internationalism, 1914-1920s: 'Finding New Words and Creating New Methods' ', in Chatfield, 
C. and van den Dungen, P., eds, 1988. Peace Afovenients and Political Cultures, Knoxville: University of 
Tennessee Press, 106-124. 
41 These patriotic humanitarians had more in common with people who held defencist or pacificist beliefs and 
had seen active military service, than with pacifist humanitarians like Dr Hector Munro. 
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At the outbreak of war Dr Elsie Inglis proposed to the Federated Suffrage Societies of 
Scotland 'to equip a hospital... staffed entirely by women - if not required at home, to be 
sent abroad'. 42 She received their support. The British War Office saw differently, and 
refused the women's offer of service. Dr Inglis therefore contacted the Foreign Offices of 
the other allies. By the end of the war there were fourteen fully equipped field hospitals 
staffed by women of the Scottish Women's Hospitals for Foreign Service. The Scottish 
Women, who included women from the rest of Britain and the Dominions, served 
alongside almost every allied army or Red Cross except the British. They formed a cadre 
of women with valuable medical skills, practised in the logistics of relief, and inured to all 
discomfort and danger. It was amongst the Serbs that much of their finest work was done. 
In 1915, when the Serbs were under attack from both the Austro-Germans and the 
Bulgarians, and allied support was unforthcoming, some of the Scottish Women 
accompanied the Serbian anny in their retreat to Albania and others stayed behind the lines 
to be taken prisoner-of-war. A number of the women died in Serbia, primarily of typhoid, 
and memorials were raised to them by the Serbs. 43 
The women who worked in Serbia during the war exemplify the professional paths open to 
the relief workers who were later to act as partners with SCF. Francesca Wilson, who 
worked with Serbs both in Serbia and in refugee camps in Corsica and Tunisia, moved 
42 Record of Committee meeting of 12 August in Krippner, M. 1980. The Quality ofAlercy: JVonlen at Mar, 
Serbia 1915-1918, London: David and Charles, 29. 
43 In the 1980s there was still a fountain dedicated to Dr Elsie Inglis in Mladenovac and a small street named 
after Lady Paget in Belgrade (Krippner 1980,92 and 160). The respect between the Scottish Women and the 
Serbian people was apparently mutual: 'They are a phenomenal people - hardy, tough, and enduring and, 
when ill, trusting and uncomplaining. They are ideal patients. ' (Krippner 1980,55). 
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from one theatre of war to another. 44 Others worked only in one country, and developed a 
deep local knowledge and enduring attachment to a particular people. Dr Katherine 
MacPhail worked for 35 years in Serbia. She established the Anglo-Yugoslav Children's 
Hospital at Kamenica which was then supported by SCF. In recognition of her work she 
was elected an honorary citizen of Sremska Kamenica and a life president of the 
Yugoslavian Red Cross. 45 
A third path is represented by women who gained field experience, and then returned to 
Britain to become policy makers within SCF. Prior to the First World War Nina Boyle was 
an outspoken supporter of women's suffrage. During the war she went to work with 
destitute children in Serbia. Following the war she approached SCF for funds for the Uzice 
orphanage in Serbia and eventually returned to Britain and became a long-serving member 
of SCF Council. 46 
Biographies reveal that many of the people associated with the foundation of SCIF were 
tied together by family or marriage or church membership, and had common interests 
through their political, academic, or humanitarian careers. Some already had institutional 
links through organizations such as the Quakers, the Independent Labour Party, the League 
of Nations Union, the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom and the 
Scottish Women's Hospitals for Foreign Service. These social solidarities gave additional 
impetus to the new movement. 
44 Wilson, F. M. 1920. Portraits and Sketches ofSerbia, London: Swarthmore Press. Francesca Wilson later 
worked in France, Austria, Russia, Spain and Germany. She wrote her own memoirs: - 1944. In the 
Alargins of Chaos: Recollections ofRelief Mork in and betiveen Three Mars, London: John Murray, as well 
as a biography of Eglantyne Jebb: - 1967 (see note 3). 
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The leadership of two sisters 
The spotlight is now turned to the values and actions of the two sisters who led the 
movement. The two sisters possessed in differing degrees several of the characteristics 
already identified among SCF's earliest supporters. They both wrote explicitly about their 
quest for spiritual and moral conversion. They were individualistic and internationalist in 
their outlook, and they had the somewhat contradictory experience of patriotic 
humanitarian action. When they founded SCIF they could draw upon a pool of people with 
similar values and practical skills to give SCIF support. Dorothy Buxton was, in her son's 
words, 'politically minded, and somewhat fanatical', whereas Eglantyne Jebb was 
'charismatic'. 47 It was Eglantyne Jebb who had the organizational vision to turn those 
loosely knit social solidarities into a contentious social movement. 
Dorothy Buxton was someone who felt compelled to shoulder all the problems of the 
world. She was an idealist in all senses, including someone out of touch with the reality 
that the majority take for granted. She made her quest for personal and social 
transfon-nation a public one. She left the Church of England to become a Quaker, and she 
withdrew her support for the Liberal Party in favour of the Independent Labour Party. Her 
long life (1881-1963) is a catalogue of initiatives borne of a strong sense of injustice. She 
took every opportunity to get her views into print, including on such controversial subjects 
45 '1919-1969 Yugoslavia', The World's Children, Vol. 49 No. 2, Summer 1969,29-3 1. 
46 Nina Boyle (1865-1943). See obituary in The World's Children, Vol. 23 No. 3, Summer 1943,34. 
47 Save the Cbildren Oral History, Iriterview with David Buxton, 22 June 1993. 
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as her support for Bolshevism. 48 Her most lasting and unpopular cause was the welfare of 
Germans. In the First World War (and again in the Second World War) she fought for the 
welfare of Gennan internees within the UK. The papers connected with Dorothy Buxton 
which survive in the SCIF archives, 49 and the memories of people who knew her well, 50 
give the impression of someone who could not be contained by an organization and did her 
best work freelance. The initiative she took with 'Notes from the Foreign Press' was 
exceptional in that she succeeded both in wielding influence and in persuading an effective 
team to gather round her and put her ideas into practice. 
Three days after Dorothy Buxton had made the dramatic gesture at the Albert Hall of 
holding up the tin of milk, the Fight the Famine Council took the decision to separate the 
two committees of SCF and the Fight the Famine Council and allow the Council to 
51 'develop on lines of international reconciliation' and 'leave relief work' to SCF. 
As the first Honorary Secretary of SCF Dorothy Buxton was indefatigable in her letter- 
writing campaigns in the pages of The Manchester Guardian. For example, after Lord 
Robert Cecil had taken the chair at a meeting of the Supreme Economic Council in May, 
which approved the plan to ensure a close blockade on Gen-nany, she wrote: 
Two months ago you exhorted your country men to play a noble part in the rescue 
of nations. You spoke of a new era of 'international confidence and cooperation', 
48 Buxton, D. 1928. The Challenge ofBolshevism: A New Social Ideal, London: George Allen and Unwin. 
49 SCIF Archives reference SC/DB. 
50 See obituary by Mosa Anderson in The World's Children, Vol. 43 No. 2, June 1963,45, and Save the 
Children Oral History, Interview with David Buxton, 22 June 1993. 
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and now you are supporting a policy expressive of national egoism and hatred and 
a destructive purpose more far-reaching than history has ever recorded or in our 
wildest imagining we have ever conceived. 52 
Notes in the Buxton family papers suggest that Dorothy also drafted letters published in 
the Manchestei- Guardian on 27 June 1919 headed 'Labour and the Treaty', 53 on 2 July 
headed 'Philanthropy and the Blockade' 54 and on 4 July headed 'The Treaty and the 
Blockade' from representatives of the peace movement. 55 These letters demonstrate the 
wide contacts she had across the anti-war movement, both with pacifists as well as 
pacificists. Despite having made the plea for practical help, Dorothy Buxton was above all 
a campaigner for international reconciliation rather than an organizer of relief work. 
Within months she retired from the position of Honorary Secretary of SCF in order to 
dedicate herself to the economic aspects of war and responding to enquiries as to the 
effects of the famine. 
51 Minute recorded at the committee meeting of the Fight the Famine Council (22 May 1919) The Recorcl 
Vol. 3 No. 1. 
52 'Economic Situation of Germany. Open letter to Lord Robert Cecil sent by Mrs C. R. Buxton', The 
Manchestei- Guardian, 12 June 1919. 
53 Signed by Robert Smillie, Robert William, C. T. Cramp, J. Bron-dey, George Lansbury. 
54 Signed by Lord Parmoor, Noel Buxton, Kate Courtney of Penwith, Barbara Ayrton Gould, Evelyn Sharp. 
55 Edward Backhouse, Hon. Secretary, Peace Committee of the Society of Friends; Annie Besant, President, 
National Home Rule League (India); Oliver Dryer, General Secretary, Fellowship of Reconciliation; Barbara 
Ayr-ton Gould, Hon. Secretary, Women's International League; Carl Heath, Secretary, National Peace 
Council; Albert Inkpen, Secretary, British Socialist Party; B. N. Langdon Davies, Secretary, National Council 
for Civil Liberties; Margaret Llewelyn Davies; J. M. McTavish; E. D. More], Secretary, Union of Democratic 
Control; George Peverett, Secretary, National Adult School Union; Marion Phillips, Secretary, Standing Joint 
Committee of Industrial Women's Organizations; Philip Snowden, Chairman, Independent Labour Party; 
James Fowler Shone, Hon. Secretary, League for World Friendship; Walter Walsh, Free Religious 
Movement. 
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Eglantyne Jebb and the foundation myth of SCF 
Within the next two years the political position of SCIF was so defined that it is doubtful 
whether someone like Dorothy Buxton could have remained the spokeswoman for the 
organization. 
The policy of the Save the Children Fund, now as always is to abstain most 
carefully from all political questions. Our relief work during the past two years has 
not been intended as a vote of confidence in any of the govenunents of the 
territories where we have operated [ ... ] We do not, we can not, ask the hungry child 
what views its parents have on the political and economic questions of the day ... 
56 
The secretaryship of SCIF had passed to her older sister, Eglantyne Jebb. It is around the 
life of Eglantyne Jebb (1876-1928) that the myth of the foundation of SCIF has been 
woven. Tom Buchanan has argued that organizations tend to develop an abbreviated 
account of when and why they were created. This then is adopted by the mass membership 
in myth form. The myth furnishes a benchmark definition of guiding principles that 
transcend formal constitutions and policy documents. Internal debates about future 
direction can then take the fonn, 'what would Eglantyne Jebb have done in these 
circumstances? '. Such myths tend to emphasize the extraordinary personality and vision of 
the founder. In the case of Eglantyne Jebb, she was endowed with wisdom enough to see 
56 The Record, Vol. 2 No. 2, I October 1921,2 1. From an article on 'Politics and Charity' published at the 
height of the Russian Famine when sections of the British press were challenging SCF's work. 
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what now appears obvious, but which no one else had stated so clearly. 57 Her early death 
and aesthetic appearance reinforced the impression of saintly othenvorldliness. 58 
The first significant date in the abbreviated history of SCF is 15 May 1919. On this day 
Eglantyne Jebb appeared at Mansion House on a summons relating to the publication of a 
leaflet. The leaflet showed a picture of two starving children and demanded the lifting of 
the blockade, in the name of the Fight the Famine Council. Her technical offence was that 
the name of the author and the printer were not included on the leaflet and that it had not 
been submitted to the censors. Eglantyne Jebb's defence was conciliatory. According to the 
Daily Herald report: 
Miss Eglantine Jebb [sic] expressed regret that the 'Fight the Famine Council' had 
been associated with this affair, as the bishops and others mentioned had not given 
their sanction. She also regretted having involved the Labour Press, but she had not 
broken the law. 
59 
Eglantyne Jebb was fined f5 without costs. A month later she retold the story as she 
wanted it remembered for posterity. This version revealed her sense of individual mission 
and was also an appeal for others to join her in a powerful social movement. She described 
herself as drawing inspiration from the self-sacrifice of the heroine Edith Cavell, who as a 
British nurse living in Belgium had tended friend and foe alike in 1914 and 1915. Edith 
57 ,A large part of the general public in Britain at that times [sic] was almost, by present day standards, 
almost inconceivably hostile to the very idea of helping enemy people, even if they were children. ' Save the 
Children Oral History, Interview with David Buxton, 22 June 1993. 
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Cavell was executed by the Germans for helping Belgian and allied fugitives to escape 
capture. Her body was returned to Britain in 1919.60 
While the prosecution was taking place inside the Mansion House, Edith Cavell's 
funeral was taking place outside. Her message rang in my mind. Can we not accept 
it? Let us have 'no hatred nor bitterness towards anyone', and carry this teaching 
into practical effect by rescuing the perishing children and thus associate the 
memory of an heroic saver of life with a movement which we might make into the 
greatest life-saving movement the world has ever seen. 61 
For some of the people associated with the early days of SCF, it was a minor channel for 
their energies, a temporary diversion to provide immediate relief to children who shared 
responsibility for neither the horrors of war nor the injustices of the peace. Some of these 
people channelled their major efforts into intergovernmental organizations such as the 
League of Nations. Others worked through non-governmental organizations such as the 
League of Nations Union, and the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. 
However, Eglantyne Jebb. was single-minded in her determination to put children first. Her 
definition of SCF as a single-issue organization was a strategic choice: she saw children as 
having an urgent claim upon the rest of humanity and set out to make SCIF the most 
effective instrument for saving children from suffering, wherever they might be. 
58 Personal correspondence with Tom Buchanan, Rewley House, Oxford. See also Schein, E. H. 1997. 
Organizational Culture and Leadership, San Francisco: Jossy Bass, 20. 
59 Daily Herald, 16 May 1919. 
60 Edith Cavell (1865-1914). A nurse from Norfolk, she became matron of the Berkendael Institute in 
Brussels in 1907. Her body was returned from Belgium for burial in 1919. Her last words were reported by 
the chaplain to be 'patriotism is not enough, that one must love all men and hate none', see Felstead, S. T. 
1940?. Edith Cavell: The Crinie that Shook the World, London: George Ne-, vnes Ltd, 185. 
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Where she derived this conviction from is hard to say. Her life preceding her involvement 
with SCIF was a series of short-lived endeavours curtailed by frail health. 62 Although, like 
many of her contemporaries she was engaged in a spiritual and moral quest, and found 
much she admired in the beliefs of the Baha'i, 63 her Christian faith was deep and 
unshakeable. Her humanitarianism was religiously inspired. She was at ease making 
appeals as a Christian to other Christians, and found solace in writing religious poetry. As 
a Christian she put loyalty to humanity above loyalty to church or state, but despite this 
nonconformist attitude she remained a member of the Church of England. In a sen-non 
preached in St Peter's, Geneva, on Sunday 10 August 1924 she declared: 
Again, this suffering is unnecessary. It is not the result of some great natural 
cataclysm, it was never the intention of God: it is the will of the wicked world 
which has decreed that refugee children should perish of hunger and disease, that 
orphans should be cast adrift upon the world, that parents should suffer the 
excruciating tonnent of watching their children ruined before their eyes, while 
lacking all possible means of saving them. But, believe me, there is no child which 
has died or has lost its health or its character through the privations inflicted upon it 
but God will demand the life of that child at our hands. 64 
61 Jebb, E. 'Rescue the Perishing', Publication unknown, SCIF Archives reference SC/DB, 21 May 1919. 
62 After studying history at Lady Margaret Hall, Oxford University, Eglantyne Jebb trained as a teacher at 
Stockwell College, but taught forjust one year. She also took part in a survey of social conditions in 
Cambridge. 
63 See citation of Baha'ullah in Buxton D., ed., 1929. Save the Child! A posthinnous essaj,, London: Weardale 
Press, 29. 
6' 'The Claims of the Children', The World's Childi-en, Vol. 9 No. 8, May 1929,143. 
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While Eglantyne Jebb believed in a vengeful God she was not a fatalist: humanity had 
been given free will, and the creation of a world without suffering depended on the use to 
which this gift was put. Her optimism that humanity would be successful in bringing about 
a world without suffering, like her universalism, derived both from her religious faith and 
her confidence in science. She did not demarcate the world of facts from the world of 
values. To her mind they were mutually reinforcing. In common with many of her 
contemporaries in social reform movements, Eglantyne Jebb believed that the people of the 
twentieth century, unlike their predecessors, had been blessed with the power to find 
scientific solutions to their problems. 65 
All through the ages we should trace a path of blood and tears where multitudes of 
our fellow-men had been consigned to unthinkable miseries. Does it mean nothing 
to us that now, at last, we have it in our power to bring these miseries to an end? 
Now, at last, in our age we can purify ourselves from a criminal complicity with 
disease, degradation, and death; now, at last, we can open the gates of life to toiling 
millions. 
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In the view of Eglantyne Jebb every child, whatever its race, creed, or politics, had a 
special claim upon the rest of humanity. This reflected the symbolic importance of God 
made man in the form of a vulnerable child in Christianity. The first emblem of SCIF was 
one of the Andrea della Robbia plaques which decorated the hospital for abandoned 
65 Weindling, P. 1994. 'From Sentiment to Science: Children's Relief Organizations and the Problem of 
Malnutrition in Inter-War Europe', in Disasters: The Journal ofDisaster Studies and Alanagement, Vol. 18 
No. 3, September 1994,203-212. 
66 Buxton 1929, viii. 
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children in Florence. Her universalism was not only inspired by her religious convictions; 
she also drew on the arguments of contemporary science. In an article entitled 
'International Responsibility for Child Welfare' Eglantyne Jebb wrote: 
The distinguishing characteristic of the thought of the present age is the increased 
recognition of the unity of mankind. Science has demonstrated that all forms of life 
are connected. 
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The overriding importance of universalism to Eglantyne Jebb is reflected in the way she 
developed the organization of SCF. She was above all a seeker after humanitarian 
collaboration. Whereas the writings of other people engaged in international relief work 
revealed a passion and curiosity aroused by the diversity within humanity, 68 Eglantyne 
Jebb, the strategist and organizer, stressed its unity. 
At the same time as stressing its unity, she believed humanity had the power to change the 
world over time. Children were not mere defenceless victims but also a new generation and 
powerful agents of this change. Her utilitarian understanding of children as the generation 
and hence creators of the future was summed up in the cartoon specially drawn for The 
Record by David Low. 69 
67 The Morld's Children, Vol. 8 No. 1, October 1927,4. 
68 Francesca Wilson narrated her o%%m experience of relief work as an adventure or a voyage of discovery 
rather than a period of service, see Wilson 1944. 
69 'The Question of the Hour', The Record ofthe Save the Children Fund, Vol. I No. 18,1 August 1921,283. 
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Eglantyne Jebb has been identified as a pacifist and her writing after the First World War 
reflects a religious and utilitarian pacifism: war was incompatible with her Christian faith 
and its results could neverjustify its use. However, she also had experienced patriotic 
humanitarianism which reflected a more pacificist stance. During her visit to the Balkans 
on behalf of the Macedonian Relief Fund in 1913 she had defended the right of small 
nations to take up anns to fight their oppressors. 70 Like others in the anti-war movement, 
she saw no contradiction in working for peace in close cooperation with people -vvho had 
engaged in active military service and held pacificist or defencist views. 71 Eglantyne Jebb 
made herself an advocate of the child first and foremost, and second an advocate of peace. 
According to her nephew she would not have wanted to be asked to define her ideas about 
peace and war. 'She saw too many sides to problems ... she would not have liked to 
commit herself either to any political party or to any definite statement about pacifism. ' 72 
If Eglantyne Jebb's views were characterized by ambivalence, this was because she 
embraced both one principle and another. She also intended to reach out to as many 
possible supporters as possible. There were bound to be tensions between the values she 
espoused and between the people she reached out to. These tensions were made more acute 
by the depth of her engagement in and with the world. It is these tensions between 
competing values and interest groups which are at the heart of the history of SCIF which is 
told in later chapters. 
70 Personal communication Rodney Breen, SCIF Archivist 1991-1999,26 April 1999. 
71 See the founding brothers of Service Civil International, of which International Voluntary Service for 
Peace, was the British branch. 'It is symbolic of this comprehensiveness and inclusiveness that Pierre 
Ceresole, the consistent and 'absolute' pacifist, and his brother Ernest, the Colonel in the Swiss Army, should 
have been sincere collaborators in building up the movement. ' Best E. and Pike B., eds, 1948. Intenzational 
Voluntary Service for Peace 1920-1946: A Histoiy of Work in Many Countriesfor the Benefit ofDistressed 
Communities andfor the Reconciliation ofthe Peoples, London: George Allen and Unwin, 133. 
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This history begins in the next chapter with Eglantyne Jebb's endeavour to make the world 
a better place for children. During her lifetime she combined universalism with a utilitarian 
eye to the future, and underpinned them with an indomitably optimistic pacificism. All 
three guiding principles were necessary to refute the objections of sceptics. In her 
posthumous essay Save the Child! she cited the example of Johann PestaloZZi, 
73 
who had 
faced opposition when he opened a home for eighty children in 1798 following war in 
Switzerland. 
Thus there are always two elasses of people who are prepared to take sides against 
the humanitarian view of a Pestalozzi: there are those who do not believe that the 
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children are worth saving, and those who do not believe that they can be saved . 
In her view children were worth saving on two counts: in themselves and as the key to the 
future, and she was convinced her generation had, for the first time in the history of 
humanity, the power to save them. 
72 Save the Children Oral History, Interview with David Buxton, 22 June 1993. 
73 Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi (1746-1827), Swiss pioneer of mass education. 
74 Buxton 1929,5. 
39 
Chapter 2 
WITHIN THE LIFETIME OF EGLANTYNE JEBB (1919-1928) 
When SCIF was launched, a great many sympathizers and supporters thought the attempt to 
raise money would be a fiasco. They were proved wrong. ' There are several events of near 
mythical proportions related to early fundraising which continue to inspire SCF volunteers. 
The story of the barrels of clothes set afloat off the Pitcairn Islands and destined for SCF is 
2 
retold many times in the SCFjournal. So too, is the story of Eglantyne Jebb's audience 
with the Pope. 
The International Point of View 
In 1919 Eglantyne Jebb went over the heads of the Protestant bishops of her own national 
church, to appeal to the Pope. War cut across the loyalties and solidarity of his flock, and 
therefore placed the Pope, as leader of the universalistic religion of Roman Catholicism, in 
a difficult position. The humanitarian initiatives Benedict XV took during the First World 
War are little known. His work on behalf of prisoners has been compared with the work of 
1 Save the Children Oral History, Interview with David Buxton, 22 June 1993. 
2 'One day in September 192 1, a message from the postmaster at Cristobal in the Canal Zone was received at 
the Fund's London headquarters. It read as follows: "The S. S. East Wind arriving from the South Seas has 
discharged two boxes and five barrels at this port, the master of the ship advising me that he took them 
aboard at Pitcairn Island, after having been signalled by the natives to stop. The address, to Lord Weardale, 
of the Save the Children Fund, in London, England, would indicate that they are of a purely charitable 
nature. " Another ship, the SS Loch Katrine, brought the two boxes and five barrels to London and later a 
letter came explaining this mysterious gift from the South Seas. 
"I read your appeal" - wrote the church treasurer, Mr McCoy - "and the vote to have a collection for the 
suffering children was unanimous. We have the clothing ready and God will open a way to get it to you. You 
%vill find many varieties for when we barter for clothing with passing ships we take anything we can get... but 
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3 
the ICRC, and in a move close in spirit to the work of SCIF fie appealed in October 1916 
to the US government for food assistance for the children of Belgium. 4 Eglantyne Jebb 
judged that an appeal to Pope Benedict on behalf of all the children in Europe would not 
fall on deaf ears, and she was right. The Pope issued an encyclical asking for collections 
for the relief of children in Europe, whatever their religion, in all churches on Holy 
Innocents Day, 28 December 1919. The encyclical was repeated the following year. The 
Archbishop of Canterbury followed the Pope's example, and this has become a celebrated 
example ofjoint action in both Catholic and Protestant, and Greek Orthodox Churches. 
The Papal recognition did much to turn SCIF into an international organization with 
international funding. 
These two stories reveal contrasting elements of Eglantyne Jebb's vision of SCF as an 
organization. She made few pronouncements about her vision of government or society, 
but her writings have left a detailed blueprint for SCF. She saw it as a movement with local 
centres, as far flung as the Pitcairn Islands, and an international centre which would 
provide leadership not only to all its supporters, but also to heads of state. She saw SCIF as 
continuing a tradition of humanitarian neutrality begun by the international work- of 
individuals such as Johann Pestalozzi and organizations such as the ICRC. Reports from 
Austria by Frdd6ric Ferri&re, Vice President of the ICRC, were vital influences upon the 
founders of SCF. Eglantyne Jebb was also a close friend of Suzanne Ferri6re, Fr6d6ric 
we feel ready to share it with our brethren for whom Christ died, who are really destitute and more needy 
than ourselves. " ' The World's Children, Vol. 39 No. 1, Spring 1959,16. 
3 Decree published in L'OsseiTatore Romano of 23 December 1914, providing for 'spiritual and material 
assistance to prisoners', see Pollard, JR 1999. The Unknown Pope: Benedict XV (1914-1922) and the 
Pursuit ofPeace, London: Geoffrey Chapman, 113. 
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Ferri&e's niece, and the two women maintained a correspondence fired with enthusiasm 
for the task of helping children across the political divide. 
It was with the patronage of the ICRC that, less than a year after the foundation of SCF, 
the Union Internationale de Secours aux Enfants (UISE) was created on 5 January 1920. 
The new union was launched in Geneva in the Salle de I'Ath6nde which had been the site 
for the creation of the ICRC over fifty years before. 5 All the funds raised in response to the 
appeal by the Pope were then channelled through the international body of UISE to 
demonstrate that they were not destined for children of any particular nationality. 
It was still not clear at this stage whether SCIF and UISE would have a long term role, or 
whether they would, like the Fight the Famine Council, be wound up after meeting a 
temporary need. Eglantyne Jebb's correspondence with Suzanne Ferri&e demonstrates that 
she was thinking strategically about the development of an organization with a long-tenn 
future. A strong centre, independent of local agencies, would have the capacity to 'promote 
and extend the movement and keep it on the right lines'. 6 She became more and more 
insistent on the importance of UISE over and above the national organizations as time 
went by. She deplored what she called the 'National Point of View'. In 1926 in an article 
on 'The Future of the Save the Children Fund' she wrote: 
4 The Vatican was involved in a number of operations aimed at providing foodstuffs for populations in or 
behind the war zones. A few examples are Lithuania; Montenegro in both 1916 and 1917; Poland in 1916; 
Russian refugees in 1916; and Syria and Lebanon from 1916 to 1922. See Pollard 1999,115. 
5 Moorehead, C. 1998. Dunant's Dream: War, Switzerland, and the Histoiy of the Red Cross, London: 
Harper Collins, 28 1. 
6 SCF Archives reference SC/SF/20,15 October 1923. 
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This point of view appears based upon the conviction that foreign work is only 
possible at times of great crisis, but that in between the crises there is a great deal 
of work- which may usefully be carried out in the national field 
My personal conclusion is therefore that it would be better to sacrifice any other 
branch of our work rather than our continuous international relief and that if it is 
impossible to maintain this, it might be better now to liquidate our work. It may 
also be pointed out that were the opinions of those who hold the national point of 
view to prevail, the quickest and best way to carry them into effect would no doubt 
be to liquidate and to let a new society be started upon quite different lines. 
Eglantyne Jebb recognized that not all the partner organizations with which SCIF worked 
would share this strong sense of internationalism, and recommended that UISE adopt 
stricter rules of affiliation. 
in spite of the immediate gains to be derived from allying ourselves with 
societies inspired by a spirit of narrow nationalism, we should make no concessions 
or compromises but insist on admitting only those to the movement who genuinely 
share its principles of universal fraternity and of mutual help. 7 
A national organization could not reflect the principles of universalism and utilitarianism 
which Eglantyne Jebb believed were key to the salvation of the world's children. She was 
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not alone in this conviction, and a number of the colleagues who outlived her continued to 
promote these principles. Both her sister, Dorothy Buxton, and Edward Fuller, the editor of 
The Worlds Childi-en, were to have a much longer involvement with SCF. They cited the 
words of Eglantyne Jebb, %vhen the governments of the member organizations once again 
went to war, arguing that only if UISE were maintained would the international movement 
be sustained. 
Eglantyne Jebb demonstrated an extraordinary capacity in her first year with SCF to put 
into practice one of her own axioms. 'We must write out our belief in deeds before we can 
communicate this belief to others. '8 Grants were made to nine countries. However, she 
devoted as much time to securing her strategic vision of the future role of SCF as part of an 
international voluntary organization working on behalf of children worldwide, as she did to 
immediate relief work. 
Work in the defeated countries of Europe 
With the funds raised through the Fight the Famine Council and the Pope's appeal, SCF 
had the means to respond to reports coming from Vienna. Whereas during the war, reports 
had been accessible only in such publications as 'Notes from the Foreign Press', after the 
war both the government and the popular press received their own reports of conditions in 
the city. Whether conditions in Vienna were reported in the measured tones of the Dispatch 
7 Jebb, E. Memo on the Policy of1he SCF, Geneva, 9 July 1928, SCF Archives reference SC/EJ. 277. There is 
an undated comment pencilled in the margin of this document: 'but this [shared fraternal bonds] can't yet be 
found Balkan states eg? ' 
8 Jebb, E. Memorandum on ReliefPolicy, SCIF Archives reference SC/EJ. 282. 
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from the British Director of Relief to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs 9 or in the emotional tones of The Daily News, 10 it was clear that there was 
widespread suffering. However, who should be helped first and how, was a more 
contentious issue. 
In Rebuilding a Ruined World: Save the Children's beginnings in Vienna, 1919 Rodney 
Breen demonstrates how the early experiences of SCIF in Austria continued to have a 
powerful effect on the way in which SCF worked around the world in the 1990s, and on 
the cbaracteristicsvvbicb set SCF apart from other organizations working in similar 
fields. " Unlike other charities, SCIF did not discriminate between particular classes or 
national or religious groups. The guiding principle of universalism meant that children 
should be aided according to the extent of their needs. The second guiding principle of 
utilitarianism meant that this aid should also be given with an eye to the future. In Austria, 
SCF adopted the habit of working with the existing community and institutions rather than 
creating new ones. 
However, these experiences were gained within a particular political context. So many of 
SCF's activities have been coded as welfare, that their political significance has been 
neglected. 12 In the summer of 1919 the socialists assumed control over the administration 
of Vienna, and continued in power until February 1934. This municipal goverment was 
9 Goode, Sir W. 1920. Economic Conditions in Central Europe, Presented to Parliament by Command ofhIs 
Hajesty. SCF Archives reference SC/EJ. 242. 
10 The Daily News, 10 May 1920. 
" Breen, SCF Archive Paper No. 7, October 1995. 
12 Atina Grossman identifies this difficulty in terms of constructing notions of citizenship for women in the 
inter-war years. Grossman, Atina 1998. 'Social Experiments' in Gruber, 11. and Graves P., eds, 1998. Women 
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the prime partner for SCF. It moved quickly to invest more public resources in the 
expansion of clinics, family assistance programmes, and aid to children, as well as public 
sanitation. In the summer of 1920 Dr Julius Tandler became city councillor for welfare. 13 
He held the view that health and welfare were the right of every citizen. This meant a shift 
from reliance on private charitable organizations, to what Francesca Wilson has described 
as 'the best thought-out and organised single system in the world; a system in which 
children were looked after from the moment of their conception, right through youth'. 14 
The innovations of the Vienna municipality positioned Austria in the vanguard of socialist 
experimentation in Europe, and its very success worried the U. S. and British governments. 
Tandler's highly interventionist policies for child welfare brought socialist ideas into every 
home.. He thus antagonized both the Church and the Christian Socialist party on the 
domestic front. Oral histories from working class families demonstrate that individuals 
also resented unasked-for interference in their lives. 15 As a partner with the municipality, 
SCIF was implicated in these conflicts, both international and domestic. 
SCF's universalist decision to assist those in greatest need placed it alongside the socialists 
within this political context. At the same time, the Quakers decided to discriminate against 
children in working-class families in favour of children in middle-class families. 
and Socialism, Socialism and Momen: Europe between the Two JVorld Mars, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 51- 
56. 
13 Dr Tandler was imprisoned in February 1934, and upon his release went to China where he died. 
14 Wilson 1944,138. 
15 Gruber, H. 1998. 'The "New Woman": Realities and Illusions of Gender Equality in Red Vienna' in 
Gruber and Graves 1998,56-95 (p. 67). 
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The future of the state seems to depend on both intellectual and manual workers 
being maintained in a state of efficiency [ ... ] It seems to us better to secure a 
minimum of subsistence for this class rather than choose first the poorest as the 
recipients of our help. 16 
This concern for ensuring social stability was also evident in the Commonwealth Fund, 
founded in October 1918, in sponsoring feeding programmes for the children of the 
intellectual classes in Warsaw, Budapest and Vienna. 17 
However, SCF's work was not only designed to meet the immediate physical needs of 
children. It also had the utilitarian aim of preparing them for adulthood. One of its most 
enduring undertakings was support for training schools for teenagers run by Julia Vajkai in 
Budapest. She identified a gap in provision for children between the ages of twelve, when 
they ceased going to school, and fourteen, when they could first be apprenticed to a trade. 
This work broke with the tradition of child welfare which saw children as vulnerable and 
dependent. It recognized that as children grew up they assumed economic and social 
responsibilities, and that older brothers and sisters might have young children who were 
dependent upon them. The schools were established with a creche for younger children. 
All the children were provided with one meal a day, while the elder children were taught 
occupations which assisted the schools to be self-supporting. 18 
16 Clark, H., 'Notes on Principles of Relief Work', Bulletin of1he Save the Children Fznzd. ý Centi-al Union, 
Vol. I No. ] 7,30 June 1920. 
17 Weindling 1994,205. 
"' It was the Theosophist Action Lodge Famine Relief Fund that first gave assistance to Madame Vajkai 
enabling her to establish vocational schools for children between the ages of twelve and fourteen. Dr 
Armstrong Smith then appealed on her behalf for aid from SCF, and the Hungarian school became one of 
SCF's longest running projects for young people. 
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In Vienna, SCF worked in partnership with a municipal govermnent which already had a 
programme for the development of child welfare. In Hungary, Julia Vajkai developed 
schools forjuvenile offenders with the Ministry of Justice. In Serbia, by contrast, no 
recognizable child welfare institutions existed. Here, SCIF encouraged the growth of 
indigenous institutions. Eglantyne Jebb rejoiced in the way in which a Yugoslav 
government department for child welfare came into being 'as in a sense the outcome of the 
war'. 19 She interpreted developments in Austria, Hungary, and Serbia as a testimony of the 
governments' humanitarian commitment to children, not as evidence of the spread of 
socialism. 
Eglantyne Jebb had an optimistic faith in the capacity of every population to fulfil a double 
duty: to its own children and to those abroad. She attributed this capacity as much to the 
Austrian, Hungarian or Serbian population as to the British. In this spirit of reciprocity, 
Julia Vajkai was invited from Hungary to Britain to make a study ofjuvenile employment 
published under the title Through Hungarian Eyes in 1928. 
As Rodney Breen points out, there is a tailpiece to the story which confirmed Eglantyne 
Jebb's faith. 20 In 1926 the General Strike collapsed after a week but the miners maintained 
strike action. When the British miners and their families were facing great hardship, help 
came from the City Council of Vienna. Just as the miners had sent help to Vienna's 
19 SCF Archives reference SC/EJ. 240. 
20 It serves as confirmation for her faith only if the inspiration behind the gift was humanitarian and not if it 
was intended as a socialist gesture of solidarity with others in their struggle for social and economic power. 
48 
children when they were in need, the City Council voted a grant of fl, 000 to provide milk 
for the children of striking miners in South Wales. 21 
The public had sympathy for Austria, and even stronger sympathy for Serbia. 22 As an 
organization that depended on publicly raised funds, this could mean that SCIF priorities 
were decided by where the public wanted to send their money. Germany, where there was 
evidently great need, had the lowest level of public sympathy. This posed SCIF with a 
dilemma. SCF made its first grant to Germany on 14 June 1919. Its representative in 
23 Gennany was the practised campaigner and relief worker Emily Hobhouse. She drew 
SCF's attention to the condition of children in Leipzig. The records of the meeting of the 
SCIF Committee of Enquiry into the needs of Gennany held on 9 July 1920 demonstrate a 
keen awareness among the members present of the discrepancy between the level of public 
sympathy and the level of need. The Secretary to the Gennan Embassy had put the case for 
aid to Germany at meetings of the SCF Council, and on the basis of need Dorothy Buxton 
argued that SCF ought to increase the aid it was giving to Germany. However, support for 
Germany remained unpopular. In 1923 it prompted the resignation of one SCF Council 
member. 
24 
21 Similar stories of mutual help survive in the annals of International Voluntary Service for Peace - see Best 
and Pike 1948. 
22 SCF Archives reference SC/EJ. 242. 
23 Emily Hobhouse (1860-1926) is best known for her work during the Boer War in South Africa. In 1919 
she had begun her own initiative for children in Austria. For a few months she was appointed SCF 
representative for Austria and Germany. Together with Dr Sch-%vytzer from Switzerland she reported to SCF 
on conditions in Leipzig in September 1919. See Fry, R. 1929. EMily Hobhozise:, 4 Afeniolr, London: 
Jonathan Cape, 278. 
24 Sir William Grey Wilson tendered his resignation at the SCF Council Meeting, 6 July 1923. SCF Archives 
reference M 1/2 C. 264. 
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The Russian Famine 
By then SCIF had become involved in another political arena which would prove even 
more contentious with the British public: Bolshevik Russia. The political struggle between 
left and right which had been a subtext in the relief work in Red Vienna, made headlines 
with the response of SCF to the Russian Famine. This response provides clear historical 
lessons about the politicization of aid. It also demonstrated the logistical requirements of 
delivering large-scale relief According to Hugo Slim, the prototype in the history of the 
twentieth century's relief operations was the SCF response to the Russian Famine. 25 
The Russian Famine of 1921-22 was not simply a natural disaster, it was enmeshed with 
the politics of war. In the summer of 1921 there was a drought in the Volga region, and the 
harvests failed. This in itself was not unusual. Orlando Figes cites harvest failures in 1891- 
1892,1906 and 1911, and goes on to explain how, since they were accustomed to harvest 
failures, the peasants had always maintained large emergency stocks of grain, often in 
communal barns. During the civil War, peasants had seen their usual reserves requisitioned 
by the Bolsheviks, and begun to grow only enough for their subsistence needs. When the 
harvest failed in 1920 they had no reserves. By the spring of 1921 Figes estimated that a 
quarter of the peasantry in Soviet Russia was starving. 26 Internationally Russia was subject 
to isolation, if not hostility. 
25 Slim, H. 1994. 'Children and Childhood in Emergency Practice 1919-1994' (editorial), A Special Issue to 
Mark the 75 th Anniversary of Save the Children (UK), Disasters: The Journal ofDisaster Studies and 
Management, Vol. ] 8. No. 3, September 1994,189-191 (p. 189). 
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By early 1921 reports were reaching SCF of the extent of the famine. Voldemar Wehrlin, a 
delegate of the ICRC and of UISE to Russia, had been granted pennission to enter the 
country and was engaged in the distribution of SCF food in Moscow. SCF's General 
Secretary, Lewis Golden, had been bom in Russia and still had family there. 27 He exerted 
personal pressure to bring the impending catastrophe to the agenda of the committee. 
Devising an appropriate response to these reports was a test of Eglantyne Jebb's political 
acumen. She sought to deliver aid in accordance with her principle of universalism and 
demonstrate impartiality, but as the correspondence between Eglantyne Jebb and her friend 
and colleague, Suzanne Ferri&re, reveals, she had to outmanoeuvre public opinion. She Nvas 
particularly concerned that if SCIF were to channel funds through the Quakers, as it had 
done in Vienna, it would be interpreted as a measure of support for the Bolsheviks: 
However, erroneously, the Quakers have acquired in this country a reputation for 
Bolshevik sympathies, & it is also widely supposed that even when they really wish 
to [crossed out: be impartial] do every thing we wanted, they would be very easily 
misled & that the supplies would not reach the children in their entirety. 
Feeling runs very high over here in regard to the relief of Bolshevik children - 
almost higher than in the case of German children. On our Committee I think the 
majority are anti-Bolshevik, a small minority oppose them, & some, including Lord 
26 See Figes, 0.1996. A People's Tragedy. - The Russian Revolution 1891-1924, London: Jonathan Cape, 
773-783. 
27 Lewis Bernard Golden (1878-1954), General Secretary SCIF 1919-37; member, Executive Committee, 
UISE; member, Hungarian Order of the Red Cross. Bom in Saratov, Russia, Lewis Golden was educated in 
Bath, Bonn and Moscow; General Manager, Anglo-Russian Trading Company; correspondent of the Daily 
Afail, Petrograd 1917-18; member of Anglo-Russian Commission (1917-18); on the staff of the Ministry of 
Information, London, 1918; and general secretary to Lady Muriel Paget's Mission to Czechoslovakia, 1919. 
51 
Weardale first & foremost, are genuinely neutral, as they ought to be, & quite 
impartial in the matter. 28 
Eglantyne Jebb made Suzanne Ferri&e her ally in cutting through the objections of the 
committee. She persuaded Suzanne Ferri&re that the grant for relief should be made to the 
Geneva-based UISE, and that UISE should then arrange for its administration by the 
Quakers 'which also is in no doubt the best way'. This way the committee would not be 
faced with a proposal to make a grant to the Quakers. 29 
In the summer of 1921 the Patriarch of Moscow launched an appeal to the West. In 
response, the joint committee of the ICRC and the League of Red Cross Societies 
summoned all interested parties to a meeting in Geneva on 15 August. An International 
Committee for Russian Relief was set up to coordinate the activities of the various relief 
organizations. Dr Fridtjof Nansen was invited to be its High Commissioner. The most 
severely hit province in Russia was Saratov. One bank- of the Volga was allocated to UISE, 
the other to the American Relief Administration (ARA) . 
30 By the summer of 1922, when 
its activities were at their height, ARA was feeding ten million people every day. SCIF was 
feeding 250,000 children. One year later the famine relief operation in Russia was wound 
up. 
28 SCF Archives reference SC/SF/3, II May 192 1. 
29 Quaker reports of how they were perceived give a different picture, 'A description of us [Quaker v., orkers] 
in a Russian official letter as "psychologically incapable of espionage", shows a perceptive, if a humorous, 
understanding of our position. ' Fry 1926,166. 
30 The ARA was founded as a result of war relief work in Belgium. It changed status from being a 
governmental to a voluntary organisation because of Hoover's agreement in July 1919 to food aid for the 
White Russian armies. Military medical and nursing personnel staffed the ARA. At the same time Hoover 
found an outlet for US wheat surpluses, establishing that solutions to the problems of famine should be 
coordinated with those of the economics of agriculture. See Weindling, P. 1994,203-212. 
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The ARA had Congressional funding and access to US grain surpluses. SCIF achieved an 
extraordinary level of funding for an organization that relied on public donations. Its 
success was due to its innovative use of advertising. Through her association with 'Notes 
from the Foreign Press' Eglantyne Jebb had already seen the power of the press to change 
public attitudes. SCIF became the first voluntary organization to harness the press for an 
advertising campaign. Eglantyne Jebb hired a professional publicist and from March 1920 
SCIF began placing full-page advertisements. The advertisements for contributions towards 
the alleviation of suffering in first Austria and then Russia made appeals to the potential 
donor's patriotism and Christian conscience, as well as their selfish desire for self- 
preservation. 
The whole world is threatened 
Disease and pestilence will spread - the winds will carry it over Continents and the 
millions of deaths will mount steadily upwards. 
Stop it in the name of heaven! Give in the name of Christianity! Crush out the 
spectre of disease and famine as you would crush a venomous reptile under your 
heel. 
Christians - Britons must give the help that is essential and urgent. Fail not - for 
you too are in peril if the Terror is allowed to spread. 31 
The journal of SCF (dubbed by the Glasgow Bulletin 'the most melancholy magazine in 
existence') was a forum for popular debate on current issues ranging from eugenics to 
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esperanto. It also served as a platform for appeals from Eglantyne Jebb to her supporters, 
whom she knew to be overwhelmingly British and Christian: 
Some day, maybe long after we have passed away, these babes who we were 
enabled to snatch from the jaws of death will be citizens, but they will never forget 
that when they had only grass, clay, and the bark of trees with which to stay hunger 
overwhelming and death bringing, British men and women came to them with open 
arms, fed them and helped them, washed them and clothed them, not for the sake of 
reward, or concession, or repayment of loans, or political hopes, but because the 
Master said 'Feed my Lambs'. 32 
Many of the first generation of supporters associated with SCIF fit comfortably beneath the 
banner of 'patriotic pacifism'. 33 They struggled inwardly to reconcile a Christian 
abhorrence of war and a liberal respect for individual conscience with an ingrained 
patriotism. One way in which they reconciled these values with action was to engage in 
humanitarian activity. They would fulfil the special destiny of the peace movement in 
Britain by preaching peace to other nations and providing less fortunate people with relief. 
Advertisements in the press for funds for the victims of the Russian Famine stressed that 
SCIF was not only helping children in the Bolshevik-controlled areas but also White 
31 SCF Appeal for victims of the Russian Famine, The DaiIj, News, 4 August 192 1. 
32 The Recorcl ofthe Save the Children Fund, Vol. 2 No. 2 1, October 1921,2 1. 
33 Cooper, S. E. 199 1. Patriotic Pacifism: If"aging lVar on lVar in Europe 1815-1914, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. See also Ceadel 1996,136. 
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Russian refugee children. 34 In The Record, with its readership of SCIF supporters, there 
were articles to show that their efforts were being met half way, and that the Russians were 
also endeavouring to help themselves. Cartoons from Pravda were reproduced showing the 
efforts on the part of Russians to help their suffering brethren in the Volga provinces: 
sharing a loaf of bread, giving a free day's labour, etc. 
Some sections of the British population were in sympathy with the Russian famine victims. 
The Record cited support from a mass meeting of Coventry unemployed. 
We do this, in spite of the fact that many of us are suffering privation and anxiety, 
knowing that in the famine area of Russia they are absolutely without the 
necessaries of life, and believing that such assistance will help Russia again to enter 
the markets of the world and, by reciprocal trade, contribute to the restoration of 
industry which should give us employment. 35 
Others took up the anti-Bolshevik cause. The Sunday Express and the Daily Express 
attacked the accuracy of Dr Fridtjof Nansen's statements as High Commissioner of the 
International Committee for Russian Relief, and then the administration of SCF. To 
counter such adverse publicity, and to be certain its own message got across to the public, 
SCIF commissioned a film showing in intimate detail the conditions of child life and death 
in the famine zone. Russian Fainine was shown at ten places in the London area and in 
34 The Daily News, 25 August 192 1. 
35 The Record, 15 June 1922. 
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sixteen other towns in England and Wales. In the early days of documentary film, pictures 
of mass graves still had the power to shock. 36 
Having raised funds on an unprecedented scale, SCF became engaged in the practical 
delivery of large-scale relief. All SCF's previous work had involved handing over funds to 
other organizations. In Russia its own staff arranged for the delivery of the aid. 37 Some of 
SCF's operational staff had previous military experience. SCF's administrator in Saratov 
was a former Royal Marine, Laurence Webster. Others had worked with the Quakers or the 
Scottish Women's Hospitals for Foreign Service. 
Between 1921-1923 SCF went into action in Russia on a scale not matched until the 
emergencies in Biafra and Ethiopia in the 1970s. Some of the models of practice relating to 
scientific targeting and relief centres persisted from the Russian to the Ethiopian famine. 
However, the significance of this classic prototype of relief lies not only in its practical 
arrangements but also in its politics. Eglantyne Jebb's correspondence reveals that she was 
well aware that relief given by the Soviet government could be used as a means of 
pacifying the population; relief given by the churches as a means of proselytizing; and 
relief from international agencies as a means of furthering strategic aims. She thought she 
was pursuing her own agenda of humanitarian neutrality, however she had misjudged Lord 
Weardale. The attitude of SCF's own chairman was far from neutral, and he considered 
36 The Russian Famine had its first public showing on 19 January 1922. SCIF corrunissioned a second film 
about the refugee crisis in Greece, Traget1j, of the Near East, in 1923. 
37 One SCIF staff member died of typhoid and one committed suicide. 
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that SCF-sponsored relief would forward his own anti-Bolshevik strategic aims: 
The true way to fight Bolshevism is by a policy of friendly approach to the people 
of Russia as a whole, and by tendering material assistance in the shape of urgent 
necessaries ... as an evidence of our friendly intentions to Russia so soon as by its 
oxvn initiatives to establish a form of government free from the impossible vices of 
Bolshevism ... 
38 
That such contradictory attitudes existed at the heart of the organization demonstrate the 
difficulty of identifying the aims and objectives behind the activities undertaken in SCF's 
name. 
The Declaration of the Rights of the Child 
In order to clarify SCFs mission a public statement of principle was needed. The 
Declaration of the Rights of the Child, drafted in 1922 and commonly known as the 
Declaration of Geneva, was to become the organizational credo. The myth of the writing of 
the Declaration is that Eglantyne Jebb climbed to the summit of Mont Sal&ve above 
Geneva, and, rather like Moses receiving the Commandments, there in the silence was 
38 In the same letter Lord Parmoor wrote: 'The Jexvish riff-raff in Russia, and indeed all over the world are 
the real instigators for the -%vhole Bolshevist movement'. Quoted in Breen R., Saving Enemy Children: Save 
the Children's reliefivork (hiring the Russian Famine, 1921-23, SCF Archive Paper NoA, n. d. 
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inspired to write the rights of the child. The actual genesis of the Declaration is unclear and 
definitely more prosaic. 39 However, a letter from Eglantyne Jebb does state that: 
My idea is that the axioms should be general and fundamental and such as to 
command universal assent: they are in the nature of principles. They should be 
sound, indisputable, and universally valid. 40 
After a year of discussion of a French language version by UISE and an English version by 
SCF, the fonn of words that was finally made public was decided upon on 17 May 1923. 
This Declaration is included as an appendix. 
The Declaration embodied Eglantyne Jebb's aim to place the child 'above all 
considerations of race, nationality, or creed'. It was adopted by the League of Nations with 
remarkable speed. UISE was able to exert such effective influence because it was able to 
frame the issue and help define the decision makers' interests in an area in which there 
were no existing policies. 41 Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald and Charles Roden 
Buxton MP both helped the Declaration get a sympathetic hearing before the Assembly of 
the League of Nations, and it was adopted on 26 September 1924. 
Although from its earliest days SCIF had friends within government, Eglantyne Jebb 
frequently insisted that its work was apolitical. She had a political goal to depoliticize work 
39 Breen R., Claiming Rightsfor Children: The Di-afting ofthe Declaration ofthe Rights ofthe Child (1922), 
SCF Archive Paper No. ], November 1994. 
40 Ibid., 2. 
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on behalf of children. However, her very success in attracting funds for SCIF made it harder 
for the organization to maintain a course independent of politics. 
But now when it attracts millions of pounds and affects millions of people, it is 
harder for it to escape from the friendship of politicians -a friendship which is 
often more dangerous than their enmity. For relief has become to them a coveted 
weapon. The promise of relief may extort political concessions, the threat of its . 
withdrawal prevent actions distasteful to the wealthier power. 42 
Only in Russia had SCIF itself become operational, elsewhere it had passed its funds 
through other agencies. It chose agencies whose ideas were compatible with its own, for 
example the Theosophical Society in Hungary and the Haverfield Fund for Serbian 
Children. 43 Some of the smaller societies protested that the success of SCIF in raising 
public funds was jeopardizing their own fund-raising efforts. The representatives of the 
two small agencies cited here later became representatives of SCF. Both the relationships 
between NGOs, and the relationships between NGO and state, were affected by economies 
of scale. Whoever held the purse strings could buy influence and attract personnel by 
offering them a wider scope for action. 
41 See the discussion of policy innovation and selection, Adler, E. and Haas, P. M. 1992. 'Epistemic 
Communities, World Order and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program' in International 
Organization, Vol. 46No. ], Winter 1992,367-390(p. 381). 
42 The Record, Vol. 3 No. 4, July 1923,158. 
43 'Miss Boyle [Nina Boyle, later member of SCF Council] explained that hitherto they had drawn a large 
proportion of their funds from Yorkshire. On their last visit to that county, they found that the SCF had 
practically absorbed public attention, and people who had formerly subscribed to the Haverfield Fund were 
now giving to the SCF, and saying that doubtless the SCF would allocate to the Haverfield Fund. ' The Hon. 
Evelina Haverfield's Fund for Serbian Children: Interview,, vith Miss Nina Boyle, English Representative, 8 
April 192 1 ?, SCF Archives reference SC/EJ. 230. 
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Thanks to the practical work of these pre-existing organizations and to the innovatory work 
of SCIF in bringing relief issues to public attention, both the public and politicians became 
more familiar with issues of child suffering caused by war and economic distress. In future 
there would be less scope for SCIF to exercise its techniques of persuasion, since potential 
supporters would have their own agenda and be predisposed to support activities 
underpinned by an ideology implicitly aligned with their own. More important in the future 
would be the effect upon SCIF of the mainstream of public opinion. 
The first decade in the history of SCIF was marked by burgeoning activity and geographical 
expansion. Its overwhelming ethos was of internationalism and pacificism. Its co-founders, 
Dorothy Buxton and Eglantyne Jebb, were as much associated with the promotion of 
international peace as the promotion of child welfare. In the pages of The Record and The 
World's Children the evils associated with war were discussed, including authoritarianism, 
lack of freedom of speech and information, economic abuse, and the social cost of 
rearmament. SCIF was a home for 'eccentrics' who through their beliefs and deeds 
challenged any authoritarianism of the state. It was on the cohesion of this social 
community that the future of the organization would depend. However, this social 
community was to disintegrate, primarily because of the rift that Eglantyne Jebb had most 
feared between supporters of her blueprint for an international organization and supporters 
of what she called 'the National Point of View'. 
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Just over a decade after her death, at the outbreak of the Second World War, the supporters 
of SCF were to regroup, in just the way that Eglantyne Jebb had deplored, as a national 
society for child welfare at home. Eighty years on it is often assumed that SCIF grew out of 
the political culture of social refon-n. However, the lives of the people active in the 
organization and the language of their publications and correspondence, suggest that the 
initial impulse behind the activities of SCIF was part of the contemporary debates about 
war and peace. A competing set of beliefs, values and techniques of persuasion were to 
predominate in the second generation. 
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Chapter 3 
AN ORGANIZATION IN RETREAT FROM IDEALISM (1929-1939) 
The aerial bombardment of Abyssinia in 1935 caused not only death and displacement but 
also widespread revulsion. ' A cartoon by David Low, reproduced in The World's Children 
from The Evening Standai'd, showed a village scene of conical thatched huts and children 
playing between them under the caption 'barbarism' and the same scene with the village 
now a smoking ruin under the caption 'civilisation'. 2 It seemed that the faith in science of 
Eglantyne Jebb, as well as so many others of her generation, had been misplaced. 
Scientific progress had given human beings weapons of mass destruction and the 
possibility of an even greater abuse of power. 
Two years later, at a time when the British government maintained a policy of non- 
intervention in the civil war in Spain, and there was popular demand for aid to the 
Republican side, German planes bombed Guernica. The pain and suffering caused by aerial 
bombardment had now been brought even closer to home and public opinion rallied round 
the cause of the four thousand Basque refugee children brought to Britain by the Basque 
Children's Committee in June 1937.3 SCF joined other British agencies in taking care of 
them. 
1 Italy invaded Abyssinia in 1935. It was then annexed as Italian East Africa from 1936-1941 until the return 
of Haile Selassie from exile. SCIF provided assistance to refugees from Abyssinia in Kenya, British 
Somaliland and the Sudan. See SCIF Council meeting minutes September 1935. SCIF Archives reference 
M 1/8 C. 2065. 
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Events in Abyssinia and Spain were all heavy blows to the confidence of those people who 
had believed that international disputes could be solved without recourse to war. In the 
face of renewed violent conflict, the deployment of new forms of weapons, and the 
attendant suffering, those attitudes to peace and war which had appeared enlightened and 
practical in the aftennath of the First World War proved difficult to sustain. During the 
decade following the First World War it had been believed by many that there would be no 
future justification for war. In the 1930s, by contrast, the rise of fascism was convincing 
proof for many self-declared pacifists of the necessity of taking up arms. This shift divided 
the anti-war movement fromwhich SCIF had drawn much of its early support. 4 
This chapter looks first at the disintegration of the anti-war movement during the 1930s, 
then identifies changes in the dominant attitudes of the particular group of people 
associated with SCF. I argue that the idealistic set of beliefs and values which guided the 
first generation had to compete against a set of beliefs and values characterized by 
pessimistic realism among this second generation. In the 1930s SCIF prepared to abandon 
its optimistic pacificism and become acquiescent in a violent world. SCF's commitment to 
universalism, and its utilitarian understanding of children as a radical lever for the 
transformation of the world, were no longer translated into action. This had an impact not 
only upon the nature of its work with children, but also upon SCF's relationships with 
government and other voluntary organizations. How this erosion of principle came about 
will be revealed by an examination of the response made by SCIF to the civil war in Spain. 
The Spanish Civil War has been chosen for a number of reasons. Firstly, it was the focus 
2 The Worlds Children November 1935,23. 
3 See below. 
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for the redefinition of many individual attitudes to war and peace. Secondly, it 
demonstrated the overriding popularity of a partisan rather than a universalist discourse. 
Thirdly, it resulted in a new array of international NGOs. 
The disintegration of the anti-war movement 
The anti-war movement was cohesive as long as war was perceived as the ultimate evil. 
The rise of fascism Presented another worst possible outcome. As Fenner Brockway 
described in his autobiography: 
The war forced on me a dilemma. I was in all my nature opposed to war. I could 
never see myself killing anyone and had never held a weapon in my hands. But I 
saw that Hitler and Nazism had been mainly responsible for bringing the war and I 
5 
could not contemplate their victory. 
Other pacifists, whether their inspiration was religious, socialist or humanitarian, persisted 
in their belief that war was the greatest evil. Although Eglantyne Jebb had never declared 
herself a pacifist, her example was an inspiration to them. In 1934 she was held up as an 
icon of pacifism to the readers of the newsletter of the No More War Movement 
(NMWM). 
4 See Ceadel 1980. 
-' Brockway, F. 1977. Towards Tomorrow The Autobiography ofFenner Brockway, London: Hart-Davis, 
MacGibbon, 136, 
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If any members of our "No More War" movement feel in need of fresh inspiration, 
of a new armoury of argument and fact as well as of poignant appeal, let them turn 
to Eglantyne Jebb ... The 'Thou shalt not's of the Old Testament clearly included 
the words 'Thou shalt not kill' but Eglantyne Jebb saw with Jesus that 
righteousness and peace could not be won by negative creeds. The everlasting 
'Yea' of the two commandments was needed before the heart of humanity could be 
won. And to the question 'who is my neighbourT Eglantyne Jebb gave the answer, 
and in the Declaration of Geneva endorsed by the Fifth Assembly of the League of 
Nations, 1924, sent it sounding through 49 states or nations: 'Every suffering 
6 
child'. 
The author of the article, Katharine Bruce-Glasier, was both a member of the 
predominantly socialist NMWM and the SCIF Nurseries Committee. 7 She chose to single 
out Eglantyne Jebb's religiously inspired conviction of the oneness of humanity to reaffirm 
the socialist belief in the brotherhood of man and the immorality of violence against fellow 
men. For her the religious, socialist and humanitarian arguments for pacifism reinforced 
one another. 
The pacificists in the anti-war movement had committed themselves to pursue all other 
means to resolve conflict and justified the use of arms only as a last resort. Many of them 
6 Bruce-Glasier, K., March 1934, 'Eglantyne Jebb: Sister of all the World', No More Mar, Organ of the 
Midlands Council of the No More War Movement, Birmingham. The NMWM was set up February 1921 and 
claimed 3000 members by 1927. It was wound up in February 1937 and merged with the Peace Pledge 
Union. 
7 Katharine Bruce-Glasier (c. 1868-1950) was involved in the setting up of nursery schools in the 1930s and 
in the campaign to provide milk in schools. She was also one of the pioneers of the Independent Labour 
Party. See obituary in The JVorlcl's Children, July 1950,243. 
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were supporters of the League of Nations. One alternative to the use of anned force 
available to the League of Nations was the use of economic sanctions. Under Article 16 of 
the League of Nations Covenant any Member of the League which resorted to war 
shall ipsofacto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other 
Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the 
severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse 
between their nationals and the nationals of the Covenant-breaking state, and the 
prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the 
nationals of the Covenant-breaking state and the nationals of any other state, 
whether a Member of the League or not. 
On 5 October 1935 Italy invaded Abyssinia and two days later on 7 October 1935 the 
League of Nations Committee of Six found Italy guilty of violating Article 12. Embargoes 
were put in place first of arms, then loans and credits, then imports, and finally a limited 
range of exports. Hufbauer judges that the sanctions were an outright failure, making no 
contribution to the policy result. 8 
However, from the perspective of many working within SCF sanctions were anathema as a 
viable alternative to violence. They had witnessed in Austria, Gennany and then in Russia, 
the limited impact of sanctions upon government, and the devastating impact of sanctions 
upon civilians, especially children. Opposition to sanctions was a defining characteristic of 
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the founding generation of SCF, and to argue in their support would mean the crossing of a 
line. During the Second World War many SCIF supporters would cross that line. It was the 
example of the First World War generation that SCF would choose to cite in order to 
strengthen their argument against the comprehensive economic sanctions that were 
increasingly applied in the post-Cold War period. 9 
In 1919 Dorothy Buxton and the founders of the Fight the Famine Council protested that 
the victorious states were continuing to wage war, if not by military means then by 
economic means. They had argued that economic relations could themselves embody the 
evils of war. In the 1930s these same people were faced with a world at peace in which 
people lived in poverty and continued to undergo the suffering they associated with the 
victims of war. The Depression had at least two effects upon the anti-war movement. Some 
members were so appalled by the dehumanizing effects of poverty that they argued that 
war and the incidental denial of pacifism could be justified to combat the permanent 
violence embodied in capitalism. This strand, together with the staunch pacifists such as 
Dorothy Buxton, still maintained an internationalist orientation. The second strand had a 
defencist response to the prevailing economic insecurity. They argued for the protection of 
national economic interests and rearmament, and had a nationalist orientation. 
8 Hufbauer, G. C. 1990. Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, Washington: Institute for International 
Economics. For details of sanctions by the UK and League of Nations against Italy over Abyssinia, see 
Vol. 2, Supplemental Case Histofies, 33-40. 
9 Save the Children Fund's Evidence to the House of Commons International Development Committee's 
Inquiry on the Future of Sanctions, April 1999. In the post-Cold War period SCF was working in a growing 
number of countries under some form of sanctions regime, including Afghanistan, Burundi, Cuba, Northern 
Iraq, Myanmar, and Sudan. 
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Pessimistic realism within SCIF 
Within the political and economic context of the 1930s the expansion of SCIF work slowed 
down. In Europe, areas where SCF had had the opportunity to work with government 
cooperation in the 1920s, now found themselves under more hostile regimes. In The 
Woj-ld's Children of April 1934 Mosa Anderson made a new appeal for Austria. 
The municipality of Vienna has been suppressed. The Mayor of Vienna, Herr Sietz, 
together with hundreds of others, is in prison simply on the ground of his municipal 
activities. Thousands of others are in prison for their participation or alleged 
connivance in the activities of the Socialist armed forces. Dismissals on political 
grounds are taking place in thousands. 10 
In Russia Stalin had closed off all access to outside agencies. It is hard to imagine children 
in Russia going through a greater ordeal than that of the 1920s, but when famine struck 
again in 1933, no international agency was able to secure permission to enter, either to 
witness the horror or provide relief 
The economic context meant that SCIF struggled with dwindling resources. Whereas its 
income for the financial year 1920-21 had been E554,938, in 1931-32 it was at its lowest 
point of f20,802, and SCIF felt compelled to use its scarce resources to assist children in 
Britain. Already in 1920 SCIF had made its first grants for use for children in Britain. In 
'0 'Austria in Need Again: A New Call to Save the Children', The World's Children, Vol. 14 No. 7, April 
1934,101. 
68 
1933 SCIF published Unemployment and the Child. 'An Enquhy'. 11 It extended its network 
of nurseries, which were designed to improve the health and well-being of the children and 
relieVe the mothers, in the areas worst hit by unemployment such as South Wales and the 
North East. 12 
Eglantyne Jebb had not foreseen a cautious future constrained by external circumstances 
for the organization. Until her death the work of SCIF had always outstripped expectations. 
In 1919 SCIF had been set up to provide relief to children affected by anned conflict in 
Europe, and it was anticipated that the organization's work could last as little as a few 
months. In the first decade of its life it became clear that the organization would have a 
longer life: relief in Austria, Germany and Serbia, had been succeeded by work in Russia 
and resettlement programmes for the refugees of Turkey and Greece. This work was all 
stamped with the hallmark of Eglantyne Jebb; not only were new refugee settlements given 
her name, 13 the organization developed according to her ambitious international vision. 
This vision was not merely European but global. The first grants to Africa and Latin 
America were made in 1923,14 and later the same year SCIF sent relief to survivors of an 
earthquake in Tokyo. Before she died plans were put in place for work in China and a 
Conference on the African Child. The year after her death, the first grant was made to sub- 
Saharan Africa 15 and the Conference was held in 193 1.16 
" Uneniployment and the Child. - 'An Enquiry', SCF, 1933. 
12 These 'open-air' nurseries - keeping children in the open air was believed at the time to combat 
tuberculosis - where nourishing food was provided, had immediate benefits for children and their mothers. 
Breen, R., The Preschool Child. Save the Children and Preschool Education, SCIF Archive Paper No. 6, 
1995. 
13 The village of 'Xheba' (Jebba) was erected in Albania for refugees of Albanian origin from Smyrna 
[Izmir], Turkey, c. 1926 
"f 560 for an orphanage in Cairo and f 150 for relief in Chile. 
15 Relief to Ruanda-Urundi, 1929. 
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While Eglantyne Jebb was alive the policy of the new Fund was clearly mapped in 
published statements. Fewer statements of policy were published in the 1930s. After her 
death, close colleagues of her generation continued to serve within the organization. 
Edward Fuller, Editor of The Recoi-d of the Save the Childi-en Fund, and later of The 
World's Children from 1920-1958, maintained a global interest not only in child welfare 
but also in issues of peace and war. For example, at the time of the World Disannament 
Conference, The WoHds Childi-en published several commentaries including an open 
letter on children and war, from John Galsworthy. 17 Lewis Golden served as General 
Secretary of SCIF until 1937. Her sister, Dorothy Buxton, also remained active in the cause 
of refugees. It cannot be said that there was no continuity, but at the same time it is evident 
that after 1928 the organization was influenced by a new generation. 18 
This second generation was not only the heir to the policy laid down by Eglantyne Jebb; it 
was also immersed in the debates of the day. They were subject to the influence of new 
constellations of beliefs, values, and techniques of persuasion. This chapter suggests that, 
by the time it was faced with the outbreak of the Second World War, SCIF was an 
organization in retreat from idealism. The second generation had found that they could not 
16 Sharp, E. 193 1. The African Child: An Account of1he 1wernational Conference on African Children 
Geneva, London: Longmans, Green and Co. 
17 'By war we mortgage the future, not only in those ways now so alarn-dngly patent to us in the trough of 
econon-& despond, but in a way far more subtle and deadly, by the partial destruction and widespread 
blighting of children who are the crop we have sown for the morrow and in great part shall never reap. ' 
'Mortgaging the Future: An Open Letter on Children and War', The Morld's Children, Vol. ] 2 No. 5, 
February 1932,70. 
18 Very quickly after her death Eglantyne Jebb herself became an icon, which may have contributed to the 
distance placed between her generation and the next. She was one of eight subjects, including Josephine 
Butler, Florence Nightingale and Harriet Beecher StoNve, chosen by Dr Alice Salomon for her book 
Heroische Fratien [Heroic Women], Zorich: Verlag flir Recht und Gesellschaft, 1936. 
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apply the guiding principles of universalism, utilitarianism and optimism to the 
circumstances of the 1930s. They reneged on SCF's original commitment to international 
reconciliation and the optimistic belief in the possibility of war prevention, and became a 
national society for child welfare at home and relief in Europe. 
There was no root and branch change of membership within the organization. Instead 
individuals with different affiliations came to have greater or lesser influence over the 
organization. Gradually the people of the first generation whose path to SCIF had been 
from the anti-war movement were replaced. This founder generation had witnessed the 
economic dislocation of Europe following the First World War and the particular suffering 
caused to children. They had then put the evidence before governments, churches, trades 
unions and the media in support of the humanitarian argument for pacifism. In 1919 it had 
seemed to a broad church of people that a simple utilitarian calculation of the unhappiness 
and destruction caused by war would invariably show these to outweigh its benefits. 
Alternative means for solving disputes also seemed near at hand. At an interstate level the 
founders of SCIF were instrumental in the establishment of the League of Nations. On an 
individual level they had faith in the possibility of reconciling nationalism with 
internationalism, and believed that 'national distinctions can become bonds instead of 
barriers I. 19 
The conviction that war was the ultimate evil, and the optimism that it was within 
humanity's means to eradicate war, had both gone by the time SCF entered the Second 
World War. Twenty years on it was a very different organization from the committee of 
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outspoken individuals that had come together in 1919. Its very purpose had changed. The 
founder members had been as much involved in efforts for international reconciliation as 
in relief work, and in its early years SCF still reflected the twin interests of its founders. In 
the period under discussion in this chapter, the avowedly political interests of its founders 
in active war prevention were set aside and the Fund became more exclusively involved in 
relief work. 
The first and second generations of SCIF also had different characteristics. The founders 
were not only interested in ridding the world of violent conflict, they were also concerned 
with personal transformation. The early journals of SCIF testify to their quests for spiritual 
and moral conversion. This convergence of personal and social transformation begins to 
disappear from the journals of this later period. In Chapter I it was also shown that the 
early members of SCIF held individualistic, anti-government and internationalist outlooks. 
By contrast, by the outbreak of the Second World War SCIF was ready to prove itself a 
loyal partner of the UK government. The single quality which persisted from the first 
generation to the second generation was that of patriotic humanitarianism. However, the 
first generation of SCIF workers had often expressed their patriotism through individual 
humanitarian adventures. By contrast, SCF workers cared for refugees from Abyssinia 
after having secured the assent of the Foreign Office, and took part in the delivery of aid to 
Spain in coordination with UISE and the ICRC. 
19 Jebb, E., 'The World Policy of the Save the Children Fund', in Fuller 1928,563. 
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The Civil War in Spain 
Lewis Golden had been General Secretary of SCIF since 1919. During this period he was 
most worried by what Eglantyne Jebb had called the triumph of the 'National Point of 
View'. 
The chief difficulty in obtaining the support of a large number of influential people, 
already necessarily taken up with other interests, is the international aspect of the 
work. Anything international is not popular in England at the present time, owing 
to the problems of unemployment, heavy taxation, etc. and general swing of public 
opinion towards national rather than international interests. 20 
Lewis Golden faced a challenge to the principle of universalism on two counts during the 
last years of his tenure. First the recession in Britain led to a deepening of the attitude that 
British children living in want had first call upon the Fund. Eglantyne Jebb had lived to see 
the income of SCF rise to its peak in response to the Russian Famine and also begin to fall. 
She insisted that even in times of scarce funds innovations could be made on a small scale. 
In this spirit SCF responded to refugees from Greece and Turkey. However, by the 1930s 
the economic situation had worsened and the income of SCF fell to its lowest level ever. 
As poverty struck more children in the UK, SCIF tilted its resources so that a greater 
proportion was spent on its work at home. 
20 Golden, L. B., Memorandum on Me Basis ofAppeal, Afoney Raising, Publicity and Publications, Geneva, 
SCF Archives reference SC/EJ. 282,28 May 1929. 
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The second challenge to the principle of universalism came from the Spanish Civil War. 
The Spanish Civil War generated an upsurge of interest in international events among 
people in Britain. Popular sympathy was predominantly with the Republican side, and the 
popular demand for aid to be sent to Spain was inextricably bound up with the campaign 
for a Republican victory against the Nationalists. 21 
Until the Spanish Civil War it is possible to see SCIF as the most significant heir to a 
tradition of humanitarian neutrality dating back to the efforts of Johann Pestalozzi in 1798, 
and to the foundation of the Red Cross in the mid-nineteenth century. Much of the tradition 
had been built upon the efforts of highly placed individuals with contacts with heads of 
state. SCIF pioneered fundraising at a more popular level, using the national media and 
petitioning churches, trades unions, schools, clubs etc. SCF's activity may have helped 
pave the way for the British response to the Spanish Civil War. Fundraising and the 
organization of relief were taken out of the hands of the established aid agencies, and relief 
became an activity open to all. At the same time as relief became more popular and 
populist the principle of humanitarian neutrality was jettisoned. As was shown in the 
preceding chapter, in the face of accusations of partiality, SCIF had always insisted upon 
the non-political nature of its appeals, arguing in the tradition of humanitarian neutrality 
for aid for 'enemy children' of Gen-nany and Austria, or for children in Bolshevik Russia. 
21 The British Institute of Public Opinion first polled on Spain in January 1937, and the response to the 
question of whether Franco's junta should be regarded as the legal government of Spain revealed only 14 per 
cent in favour and 86 per cent opposed. Buchanan, T. 1997. Britain and the Spanish Civil lVar, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 23. 
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During the Spanish Civil War the widespread readiness of the British public to give 
material support was harnessed as an extension of politics. 22 
The General Secretary of SCIF found himself confronted with a novel dilemma. An 
international issue had succeeded in capturing the imagination of a large number of 
influential people, but the universalist principles of SCIF were not consistent with the 
popular enthusiasm for one side of the conflict. SCIF was not alone among the established 
relief organizations in being unable to meet the demand for aid to Spain. The League of 
Nations was not strong enough to make a humanitarian intervention in its own right. The 
ICRC and the Quakers, like SCF, insisted on the principle of humanitarian neutrality, and 
would not send aid exclusively to one side. Other organizations already in existence with 
wartime experience were committed to provide relief to particular groups of people, such 
as the Armenian refugees. Of the cadre of people with experience of relief work, some of 
them joined the ranks of those individuals who volunteered to join relief efforts in Spain. 
However, on the whole the demand for aid was met by a raft of new organizations. 
Francesca Wilson was in an interesting position to comment upon the different actors 
amongst the organizations. She came from a Quaker family and knew their relief work 
well, however, she was never part of their guiding committees. She had gained experience 
of humanitarian relief work during the First World War, first in France and then with Serb 
refugees. During the Russian Famine she worked alongside both Quaker and SCF teams. 
With the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War she took unpaid leave from her teaching post 
22 ' Party politics offered little hope for influencing the British government to change its policy, and the 
option ofjoining the International Brigades could only appeal to a few, but fundraising and the organization 
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in London to work in Spain. She was impressed by the educational goals of the Republican 
side, and wanted to be part of their efforts to raise literacy levels and provide workers' 
schools and libraries. In her memoirs she gives a glimpse of the contrast between the 
enthusiasm of the Republican supporters and the reticence of the neutral agencies. She 
recalls the opening of a fann colony for boys at Crevillente: 
The delegate from the Provincial Board for education in Alicante said that we 
represented the real England, the England of John Stuart Mill, the England that had 
taught the world liberty. But the Quakers, who had come out to inspect the relief 
work in Spain and whose visit happened to synchronize with our opening, gravely 
reminded the audience that Friends represented nothing except peace and good will, 
and that their mission was to save children without regard for race or creed, or 
political colour. They were working on the other side too, they said, in fact 
wherever there was need. 23 
The Quakers' conception of impartiality was different from that of SCF. They obviously 
did not share SCF's non-denominational character, and had a religious objective in 
preventing Spain from becoming an entirely secular state. 24 However, another critical 
distinction between the two organizations was the division of labour between relief and 
international reconciliation. Unlike SCF, the Quakers made no such division. Although 
of relief -was open to all and could make a material difference. ' Buchanan 1997,93. 
23 Wilson 1944,196. 
2' Buchanan 1997,117. 
76 
they were not allowed to operate in Nationalist Spain, part way through the conflict they 
sought an interview with Franco. 25 
SCF studiously avoided becoming involved in the politics of the conflict, insisting on the 
impartiality of work with children. The importance to SCIF of its conception of impartiality 
is stressed in this article by Lord Noel-Buxton: 
This impartiality in the cause of the Child has lastly triumphed again, in the midst 
of the war in Spain... We do not know and we do not enquire what are the political 
views of the parents of the children we help, any more than we are concerned as to 
their religious faith ... The children have no responsibility 
for the acts or the attitude 
of their parents. Our common humanity demands that we must make the utmost 
effort to aid them in their desperate need and so to demonstrate once again the 
- universal brotherhood of mankind. 26 
Since it was dedicated to the assistance of all children whatever the political views of their 
parents, SCIF could not accept donations which were tied to one side of the war or the 
other. This principle had to be applied to all donations whatever their size. The Council 
minutes record the decision to return a cheque for f5 for Spanish children, since it was 
accompanied by a letter stating that the donor was strongly opposed to helping the children 
25 Friends Service Council papers, Spain committee minutes, 16 February 1938. 
26 Lord Noel-Buxton, President of the Save the Children Fund, ' "Neutrality of the Save the Children Fund", 
From an Article in The British 11, eekly', in The World's Children Vol. ] 7 No. 4 January 1937,6 1. 
77 
of insurgents. In this case the donor was directed to an organization which was helping on 
the Government side only. 27 
The funds which SCF did raise in Britain were passed to UISE in Geneva. UISE then 
supervised the provision of relief in Spain. Together with the ICRC, UISE succeeded in 
facilitating the transfer of children from territory held by one side to territory controlled by 
the other. For this kind of task cooperation with the ICRC was essential as it was the only 
body in Spain recognized by both sides. 28 This action was consistent with Eglantyne Jebb's 
vision of an international voluntary organization where the central machinery of the 
international union was more important than the local machinery of the national 
organization. She had also always been in favour of close cooperation with the ICRC. 
Despite the fine principles behind SCF's position, and the international organization of its 
operation, SCF's response to the Spanish Civil War does not stand up well to scrutiny. The 
overall impression of SCIF in its early years is of an organization defining its own path and 
influencing others rather than being influenced by them. A detailed examination of SCIF 
decision-making during the Spanish Civil War suggests that the organization became 
constrained by other more vocal and action-oriented organizations on the British scene. It 
lost the initiative and found its resources were drawn into activities defined by others. This 
was in part a measure of SCF's success in establishing itself as the agency for children 
with a recognized expertise. There was a tacit expectation that SCF would make itself 
responsible for activities for Spanish children, freeing other actors for other engagements. 
27 Meeting of SCF Council, Thursday 17 December 1936, SCIF Archive reference MI/8 C. 2333. 
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Two umbrella committees emerged to provide assistance to the Nationalist and the 
Republican sides of the conflict. SCIF could be an influential member of neither, because 
the raison detre of each committee was to promote one side, a goal which it was known 
SCIF did not share. Although SCIF had little influence over other members, they could have 
some influence over SCF. Not only did they hold the purse strings for funds for Spain from 
the British public, but they could also put pressure upon SCIF to fulfil its role as the 
acknowledged expert agency for children. 
In late 1936 a committee was formed by the Infanta Beatrice, cousin of the exiled Spanish 
King Alfonso XIII, known as the General Relief Fund for the Distressed Women and 
Children of Spain with the avowed aim of raising funds for assisting both sides. When the 
Council considered the question of cooperation, a number of members felt that as the 
Infanta's Committee was made up of people whose sympathies were known to be to the 
'right', SCIF might lose prestige if it identified itself with this Committee. 29 Popular 
sympathy was with the Republicans. 
Dedicated to the support of the Republican side was the better known National Joint 
Committee for Spanish Relief . 
30 The leading light of this Committee was the Duchess of 
Atholl. As a Conservative MP and a prolific writer she was influential in her own right. 
Her husband was also Scottish President of SCF. 
28 Meeting of SCF Council, Thursday 29 October 1936. The General Secretary reported on the successful 
transfer of one thousand children. SCF Archives reference M 1/8 C. 2302. 
29 Meeting of SCF Council, Thursday 17 December 1936, SCF Archives reference MI/8 C. 2333. 
30 Formed in November 1936 in response to a visit to Spain by a cross-party group of MPs. 
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SCIF joined the two committees but participated wholeheartedly in neither. The 'political' 
character of the National Joint Committee alarmed both the Quakers and SCF, so much so 
that they forced it to agree to a statement of impartiality being read out before all of its 
public meetings. 31 Since the fonnation of UISE in the Salle de I'Ath6n6e in Geneva, SCIF 
had aspired to the tradition of humanitarian neutrality pioneered by the ICRC. However, 
SCIF never had the special status of the ICRC and so could not hold itself aloof from all 
other relief agencies. With the creation of a raft of new organizations to provide relief to 
Spain, it found itself one among many. Its special mission for children and record of 
twenty years' work gave it some clout, but it joined the two umbrella agencies to share in 
infon-nation, funding and logistical support. By doing so SCIF found itself in a position of 
interdependency with agencies whose principles it did not wholly share. 
The case of the evacuation of the Basque children illustrates this. In May 1937 the 
dramatic evacuation of four thousand children from the Basque country to Britain absorbed 
much of the energy and funds of the Joint Committee. In her Penguin Special, Searchlight 
on Spain, the Duchess of Atholl portrayed the evacuation as a rescue mission. 32 She 
described how agencies such as SCIF rallied round, and how the children were made very 
welcome. The records of SCIF show a different picture: one of an organization split over 
fundamental policy. 
31 Save the Children Council minutes, 17 June 1937, SCIF Archives reference M 1/9. 
32 Atholl, K. 1938. Searchlight on Spain, London: Penguin, 199. 
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Lewis Golden had been with the Fund since its inception. After eighteen and a half years 
of service, the General Secretary was driven to resign because of his opposition to the 
Council policy on Spain. It is stated in the minutes of the Council meeting that he 
33 
considered the policy 'wrong and almost criminal as regards the Basque children'. The 
minutes also record his disappointment that the ideas of new members of the Council were 
not aligned with his. 
34 
. 
There is evidence to show that from his visits to Spain the General Secretary found that 
there was no actual lack of food, except milk, and judged that it was difficult to appeal for 
relief work except on political grounds. 35 As someone who had witnessed SCF's work 
during the Russian Famine and shared Eglantyne Jebb's interest in the condition of 
children worldwide, he may also have been frustrated with the SCIF response towards 
Spain on another score. This well-reported European conflict had provoked a rush of 
popular support. While a welcome change from the preoccupation with domestic affairs, it 
also diverted attention from children in need elsewhere. 36 
As for the almost 'criminal' nature of the evacuation, Lewis Golden was concerned that the 
evacuation was a political stunt, performed at a cost to the physical, moral and mental 
health of the children. 37 The Council agreed with him that the evacuation of the children 
33 Save the Children Council minutes, 15 July 1937, SCF Archives reference M 1/9. 
34 'During the past two or three years he had received no support from quarters in the Council from which he 
should have had it. On the contrary he had nothing but niggling criticism. After 18.5 years new people came 
into the Fund with new ideas. ' Save the Children Council meeting, minutes 15 July 1937, SCF Archives 
reference M 1/9. 
35 Save the Children Council meeting, minutes 18 March 1937, SCF Archives reference M 1/9. 
36 There is no record of discussion in the Council minutes of this period of follow-up to any non-European 
work 
37 Buchanan 1997,110. 
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from Spain to Britain should never have happened. They had advised the Foreign Office 
that the children should remain in Spain, and if they could not be moved to safe areas in 
their own country, that they should be evacuated to neighbouring France. However, they 
were also in agreement that once the children had arrived in Britain they could not refuse 
their help. 
In an attempt to separate the future care of the children from the politics of the National 
Joint Committee, a Basque Children's Committee was set up. Although the two 
committees shared much the same membership, this measure succeeded in involving the 
Catholic Church and the Labour movement, who had both refrained from joining the 
National Joint Committee, and attracting a wider spectrum of humanitarian support. The 
Catholic Church had been hostile to the evacuation of the children to Britain because it 
anticipated that the initiative would be a dangerously open-ended financial responsibility. 38 
The Catholics did however eventually provide hospitality for the 1200 children of their 
own faith. 
The Basque Children's Committee faced many problems: typhoid broke out in the camp, 
the children proved difficult to manage and a number escaped from the camp near 
Southampton. However, these short-tenn problems were slight in comparison with the 
longer-term problems of the children's repatriation. 
When Bilbao fell to the Nationalists on 19 June 1937 the new authorities were determined 
to arrange for the children's return. Many of the children's families had fled in the face of 
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the rebel advance and were difficult to trace. The children quickly became political pawns 
with some members of the Basque Children's Committee, such as the Catholic Church, 
pressing for their speedy repatriation, and others holding out for their continued stay in 
Britain. By the summer of 1938 it was clear that there was a core of some 1800 children 
whose parents were separated, could not be traced, or were not in a position to look after 
them. At the end of the civil war one thousand children still remained in Britain. At the 
outbreak of the Second World War the British government immediately intensified the 
pressure on the committee for repatriation. However, in 1945,4 10 were still living in 
Britain. 39 
The testimonies of some of those who have spent most of their lives in Britain emphasize 
how far the children themselves and their families were unprepared for the consequences 
of the evacuation. 
They weren't sending you abroad for a long period, according to what we thought, 
what everybody thought at the time, it was a question of days or months. I don't 
think our families thought otherwise. I'm quite sure that if they felt that we were 
going to be abroad, never mind where, for years, no one would have come out. To 
us it was like going on a holiday. 40 
38 Ibid. 
39 Buchanan 1997,115. 
40 From the testimony of Jos6 Maria Villegas in Marshall, 0.199 1. Ship ofHope, London: Ethnic 
Communities Oral History Project, 6. 
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Just as no one had predicted that the holiday would turn into a lifetime, no one predicted 
the problems that would prevent the children receiving continuity of care. Eduardo 
Martinez was aged six, %vhen he came to Britain. He was separated from his elder sister 
when the refugees were divided into accommodation for boys and girls and into sections 
according to the political beliefs of their parents: Communist, Anarchist, Nationalist, 
Socialist. Over the next three years he was moved five times. He spent two months in the 
tented accommodation near Southampton, then was moved for two weeks to a transit camp 
in army sheds, then spent two months at a colony near Maidenhead, then went to Belfast to 
live with a family. The host couple separated and Eduardo returned to a colony in the 
London area where he lived until he was old enough to find work and make a home of his 
own. 
41 
SCIF had argued that if the children were to be evacuated they should be evacuated to safe 
areas as close as possible to their homes. The majority of children evacuated from Spain 
were in fact evacuated to neighbouring France. 42 Here too UISE gave support, including 
through the organization Service Civil International (SCI). The concern registered by the 
Council that SCI was known as a 'pacifist' organization is an indicator of the shift in 
attitudes towards peace and war that had taken place within the organization. 
The involvement with Spanish evacuees was an opportunity for SCIF to learn several 
lessons. The most important lesson related to older children and challenged the conception 
of the apolitical and dependent child. The older evacuees had confounded the image of 
41 Marshall 0.1991,9. 
4' A minority were evacuated to as faraway as Mexico and the USSR. Marshall 0.1991. 
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children as passive victims of war by asserting their national culture, making their political 
views clear and sending a clear message to the organization that they were not only victims 
of war but also potential protagonists. An SCI staff member at ChAteau de Soisy, Soisy sur 
Seine, where 50 children aged 3-16 were looked after said: 
The children's experiences had not left them unscathed. They all had decided 
political views; they seemed to have a vivid idea of what the Civil War was about, 
and a downright way of showing their allegiance. 43 
They had been a reminder that all children were potential adults and actors who belonged 
to a particular social world. Eglantyne Jebb had understood this and emphasized the 
utilitarian principle that saving children was not only an end in itself but also a means to a 
better future for the community to which they belonged. Within this framework of 
understanding it would have been seen that the Basque children could not be removed 
from Bilbao without undermining their utilitarian and social role. A number of the children 
never returned, and those who did return no longer had a continuous history of contact 
with their families and neighbours, or their language and culture. 
Another practical lesson related to younger children: before laying plans for the evacuation 
of children in the Second World War SCIF now knew it had to solve the problem of tracing 
very young children who could not identify themselves. 44 
43 Best and Pike 1948,70. 
44 'We would like to mention here a suggestion made to us by a member of the Executive of the Save the 
Children International Union, namely the need for a mark of identification for each child. This suggestion is 
made as the result of actual experience following the evacuation of Spanish children to other countries, where 
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Overall it was felt that the cost to the Basque children of separating them from their 
families had been underestimated. As Lewis Golden had originally recommended, SCIF 
concluded from its experience that all other avenues of protection should have been 
explored before the option of evacuation. When children's lives are under direct threat it is 
difficult to argue the case against evacuation, and in later chapters it will be seen that SCIF 
assisted in a number of other operations to remove children from the areas of greatest risk. 
However, evacuation could be interpreted as a sign that international agencies consider a 
situation to be irretrievable. This was contrary to Eglantyne Jebb's message of optimism 
and faith that a peaceful future was within the next generation's grasp. With accumulated 
experience, SCIF began to question the wisdom of evacuation to safeguard children. 
Reference was made to the experience of the Basque children when in 1992 UNICEF drew 
up guidelines to encourage agencies to reconsider before putting into effect plans to 
evacuate children from former Yugoslavia. 45 
In its response to the Spanish Civil War SCF had struggled to maintain its principle of 
universalism, and eventually succumbed to popular pressure to extend greater support to 
children from just one side of the conflict. It had neglected the utilitarian and social role of 
children by dividing them from their families, and sent a pessimistic message to all 
involved by supporting evacuation. 
in many cases, especially with young children, it was extremely difficult to trace the parents. ' Translation, 
Save the Children International Union, Protection of Children in Time of Armed Conflict, Rdsumd of the 
discussion at the General Council, SCIF Archives reference M14/13 and M14/14, June 1939. 
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These are harsh conclusions. It could be argued that twenty years into its lifetime, the 
organization was faced with the consequences of its success in defining itself as the 
authoritative children's agency and that it had been railroaded into taking care of the 
Basque refugees because it could not be seen to neglect what was perceived as a children's 
issue. It is on record that the children had been brought to Britain against SCF's 
recommendation. 46 The Spanish Civil War was a significant milestone in the trend towards 
an increase in the number of voluntary agencies involved in the delivery of aid. In future 
part of SCF's effort would be aimed at persuading these other agencies to adopt what SCIF 
defined as good practice in relation to children affected by war, primarily for the sake of 
the children and incidentally to spare SCIF involvement in misguided operations. 
It is noteworthy that in its response to the aerial bombardment of Abyssinia and Spain, 
SCIF fulfilled public expectations by taking special measures for the protection of children. 
SCF worked with the Foreign Office to provide food to refugees from Abyssinia, and it 
responded to calls from other agencies to help in the reception of the Basque refugees. At 
the same time it began working in close coordination with the government to prepare for 
the protection of British children during the Second World War. None of these acts was 
45 Ressler, E. M. December 1992. Evacualion of Childrenfrom Conflict Areas: Considerations and 
Guidelines, Geneva: UNHCR and UNICEF. See also Bonnerjea, L. 1994. Family Tracing. A Good Practice 
Guide, Development Manual 3, London: Save the Children. 
46 Minutes of Special meeting of Council to discuss proposed evacuation of children from Bilbao, Monday 10 
May 1937, SCF Archives reference M 1/9. 
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controversial. This in itself was a departure from the early history of SCF, xvhen it had 
consistently taken action that was out of line with public opinion and government policy. 
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Chapter 4 
THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND THE NATIONAL POINT OF VIEW 
(1939-1945) 
The Second World War forced the people associated with SCF to choose between two 
competing sets of beliefs and values. Immediately after the First World War the people that 
founded SCF had been internationalist in their orientation, and drawn their inspiration from 
religious, socialist and humanitarian sources. During the 1930s, the organization was in 
thrall to people who adhered to a pessimistic defencist view of the world. It was also 
constrained by economic resources. Throughout this period The Worlds Children 
remained under the editorial control of Edward Fuller. The articles he chose to publish 
reveal the rising ascendancy of the nationalist persuasion among supporters of SCIF as they 
witnessed the effects of armed conflict round the globe. 
During the war between Japan and China, the Bishop of Hong Kong and South China 
wrote for The Worlds Children about the work of the nationalist leader, Madame Chiang 
Kai-Shek. SCF was supporting this work through a grant to the United Aid to China Fund. 
Madame Chiang Kai-Shek's orphanages point a moral which I shall never forget. It 
is not enough to save the life of a child. What sort of life are you saving it for... The 
grand thing about Madame Chiang Kai-Shek's orphanages is that they are directly 
related to the purposive life of the nation, and the problems of adolescence 
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emphasise this both in the very intelligent co-educational system and in the very 
strong sense of purpose for life which permeates her work. 
Like Eglantyne Jebb, the Bishop identified the utilitarian value of work with children, and 
in particular work with adolescents, but he was worried by the way in which this value 
could be corrupted and power over the next generation abused. 
You must allow me to say that my own personal view is that if you have no 
religious purpose, the danger of a form of national idolatry, which Germany knows 
too well, is always there. I am myself a strong believer therefore in religious 
orphanages rather than national ones 
He goes on to admit the ascendancy of pessimistic realism over optimism in his own 
beliefs. 
On the other hand, Madame Chiang Kai-Shek's system has many other great 
advantages, and I am confident that it would not have been possible to do on a 
religious basis what she has done on a national basis. ' 
Among the people who refused to be intimidated by the evidence of nationalist success, 
was Dorothy Buxton. Althoughl she was an inveterate individualist, up until 1939 she was 
able to translate her political beliefs into action through SCF. During the Second World 
War the organization failed her. It failed her because it withdrew its support for 
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universalism and for her pacifistic optimism. Instead it narrowed its vision of children to a 
utilitarian view related to the 'purposive life of the nation'. 
This chapter begins by examining the work Dorothy Buxton sustained within SCIF until the 
outbreak of the war. During the 1930s she was involved with SCF's work on behalf of 
refugees from Germany. More than any other strand of SCF's work at the time, this 
activity was consistent with the founding principles. However, it was unpopular with the 
government, and meant pushing for change in govermnent policy. The chapter then charts 
the way in which the government and SCIF found a more comfortable relationship. This 
developed out of the less contentious work SCIF had been doing on the protection of 
children in time of war, as well as its network of nurseries. By the end of the war, SCIF had 
been co-opted into the national war effort. So much so that when Churchill adopted his 
policy of total war, SCIF made no protest against the imposition of comprehensive 
sanctions on the civilian population of occupied Europe, despite being urged to do so by 
Dorothy Buxton. It was left to the Peace Pledge Union, the Oxford Famine Relief 
Committee and other groups to protest against this violation of the universal rights of 
children. 
Contentious work on behalf of refugees from Germany 
Since its inception, SCIF had stood up for German children, one of the most unpopular of 
causes with the British public. While SCIF was under pressure during the 1930s in Britain 
and in Spain to make its aid parochial and party political, the work of the Inter-Aid 
1 'Warphans', The World's Children, Vol. 22 No. 3, Autumn 1942,6 1. 
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Committee for Refugee Children from Gennany remained consistent with the guiding 
principle of universalism. However, the Inter-Aid Committee was working within a 
context where the principle of universalism was to meet its most persistent challenge: 
indifference to the predicament of refugees. 
Although the case of the Basque children in Britain has become part of the romance of the 
Civil War, Tom Buchanan argues that the acceptance of these refugees must be kept in 
perspective. He explains the fact that their arrival was treated as st! ch a remarkable event as 
due, in part, to the unwillingness of British governments since the First World War to 
accept refugees - especially those without private means. In comparison, by October 1937, 
France had taken 70,000 Spanish refugees, and by the end of the war this had risen to some 
440,000.2 Although the refugees were indebted to the government for political and legal 
protection, the financial cost of receiving refugees in Britain had been borne primarily by 
non-governmental organizations. 3 
Since the First World War the League of Nations had begun to develop arrangements for 
the protection of refugees. Claudena Skran has outlined how the inter-war years saw the 
establishment of a 'refugee regime'. She describes how long before the formation of the 
International Refugee Organization (after the Second World War) a group of countries 
were developing a set of arrangements to govern the way in which they dealt with 
2 Buchanan 1997,116. 
3 'In the post-War crisis, the whole financial responsibility was bome for some time in this way before 
Governments stepped in. It is fair to say that the greater part of material assistance has been provided by 
private organizations, some of them set up ad hoc, but some with more general functions of which refugee 
work is only one. ' Hope Simpson, J. 1939. The Refugee Problem: Report ofa Survey, London: Oxford 
University Press, 172. 
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refugees. 4 SCF was influential in the shaping of this regime, and contributed to the raising 
of the level of protection offered to refugees. It recognized that as nation states took over 
more and more civil functions, twentieth century refugees would suffer greater 
5 
marginalization. For example, SCF advocated the creation of a travel document for 
refugees. The Nansen passport was introduced in 5 July 1922 for Russian refugees and for 
Annenian refugees in 1924 to facilitate their travel, and this was then extended on an ad 
hoe basis to other refugee groups. 
The refugee regime of the inter-war years was underpinned by the two principles of 
humanitarianism and state sovereignty. However, there was a tension between these two 
principles which still confuses refugee politics. 6 The tension was brought into the open 
when the rise of Nazism led to an increase in the numbers of people leaving Germany, 
prompting the resignation of James McDonald, the High Commissioner for Refugees from 
Germany. He felt strongly that his office should tackle the violations of humanitarian 
standards by states and concluded his letter of resignation with a plea that state sovereignty 
be set aside in favour of humanitarian imperatives: 
When domestic policies threaten the demoralization and exile of hundreds of 
thousands of human beings considerations of diplomatic correctness must yield to 
those of common humanity. I should be recreant if I did not call attention to the 
actual situation, and plead that world opinion, acting through the League and its 
4 Skran, C. M. 1995. Refugees in Inter-Mar Europe: The Emergence ofa Regime, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
5 Joly, D. 1992. Refugees: As), him in Europe? London: Minority Rights Publications, 5. 
6 See for example Kom, D. A. 1998. Exodus within Borclers: An Introduction to the Crisis ofInternal 
Displacement, Washington D. C: Brookings Institution Press. 
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Member States and other countries move to avert the existing and impending 
tragedies. 7 
McDonald's stand was consistent with the policy of SCIF laid out by Eglantyne Jebb in The 
International Handbook of Child Care and Protection. 
We need to remember that we are human beings first and the members of a 
particular nation afterwards... There are certain fundamental duties which we owe 
to mankind, and which, when they appear to clash (it is always in appearance only) 
with our duties to our National State, should nevertheless take precedence ... The 
Save the Children Fund, therefore, takes up its stand upon the conviction that we 
have duties to our fellow-men generally, and not only to our fellow-nationals, and 
that these duties are categorical 8 
Those who adhered to the principle of state sovereignty could only offer refugees 
protection, and could not deal with the root causes of the refugee flight. Through the mid- 
1930s a kernel of SCIF supporters still attempted to deal with root causes, and to 
understand and undo the processes which led to persecution and war. Dorothy Buxton was 
one of them. When the SCF had dwindling resources and was under pressure to give aid to 
children in Britain, she had continued to appeal for relief for Germany. The appeal 
recognized the straitened circumstances of British households. 
7 Letter of resignation of James G. McDonald as High Commissioner for Refugees from Gennany, October 
1933. The League chose to appoint a successor who would be prepared to subordinate humanitarian 
principles to state sovereignty. Quoted in Skran 1995,235. 
8 Jebb, E., 'The World Policy of the Save the Children Fund' in Fuller 1928,564. 
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An urgent appeal is more than justified despite the need in this country. Although 
the statistics are incomplete the percentage of people unemployed or working on 
very short time (often only eight hours a week) is greater by far in Germany than in 
England, and the only unemployment pay available in Germany is a government 
dole worth 51- to 6/- a week for a whole family. 
Together with her husband Charles Roden Buxton she had visited Germany in 1921 and 
stayed with a Ruhr miner's family to experience at first hand the difficulties of their daily 
life. After the rise of Hitler her contact with Germans was with refugees. She had become 
more and more isolated in her work, but had the same principled objections to the 
established refugee regime as the McDonald school. 
In 1938, SCF published a report calling attention to the dire conditions facing Russian 
refugees in France. ' 0 In response to the economic recession many governments had 
adopted legislation prohibiting the employment of foreigners. It was not only becoming 
harder for refugees to travel, find shelter and cam a living within Europe; the US was also 
closing its doors. The US Immigration Acts of 1921 and 1924 established a quota system 
designed to limit the total immigration to the US and to favour immigrants born in northern 
and western Europe. This quota system proved inflexible even in the event of the 1938 
Anschluss and an increase in refugees from the Sudetenland and Austria, and the events of 
Kilslallnacht in November of the same year. Even the entrance of 20,000 German refugee 
9 British Appeal for Relief in Germany, SCF Archives reference SC/DB. 13. 
10 Save the Children Fund 1935. Report on Russians, Armenians, German andSaar Refugees in France. 
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children outside the existing quotas for 1939 and 1940 was ruled out. 'One of the principal 
arguments made by the restrictionists was that special treatment for refugee children would 
divert needed attention from poor children already in the US. "' This was what Eglantyne 
Jebb had deplored as the 'National Point of View' of child welfare. 
The extent to which anti-Semitism permeated the British government and British public 
was a measure of the widespread and deep-seated reluctance to accept the tenets of 
universalism. The work of the Inter-Aid Committee was exceptional. It is important to note 
how limited its success was, because otherwise mention of its existence can serve to cover 
up the fact that anti-Semitism was not merelY a German, but a Europe-wide phenomenon. 12 
The British goverment had initially responded to the Anschluss by requiring visas for 
Austrians, however, public pressure forced it to adopt a more favourable policy, and in 
April 1938 the Home Office did ask the ma or British voluntary organizations to form a i 
committee on refugees. 13 Overall it must be said that the British government led the efforts 
to block the escape of Jews from Germany, both before and during the war. For example, 
in 1941 when ten thousand Jews were deported from Vichy France to Poland, the British 
goven-anent denied entry to all Jews, including children, from unoccupied France. 14 
11 The Wagners-Rogers bill, discussed in Skran 1995,219. 
12 Wasserstein, B. 1999. Britain and the Jews ofEurope, London: Leicester University Press. See also 
comments by Lord Parmoor, Chairman of SCF, about 'the Jewish riff-raff of Russia': Breen, SCIF Archive 
Paper No. 4, n. d. 13 Skran 1995,221. 
14 'On 8 December 1942 Otto Schiff, Chairman of Jewish Refugee Committees, reported to the Aliens 
Committee of the Board of Deputies of British Jews that "it had not been possible to bring one child here. " 
Wasserstein 1999,104. 
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The movement to save German children fell far short of 'the greatest life-saving movement 
that the world has ever seen' envisaged by Eglantyne Jebb. 15 However insignificant in its 
effects, it was interesting in the history of SCF on several counts. Firstly it vindicated the 
insistence of Eglantyne Jebb on the non-denominational and non-political character of 
SCF. The Inter-Aid Committee for Children from Germany was formed on 24 March 1936 
by the Jewish Refugee Committee and the Society of Friends (Germany Emergency 
Committee) which were dealing respectively with Jewish refugees and non-Aryan 
Christian refugees. It placed itself under the aegis of the SCF, using the Fund's address and 
financial auditor, in order 'to emphasize its non-denominational and non-political 
character'. 16 Secondly it adopted the language of children's rights established by Eglantyne 
Jebb. 
It very early became evident that the problem of the 'non-Aryan' children in 
Germany is on so vast a scale that no voluntary organisation can do more than 
touch the fringes [ ... ] Yet it was felt that, however small the help given, it could 
keep hope alive in the persecuted minority in Germany and demonstrate, however 
modestly, faith in the rights of childhood. 17 
Thirdly, it set the precedent of explicitly identifying children for assistance not on the basis 
of their economic or physical needs, but on the basis of their moral and mental health. 18 
15 Jebb, E. 'Rescue the Perishing', Publication unknown, SCF Archives reference SC/DB, 21 May 1919. 
16 The First Annual Report of the Inter-Aid Committee for Children from Germany 27April 1936-31 August 
1937, SCF Archives reference M 14/23. 17 Ibid. 
" The experience of children during the Second World War has been the starting point for debate on the 
psychological effects of -vvar upon children. See for example Cairns, E. 1996. Children andPolifical 
Violence, Oxford: Blackwell, 28-69. 
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Poverty, being as widespread among the displaced 'non-Aryan' population, could 
not by itself constitute a claim for help; selection must be made among those 
children whose mental and moral equilibrium is threatened by the conditions under 
which they live. 
19 
The following case history of an eleven-year-old girl gives some idea of the circumstances 
of the children. It also shows how the appeal relied upon the hospitality of individual 
families and the willingness of individuals not only to give money to SCF but also to open 
up their homes. 
The father is 'Aryan' and the wife Jewish. They have divorced because the 
presence of a Jewish wife is a serious handicap to a man's career. The mother has 
received permission to work in England as an artist. The child was left in Germany 
because the mother's position in England was so precarious. The child had no 
relatives in Germany with whom she could live, since her father's parents would 
not receive her, owing to her Jewish blood. At school she suffered greatly because 
she was not allowed to join the Hitler Youth, but she tried to identify herself with 
the Nazi ideals, hanging out the Nazi flag on holidays and talking violent anti- 
Sernitism. Yet she was never allowed to forget her Jewish blood. She is receiving 
free hospitality from an English family and attending day-school. 20 
19 The First Annual Report of the Inter-Aid Committee, SCF Archives reference M 14/23. 
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The Inter-Aid Committee demonstrated again the close links between the Quakers and 
SCF. The internationalism of the founders of SCIF was given practical expression in the 
Quaker methodology of individuals providing hospitality to others suffering persecution. 
For the Quakers there was no separation of the personal from the professional, in other 
words an individual Quaker would be expected to act according to his or her conscience as 
much as according to the policy of a Quaker committee. It is possible to speak of a 
movement, however minor, on behalf of Gen-nan children, at a timewhen other SCF 
activities did not achieve the same momentum. This may be attributed to the vital core of 
personal commitment to which SCF lent its institutional support. 
War prevention or war preparation 
The Quakers differed from SCF in that they made no division of labour between 
international reconciliation and relief This division of labour had come about when the 
Fight the Famine Council was still in existence. The Fight the Famine Council had been 
dedicated to international reconciliation, and SCF to relief In the 1930s as war appeared 
more likely, SCF now had no parent organization to undertake war prevention. However, it 
did still have supporters who had participated in the early meetings of the Fight the Famine 
Council and embodied the concerns of both organizations. 
20 One of several 'typical histories' cited in The First Annual Report of the Inter-Aid Committee for Children 
from Germany 27April 1936 - 31 August 1937, SCF Archives reference M 14/23. 
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Dorothy Buxton is described by her husband's biographer, Victoria de Bunsen, as 
concerning herself less with politics and more and more with humanitarian issues. 21 
However, in the year that the Nuremberg Laws were proclaimed and the numbers of 
people leaving Germany again increased she undertook to meet with Hermann G6ring 22 
and protest against Nazi atrocities. It was through the friends that SCF had in government, 
that Dorothy Buxton was able to gain access to G6ring. Countess Wilarnowitz 
Moellendorff had workedwith Eglantyne Jebb following the First World War and had 
been instrumental in the foundation of Radda Barnen (Swedish Save the Children). Her 
sister was married to Gbring. Dorothy Buxton learned that the Countess had since engaged 
in lecture tours supporting her brother-in-law's politics, nevertheless the old friendship 
served its purpose and she was granted an interview. This was an individual initiative 
sanctioned neither by SCIF nor by her husband, Charles Roden Buxton Mp. 23 Dorothy 
Buxton shared with her sister Eglantyne Jebb a characteristic detennination to do whatever 
was within her power: 
There seemed so little that one insignificant individual could possibly do against 
the horrors of the concentration camps! A personal interview with G6ring however 
might conceivably produce some effect and it was therefore out of the question for 
me to forgo it [ ... ] At least my remarks went home to the extent that he became 
very angry and excited; the dignified mien was dropped and he gesticulated 
21 Bunsen, de 1948,159. 
22 Hermann G6ring (1893-1946), was President of the Reichstag from 1932, joined the Nazi government in 
1933, founded the Gestapo and set up the concentration camps. 
23 Charles Roden Buxton did himself make three visits to Germany in 1939. He went xvith a Quaker concern. 
On 23 September 1939 he resigned from his position as Parliamentary Adviser to the Labour Party in order 
to be able to speak out freely in favour of a negotiated peace. Bunsen, de 1948,68. 
loo 
furiously, waving his anns over his head. I soon felt that my mission was hopeless. 
Failure once more - as so often (and since) ! 
24 
Dorothy Buxton belonged to the tradition of pacifists that believed that 'We must have 
truck with dictators, either on the battle field or round the conference table - and I choose 
the conference table'. 25 When war broke out she continued to find ways of giving 
expression to her oxvn undiminished internationalism by providing assistance to German 
internees in Britain. 
Eglantyne Jebb had always insisted that the strength of the movement must lie in the 
international organization, not in individual initiatives or even national societies. How well 
did her blueprint for an international voluntary organization withstand the test of the years 
leading up to the Second World War? During the inter-war years SCIF had built up a 
formal union of organizations across Europe as well as a network of informal contacts and 
friends. Prior to the outbreak of war, the rise of the Nazis had already had a direct effect 
upon members of UISE. 
One of the Union's most successful projects on behalf of young people had been led by 
Madame Vajkai in Hungary. Following the Anschluss and the introduction of Nazi laws in 
Austria, the SCF Council received a letter from Madame Vajkai stating how her work in 
neighbouring Hungary had been affected. 
24 Quoted in Bunsen, de 157. 
25 Hudson, J. Peace News, 26 March 1938,1. 
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The General Secretary read extracts from a confidential letter received from 
Madame Vajkai, describing the serious situation in which she found herself and her 
work owing to the new law proposed in Hungary regarding persons of Jewish 
origin engaged in educational and executive work. 26 
A Gennan child welfare organization had also been part of the Union. However, following 
an enquiry by UISE regarding Jewish children in Gennany, the Deutsche Zenti-ale resigned 
from UISE. There were rumours that the Gen-nan organization then approached the 
Scandinavian sister organizations of SCF to set up a new and separate association, but this 
came to nothing. 
27 
At the outbreak of war UISE took steps to safeguard its own neutrality. The British 
president, Hubert Watson, resigned, and a management committee was composed of 
members of the Executive belonging to neutral countries. 28 
As the outbreak of war drew nearer, there is no evidence that SCF put its efforts into war 
prevention, instead discussions of the Council were dominated by pessimistic realism. 
Given that war was bound to come, then how best could children be protected from its 
worst consequences? In 1939 the Council dedicated most of its time to the proposal for 
Zones of Immunity for children. The proposal had originated with the SCF's Chairman, 
Hubert Watson. He gathered support from UISE. A joint commission of the ICRC and 
26 Save the Children Council meeting, 9 January 1939, SCF Archives reference MI/9. 
27 SCF Archives reference M 1/10,20 July 1939. 
28 Minutes of the 10 Meeting of the Executive Committee of Save the Children Fund, 3 October 1939, SCF 
Archives reference MI/10. 
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UISE was then fornied to bring the question before governments. The draft 'Convention 
for the Protection of Children in the Event of Armed Conflict' was modelled on the 
International Red Cross Convention. It provided for food, clothing and supplies to be sent 
from other countries for the benefit of children residing at the outbreak or during the period 
of hostilities in the territories of States engaged in anned conflict. It also provided for 
places of safety to be established for the exclusive protection of children. 29 
Both UISE and the ICRC had discussed the question of whether the protection of children 
should be included in that for the civilian population in general or dealt with separately. 
The Council of UISE agreed that protection for children would be much more easily 
accomplished than general protection for the civil population. They therefore considered 
that it would be in the interests of the children to make them the object of a special 
Convention and consequently to devise a distinctive protective sign for them. 
Both the German and the British governments took a different view from that of UISE. On 
12 July 1939 The Manchester Guardian published an extract from correspondence with the 
German Embassy. 
My view is that it would be advisable to solve the question of the protection of 
children within the scope of the general problem of the protection of the Civil 
Population. The introduction of a special protection for a specific portion of the 
29 The lVorld's Children, March 1939,76-77. 
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Civil Population involved the risk that the protection of the remainder of the Civil 
Population might be regarded as of less importance. 30 
Correspondence between representatives of SCIF and the German Embassy continued until 
as late as 2 September. When negotiations over the draft convention finally broke down, 
their failure was blamed by the British press upon the Germans. The Thnes reported that 
the Gen-nan Government had refused to consider a proposal to humanize the war: 
The German answer, which is reported to have been given after the Gennan Red 
Cross had consulted its Government in the hope of securing such a guarantee, was: 
'We are unable to sign such an agreement. Germany cannot reveal in advance what 
will or will not be her objectives. War to-day is total warfare. ' 31 
Part and parcel of the discussion of the 'International Convention for the Protection of 
Children in the event of Armed Conflict' were discussions of national plans for the 
protection of children. UISE advised each of the national societies which made up its 
members to get in touch with their national Ministry of Defence. SCIF found itself 
participating in the national plans for the defence and education of Britain's children. 
The work that SCF engaged in on behalf of the Ministry of Defence demonstrated the 
significance of the second of Eglantyne Jebb's guiding principles, utilitarianism. In time of 
war, children were embraced as part of the nation, and their welfare was seen as critical to 
30 Weizacker to Morgan, 21 August 1939, Berlin. SCIF Archives reference M 14/13 and M 14/14. 
31 The Times, 29 November 1939. 
104 
the national spirit. In the first month of the war Edward Fuller, Editor of The Worlds 
Children, met with Miss Greaves, Inspector of the Board of Education, to discuss War 
Emergency Nursery Schools. 32 
Miss Greaves was alive to the ill effects on children of the sort of gossip which is 
going on all through the country between neighbours, which has the effect of 
intensifying the terror of the times for small children and in this way of 
disintegrating the national spirit. Nursery schools would remove the children from 
this influence to no small extent. 
The founders of SCF had been concerned that war preparation fostered a war mentality 
amongst the population and represented a step towards totalitarianism. This liberal strand 
was not present in SCIF in the 1940s. By contrast, SCF almost became an arm of the 
government, helping to maintain order and discipline within home and school. The direct 
contribution that SCIF was making to the national war effort was recognized by Save the 
Children USA. Save the Children USA supported the work of SCIF in running residential 
nurseries for young children in order to free more women to work in the munitions 
factories. 
One of the great needs in England today in the way of cooperation, is residential 
nurseries for the children of the war workers. Two hundred thousand additional 
women have just been called to work in munitions factories. 25% of them have 
children. Under the present ruling of the government, all children from 2 to 5 years 
32 SCF Archives reference SC/EF/i/ 10,16 September 1939. 
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of age remain the responsibility of their mothers, no matter what the mothers are 
doing. This responsibility has made it necessary to study the problem as a welfare 
situation ... [The contribution of the residential nurseries] to this work is peculiarly 
constructive, because we not only make it possible to start the children out without 
the neurotic shell-shock of the war, but we also release more women to war 
industries, which increases the manpower in the battle line. 33 
At the same time as responding to the immediate wartime needs, one of the most striking 
characteristics of SCF's war-time work in Britain is how forward-looking it was. It 
resembled development work as much as emergency work. Even before the outbreak of 
war, UISE had determined that the war should not divert its members from their long-term 
goals. 
The second extremely important point is that all work for the protection of children 
in time of anned conflict, and notably the plans for camps, should be undertaken 
with the idea that they may be useful in time of peace. This principle would avoid 
expense for what would otherwise be only temporary work and would assist the 
various countries to develop their pennanent work for the welfare of children. 34 
The work of SCIF during the Second World War can be interpreted in a number of ways. 
Clearly there was a retreat from universalism, however there was also a new emphasis 
upon the contribution to be made by children within national society. There were echoes of 
33 Allen, H. J. Britain undei- Bombs, SCIF Archives reference SC/EF/i. 
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the utilitarian principle of Eglantyne Jebb and her vision of children belonging to the social 
world. She would, however, have been disappointed that the emphasis was upon children 
belonging to the nation at the expense both of their ties to humanity and of the more 
immediate ties that are necessary to children's well-being. Mass evacuation plans separated 
children from their families and homes at the same time as introducing them to other parts 
of the nation. 
35 
Total -war 
When in August 1940 Winston Churchill declared his policy of total war on Germany, it 
was the antithesis of all that SCIF had ever striven for. However, SCIF had already taken on 
the role of loyal supporter of the national war effort. Confronted with the terrible 
consequences for children in German-controlled areas of the total war policy, SCIF did not 
deviate from this loyal role. This chapter concludes by examining the response of the 
Council to the policy of total war in order to discover the distance SCIF had removed itself 
from its first principles, its past record, and its oldest and closest allies. 
As part of the policy of total war, Winston Churchill had laid out his intention to maintain 
and enforce a strict blockade not only of Germany but of its ally Italy, France and other 
36 
countries that had fallen under German control. All goods traded with the enemy were 
34 Save the Children International Union, Protection of Children in Time ofArmed Conflict, rdsum6 of the 
discussion at the General Council, June 1939. SCF Archives reference M 14/13 and M 14/14. 
33 Padley, R. and Cole, M., eds, 1940. Evacuation Survey: A Report to the Fabian Society, London: George 
Routledge and Sons, and Maas 1963. 'Young Adult Adjustment of T-wenty Wartime Residential Nursery 
Children', Chilel lVelfare, February 1963. 
36 Speech in House of Commons, 20 August 1940. Quoted in Black, M. 1992. A Callsefor our Thnes. 
Oxfani: The First Fifty Years, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2. 
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declared contraband as were all goods destined for the relief of friendly countries under 
enemy occupation. For German-controlled areas which relied on food imports, such as the 
Greek islands, this amounted to a virtual sentence to death by starvation. 37 At a meeting of 
the Council of SCIF on 24 April 1941 the situation in Greece was on the agenda. The 
following minute was made; 
The situation in Greece has made it impossible to continue sending allocations to 
Salonika for the work of M. Tsiomis, from whom there was no recent news. All 
allocations for Greece had therefore been cancelled. 38 
There was no record of any initiative on the part of the Council either to investigate other 
channels for sending allocations to Greece or to monitor the situation in Greece. By the 
autumn of 1941 news of famine in Greece began to reach London. The most prominent 
figures lobbying the government to lift its blockade were people who were closely 
associated with the first generation of SCF. It is perplexing that throughout the period from 
1941 to 1944 they were not able to spur the Council to action. By its inaction, the Council 
can be seen to have supported the government's policy of total war, with its terrible 
implications not only for the civilian populations under the control of Germany, but also 
for future generations. 39 
37 The British government argued that according to the 1907 Hague Conventions it was the responsibility of 
the occupying power to feed those people under its authority, or to allow them to feed themselves from their 
own resources. 
39 SCF Archives reference M I/ 10,24 April 194 1. 
39 The harmful effects of the short-lived famine in the winter of 1944-1945 in the Netherlands upon a 
previously Nvell-nouri shed population have attracted much medical interest. See Jeffrey, S. 'The High Price 
of Hunger', The Medical Post, 7 November 1995, www. mentalhealth. com/mag I /p5m-scOl. html 
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The previous chapter showed how the pacifist beliefs popular immediately after the First 
World War held little sway over supporters of SCIF by 1939. This may explain why the 
'Food Relief Campaign' set up by the Peace Pledge Union had little impact upon SCF. Its 
Chain-nan, Vera Brittain, lamented that a campaign by pacifists could easily be dismissed 
as the work of 'fanatics, soft-heads, and sentimental idealists'. 40 However, it was harder for 
SCIF to ignore the voices of two of its most significant early supporters, Gilbert Murray 
and Lord Robert Cecil. The latter had been one of the first patrons of the SCIF and a friend 
and admirer of Eglantyne Jebb. As Minister for the Blockade in 1919 he had been 
responsible in some people's view for maintaining the conditions of scarcity in central 
Europe and was lobbied hard by the founders of SCF, who won him to their cause. By the 
end of 1941 both Gilbert Murray and Lord Robert Cecil had decided to lend their weight to 
the Peace Pledge Union campaign on behalf of the famine-stricken Greeks. SCIF still 
hesitated. Ex-President Herbert Hoover, founder of the ARA and SCF's partner in Saratov 
province during the Russian Famine, also appealed to Winston Churchill to lift the 
blockade. 41 So did the Quaker Edith Pye, SCF's mentor in Vienna. These were all people 
who could have been expected to carry influence with the Council because of their long 
historical associations with SCF. 
On 29 May 1942 the creation of a national Famine Relief Committee was publicly 
announced, with Bishop Bell as chairman. Edith Pye led the nationwide campaign. The 
Famine Relief Committee's aims were to obtain accurate information about food 
conditions in German-controlled or invaded countries and to promote schemes for sending 
40 Black 1992,9. 
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food, vitamins and medical aid into such countries. The Committee also opened a Famine 
Relief Fund to pay for such relief as soon as pen-nission was obtained to use it. The 
Committee recorded at its second meeting of 24 March 1943 that its objects were 'the 
relief (to the extent that the law for the time being permits) of famine and sickness arising 
as a result of war'. 42 
These aims were remarkably similar to those of the Fight the Famine Council, combining 
information, advocacy, and relief. History seemed to be repeating itself, and yet at this 
juncture the SCF Council took a very different decision from its forebears. It cannot be 
said that the Council members were ignorant of the circumstances of children living in 
Europe. SCF was in possession of as much, if not more, information than the members of 
the Fight the Famine Council. It was already collecting material for a survey of the effect 
of war on children in occupied areas. 43 Through the fonnal and infonnal network of the 
international union, SCIF was able to gather information about the situation of children in 
occupied countries. Madame Vajkai remained in Hungary throughout the war and extended 
44 her work to include Polish refugees whose homes were in Russian-occupied Poland. In 
1942 M. Thdlin reported on his journey in unoccupied France. He particularly took up the 
issue of young foreigners aged between 15 and 18. Jews in that age group could not benefit 
41 Herbert Hoover's Commission for Polish Relief had already delivered supplies through the blockade in 
1939 with British consent. 
42 Oxford Committee for Famine Relief, Minute Book, 1942. This is a small lined exercise book now kept in 
the Bodleian Library, Oxford. See also Black 1992. 
43 Save the Children Fund Post War Committee. Children in Bondage: A Survey ofChild Life in the 
Occupied Countries ofEurope and in Finland, London: Longmans. 
44 Vajkai, R. 1940. XIVe Rapport concernant les enfants rifugiis polonais, Union Internationale de Secours 
aux Enfants, Budapest, 21 September 1940. 
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as children from release from internment camps, instead they were enrolled in ' "workers 
battalions" where the conditions may prove fatal owing to their debilitated health I. 45 
There was nothing in these reports which led the Council to believe that circumstances 
were about to improve. 
This survey incorporates infon-nation which was available up to June 1942. It may 
become out of date, even before it is published, but unhappily only by an 
exacerbation of the deprivations and sufferings here shown to exist in a degree 
which has probably never been surpassed, and seldom paralleled, on the long Via 
Dolorosa of the human race. 46 
The feasibility of delivering aid to children suffering from malnutrition was also not in 
question. In German-occupied France, the American Friends Service Council were feeding 
100,000 seriously malnourished children with no evidence. that food was being 
commandeered by the Germans. 47 
While other organizations made public appeals, SCIF remained silent. In January 1944, the 
Council received a sharp letter from Dorothy Buxton. In her inimitable style she returned 
to first principles. 
45 Th6lin, Stuninary ofAf. Thilin's Report on hisjourney in Unoccupied France, Maj, 18130,1942, Save the 
Children International Union, Geneva, SCF Archives reference M 14/13 and M 14/14. 
46 Save the Children Fund Post War Committee, 1943,9. 
47 In November 1942 the supplies to this scheme . vere cut off by the British government. 
She hoped the Council would consider very seriously whether the Fund was still 
justified, in view of present conditions, in drawing a hard and fast line round the 
sphere of the SCIF to avoid touching on what might be considered as a political 
matter - i. e. pleading for even the slightest relaxation of the blockade. She felt it 
was possible that the destruction of child life would have already taken place on 
such a vast scale if one waited until after the war to take part in relief work that 
neither the surviving individual nor the nations concerned would ever recover; and 
that if the SCIF was to remain worthy of its name it should take part in the 
movement for an immediate scheme of relief in Belgium and elsewhere. 48 
The response of the General Secretary reveals a man without a sense of urgency. He 
recalled that a year ago SCIF had arranged a joint deputation with the National Union of 
Teachers to the Foreign Office. 49 The response of Victoria de Bunsen was more surprising 
given her participation in the radical early days of SCF. She tempered her support for a 
resolution calling for the government to relax its blockade with a warning against 
jeopardizing the post-war participation of SCIF in the work of the Council of British 
Societies for Relief Abroad (COBSRA). COBSRA had been fonned under government 
auspices to undertake the task of coordinating all British voluntary efforts. 
It was Edward Fuller, another member of the first generation of SCF, who made the 
comparison with the position twenty-five years earlier, and the work of the Fight the 
Famine Council. He reminded them that SCF's principal function was 'to raise funds and 
'g SCF Archives reference M I/ IIC. 2867,20 January 1944. 
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to administer relief to the children'. 50 However, the closest that the Council eventually got 
to an admission that it had failed to act in accordance with its principal function was in its 
recognition that other organizations may have stepped in to act where it had failed to do so. 
One of the organizations that stepped into the breach was the Oxford Famine Committee, 
later to be known as Oxfam. The Quaker roots of Oxfam. are more often recognized than 
those of SCF, but it could be said that SCF drew on the experiences of the First World War 
generation of Quakers, while Oxfam drew on the experiences of the Second World War 
generation of Quakers .51 Both the Quakers and the newly founded Oxford Famine 
Committee were to remain close partners in relief with SCF, but following the failure of 
SCIF to oppose the policy of total war, there was a public perception of a difference in 
respectability between the two organizations. 
- Although SCIF generally worked with a wide variety of groups and strove to 
include representatives of all faiths and parties among its supporters, never before 
had it been quite so respectable. Before the war, Save the Children had always had 
a slightly eccentric tone; after the war it was definitely part of the establishment. 52 
During the Second World War SCF distanced itself from its founding principles. 
According to Gilbert Murray, 'the rules of total war are not easily distinguishable from 
'9 Joint deputation of SCF and NUT to approach the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs on the question of 
the possibility of organizing transport and asylum for Jewish and other children from Nazi-occupied Europe. 
-'0 SCF Archives reference M I/ IIC. 2867,20 January 1944. 
51 The influence of the Quakers and in particular the FAU lasted long into Oxfam's development. See 
Chapter 5, and Black 1992,8 1. 
52 Breen, SCF Archive Paper No. ], April 1995. 
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those of Hell. ý53 The fact that the SCIF Council remained unmoved showed how far the 
organization had come. It was in retreat from universalism: the survival needs of German 
children, and children living in occupied Europe, did not spur the Council to action. It was 
in retreat too from the utilitarian concern with the next generation, and the kind of society 
that the survivors of the war in Europe would build. Above all it had succumbed to the 
impossibility argument, and abandoned Eglantyne Jebb's optimistic belief that there was 
'no inherent impossibility in saving the children of the world'. Instead of a global vision, 
the Council fixed its attention upon the UK where, with substantial funding from the 
United States, SCIF did much to ensure that British children were protected from the worst 
effects of the war. This national work did prove a useful foundation for pre-school 
education in post-war British society. But whatever the quality of SCF's work in the UK, it 
could. no longer be described as part of the optimistic international vision laid down by 
Eglantyne Jebb. 
After the war SCF sent its first relief teams into Europe, in association with COBSRA. It 
had emerged from the Second World War as a national society which acted as a child 
welfare organization at home and a relief organization abroad. When it did seek to 
revitalize its work with other child welfare organizations, particularly in Eastern Europe, it 
found that the new political divides between East and West acted as a barrier to 
international cooperation. These political divisions and their impact upon international 
humanitarian efforts on behalf of children are the subject of the next chapter. 
53 Murray, G., 1943. 'The Tum of the Tide', The Conlemporaty Review, Vol. 164, September 1943,129-134. 
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Chapter 5 
THE EARLY COLD WAR (1945-1959) 
Two competing perspectives were vying for the attention of the British public and 
politicians in 1945. The first focussed on the end of anned conflict and was post-war. The 
second focussed on the hardening divisions between East and West and was Cold War. 
These two perspectives had contrary influences over SCF. The post-war perspective 
allowed for a reawakening of the original spirit of SCIF and a rediscovery of the guiding 
principles of universalism, utilitarianism and optimistic pacificism. The Cold War 
perspective encouraged renewed challenges to the validity of these guiding principles. This 
competition can be most clearly seen in Europe where attempts to work according to the 
three guiding principles were distorted at every level by the ideological divide between 
East and West. It proved impossible to practise universalism in a bipolar world, and this 
period saw the end of thirty years of SCF work in the Eastern European countries of 
Yugoslavia and Hungary. While it could be said that the utilitarian role of children as the 
generation and hence creators of the future was an integral part of both the ideological 
rhetoric of East and West, the structural nature of that future was contested. Lastly, there 
was no place for optimistic pacificism in a landscape of 'negative peace'. 
The outcome of the competition between the post-war perspective and the Cold War 
perspective was not immediately evident. However, in retrospect it can be seen that a 
pattern was set in Europe which was then imitated in Korea and Vietnam. In each case 
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SCF workers worked in the zone of influence of the US and its allies only, and had to 
follow in the wake of the military and set up programmes under military authority. In a 
world dominated by the Cold War and the threat of nuclear conflict, SCIF was restricted to 
work on one side of the Iron Curtain only. 
In this chapter I look first at the impetus for the revival of the guiding principles of the 
founding generation, and in particular the durability of the organizational blueprint for SCIF 
laid down by Eglantyne Jebb. The crowning evidence for this is the acceptance of the 
Declaration of the Rights of the Child by the UN in 1959. Next, I consider the response of 
SCF to the aftennath of the Second World War in Europe. Here the post-war perspective 
and the revival of the paradigm that guided the founding generation met with a competing 
Cold War perspective. By the time of the outbreak of the Korean war, the Cold War 
perspective was pervasive. It is noteworthy that this period also coincided with the 
establishment of the state of Israel and the displacement of Palestinians from Palestine, the 
flight of refugees from China to Hong Kong, from Hungary to Austria, and from Tibet to 
India. I have chosen to focus upon SCF's response to the Korean war, because by 1955 
South Korea had become the largest recipient of aid from SCIF and remained so until 
1968.1 
The resilience of Eglantyne Jebb's blueprint for SCIF 
Through the Second World War SCIF had found itself cut off from its partners in UISE, 
and insulated from the experiences of others by the difficulties of wartime travel and news 
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censorship. It was no longer functioning as part of an international organization with an 
international perspective. After the war the links with its partners were resuscitated and 
SCIF staff began to travel among other war affected people. This international contact 
rekindled the original spirit of SCF. The practical work of a new generation of 
fieldworkers shines through from the records. In particular Bridget Stevenson in Germany 2 
and Mary Hawkins in the Middle East and Korea 3 can be seen both as successors to the 
pioneering generation of the inter-war years, and as remark-able precursors and mentors for 
the current generation of professionals who make a career of international relief and 
development work. In all their reports they emphasize the importance of developing 
opportunities for local staff to extend work on behalf of children. For example, Frau 
Nielsen was working with Bridget Stevenson in Uelzen before she went on to start SCIF 
work in the refugee camps in Hamburg. She wrote with enthusiasm of the work SCF had 
enabled her to do. 
Vor ungefähr drei Wochen habe ich mit meiner Arbeit in Hamburg begonnen. Ich 
möchtefast sagen, dass das Wort Arbeit night zutreffend ist. Es ist viehnehr eine 
wunderbare A ufgabe und ein schönes Gefühl seinen Mitmenschen helfen zu 
k6nizen. Besonders den Kindern. 4 
' With the exception of 1957. 
2 See monthly reports from Germany from 1948 to 1962 in Bridget Stevenson Papers, SCIF Archives 
reference SUBS/1-4. 
3 See Tapes 1-3 of interviews with Mary Hawkins by Rodney Breen, 4-5 December 1997, SCF Archives. 
4 'About three weeks ago I began my work in Hamburg, but I must admit that "Nvorle' is scarcely the 
expression to use of something which brings me such a wonderful opportunity, so much happiness, and the 
satisfying feeling of at last trying to help people who have suffered so much and particularly the children. ' 
SCF Archives reference SC/BS/l -4, March 1953. 
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SCIF has been described as 'the almoner' of its supporters. 5 It was a channel for individuals 
to provide assistance to suffering children worldwide. Without the vivid accounts of SCIF 
personnel, whether British or Gennan, of their daily encounters with children, and the 
sense that SCF was making a contribution, however minor, to the alleviation of suffering, 
the impetus to support SCF would dwindle. The 'impossibility argument' was most likely 
to surface when there were no practical examples to refute it. As Eglantyne Jebb had said, 
once the organization was able to write out its beliefs in practice, it was then able to 
communicate them to others. 6 
During the war the SCIF Council had been isolated from international contacts and from the 
needs of children. During the period 1945-1959 the SCIF Council was part of an 
organizational picture that was increasingly coloured by the experiences of its own workers 
in the field, and of a wider community of practitioners specializing in the study of 
childhood and children. These years were proof that the blueprint for the organization laid 
down by Eglantyne Jebb was remarkably resilient. In September 1946 UISE merged with a 
contemporary Belgian organization, the International Association for Child Welfare, to 
become the International Union for Child Welfare (IUCW). 7 Some aspects of the new 
organization reflected the persistence of the 'National Point of View'. For example, prior 
to the Second World War UISE had engaged in relief activities on behalf of all the national 
societies. After 1945 each national society allocated their resources to its own relief 
5 Fuller, E. Memorandum on UNICEF, with special relation to Miss Alag Gulteridge's letter of 14 August 
1956, SCF Archives reference SC/EF/ii. 40. 
6 Jebb, E. Memorandum on ReliefPolicj, SCFArchives reference SC/EJ. 282. 
7 Fuller 1950,50. The lUCW lasted untii 1986, by which time the International Save the Children Alliance 
(ISCA) had been formed. 
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activities. Jeanne-Marie Small, Deputy Secretary General of the IUCW gave the reasons 
for the separate relief operations. 
The overriding reason was that it was felt that propaganda at home would carry 
greater weight if the societies said that relief was being administered by their own 
nationals. 
However, in other ways IUCW managed to retain an international perspective. Despite 
administrative concessions to public opinion, it developed a reputation for expertise in 
child welfare which transcended national boundaries. 
Two aspects of good practice identified by the IUCW during this period have remained 
important within SCF's view of child welfare. 9 First was an insistence on the importance 
of family life, and the disadvantages of institutional care. This idea arose not only from the 
British experience of evacuation, 10 but also from research conducted by the lUCW into the 
experience of other war affected populations. A special round table on child welfare, which 
took place during the National Welfare Conference held at Shanghai in March 1947, 
concluded: 
The Conference felt strongly that assistance and services should, where possible, be 
provided for needy children in their own families. The Conference was not in 
8 'International Cooperation', The lVorlds Children, Vol. 30 No. 7, July 1950,227-229. 
9 Compare for example the response by SCIF to the 1995 World Summit on Social Development in 
Copenhagen, Towarcls a Chilch-en's Agencla: New Challengesfor Social Development, Save the Children, 
March 1995. 
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favour of the customary practice in China of caring for children mainly by placing 
them in institutions. 
Second was the identification of the important social and economic role of children and the 
need to adapt educational provision for working children. 
It was realised that under present economic conditions it was not possible to extend 
educational facilities to all children, neither was it possible for children, even were 
facilities available, to be able to attend school full-time. The Conference explored 
ways and means in the hope of providing educational opportunities for children 
which could be adapted to the economic and social conditions of the community. I 
Not only was there a growing recognition of the social and economic role of children, there 
was also a new set of questions around the participation of children in warfare. Children 
had been seen to play their own part in successful resistance movements. They were 
members of the Partisans in Greece, and under cover of darkness children had pushed 
German soldiers into canals in the Netherlands. 12 Their participation in the war effort 
raised disturbing questions for SCIF in relation to children and war. How far were these 
children passive victims fulfilling adult plans, and how far were they voluntarily involved 
in the resistance? This attention to the agency of children was highlighted in the debates 
10 See for instance, Streatfield, N. 'Unsettled Children', The Morld's Children, Vol. 27 No. 6, June 1947,102- 
104. 
11 'Child Welfare Work in China' by Lu Kuang-Mien, Special Advisor on Far Eastern Affairs to the 
International Refugee Organization of the United Nations at Geneva and delegate to the recent General 
Council of the International Union for Child Welfare at Stockholm, The Morlds Children, Vol. 28 No. 12, 
December 1948,400. 
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within the SCIF Council over a memorial to the children who died during the Second World 
War. The Bishop of London expressed his preference for a design which emphasized the 
heroism and spirit of the children as well as the suffering. 13 
There is evidence in this period of a new paradigm for the understanding of childhood 
attracting a larger following, which resonated with Eglantyne Jebb's emphasis on the 
utilitarian value of childhood. In 1945 childhood was increasingly constructed as part of 
society and culture rather than a precursor to it. Children were described not only as 
victims but also as social agents, who could resist, take on responsibilities for younger 
siblings, make a vital economic contribution to the household, and have aspirations for the 
future. This understanding of childhood has been identified as a phenomenon of the late 
twentieth century, 14 however the publications of SCIF reveal that the major shift in 
perception took place after the Second World War. 
The greatest diplomatic success of the lUCW was the adoption of a revised Declaration Of 
the Rights of the Child by the UN Assembly in 1959. It succeeded in reinstating Eglantyne 
Jebb's original vision, despite the opposition from governments that argued that the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted in 1948 made any separate Declaration on 
behalf of children superfluous. It also succeeded in breaking the ideological deadlock 
between East and West over whether civil and political rights or social and economic rights 
should be accorded priority. In her detailed study of the negotiations leading up to the 
12 Green, L. H., 'The Protection of Children in Time of War', The lVorki's ChilcIren, Vol. 28 No. 9, September 
1948,296. 
13 SCF Archives reference M 1/12 C. 3052,25 April 1946. 
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acceptance of the Declaration, Dominique Marshall has demonstrated that, 'children's 
rights provided ground on which nations otherwise unable to agree could converse. ' 15 
Amongst the confluence of reasons for attention to be accorded to children's rights, she 
cited the mounting popular concern in 1950s over the fate of children given the danger of a 
nuclear conflict. At a time when the UN was divided by the hostilities of the Cold War, the 
1959 Declaration of the Rights of the Child was a success for universalism. 
The 1959 Declaration of the Rights of the Child was the most obvious evidence for the 
resilience of Eglantyne Jebb's ideas, and in particular universalism. The guiding principles 
of the founding generation are also reflected in the emphasis placed by the post-war 
generation of SCIF workers on the development of national personnel, and the more 
widespread utilitarian understanding of children as social agents. 
The aftermath of the Second World War in Europe 
Following the First World War, SCF had been able to appeal for voluntary donations to 
translate its universalist values into action. In its first three years it claimed to have 
maintained its independence at the same time as working alongside the socialist 
municipality in Vienna, and in cooperation with the Bolshevik government in Russia. By 
contrast, in 1945 SCIF could not escape the fact that all relief from Britain had been made a 
weapon in an ideological crusade. 
14 James, A. and Prout, A., eds, 1990. Constructing and Deconstructing Childhood. ý Contemporary Issues in 
the Sociological Study of Childhood, London: The Falmer Press. 
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We will organize food immediately an area is liberated. We will build up reserves 
of food all over the world so that there will always be held up before the eyes of the 
people of Europe -I say it deliberately - the Gennan and Austrian people, the 
certainty that the shattering of the Nazi power will bring to them all immediate 
food, freedom, and peace. 16 
In September 1944 Paris was liberated, followed by Greece and Belgium. Now the allies 
had the opportunity to fulfil Churchill's promise of immediate relief. They did provide 
relief to allied countries, but not to Germany. History appeared to be repeating itself On 
26 October 1945, Sir Arthur Salter, the Member for Oxford University, opened a debate in 
parliament on a motion with cross-party support. 
That this House feels deep concern over the possibility that millions of men, 
women, and children in Europe may die of starvation and cold during the coming 
winter, with the result that disease and economic and social chaos may spread over 
Europe, and therefore urges His Majesty's Government to take all possible steps to 
prevent this disaster. 17 
Not satisfied with having won the war by military means, crippling economic reparations 
were demanded of Germany. It was Victor Gollancz, himself of Jewish origin, who argued 
15 Marshall D. 1999, 'The Cold War, Canada and the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of the Child' 
in Donaghy, G., ed., Canada and the Early Cold Mar, Canada: Department of Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade, 183-212 (p. 202). 
16 Speech by Winston Churchill to House of Commons, 20 August 1940, quoted in Black 1992,2. 
123 
most convincingly against 'putting Gen-nany at the end of the queue', and the 'hideous 
habit of personalising abstractions - "Germany" "The Germans" - and consequently 
depersonalising real men and women'. ] 8 
The debate over European relief was brought to the attention of readers of The Worlds 
Children by Dorothy Buxton. Since she first started publishing 'Notes from the Foreign 
Press' in 1915, she had never deviated from her mission to awaken the sympathy of the 
British public for the economic plight of the German population. The British government 
had ruled that private individuals could not send food parcels to Gennany. Dorothy Buxton 
voiced her sense of shame, that while British soldiers in Vienna were taking a voluntary 
cut in their rations to provide supplies for a Christmas party for the children in the British 
Zone, civilians were not allowed to make similar sacrifices. 19 
At an event reminiscent of the first meeting of the Fight the Famine Council in 1919, the 
Save Europe Now campaign was launched at a public meeting in the Royal Albert Hall in 
November 1945. Lord Noel-Buxton was on the platfonu in his role as president of SCF. 20 
At last it appeared that the universalist principle which had been so important to the 
founding generation had been reawakened. The pages of The Worlds Children of 1945 
resonate with the same arguments as the pages of The Recoi-d of 1920. The leader of the 
campaign was Victor Gollancz. The argument was succinctly put in his pamphlet Leaving 
Them to Their Fate: The Ethics ofStarvation. 
17 Quoted by Dorothy Buxton in 'The Battle of the Winter', The Morld's Children, Vol. 26. No. 2, February 
1946,25. 
18 Gollancz, V. 1946. Leaving Them to Their Fate: The Ethics ofStarvation, London: Victor Gollancz, 30. 
19 'The Battle of the Winter', The lVorld's Children, Vol. 26 No. 2, February 1946,25. 
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The plain fact is that in this last week of March, when after the long winter Spring 
is for the first time in the English air, we are starving the German people. And we 
are starving them, not deliberately in the sense that we definitely want them to die, 
but wilfully in the sense that we prefer their death to our own inconvenience. 21 
The Fight the Famine Council and the Save the Europe Now meetings were followed by 
two very different relief operations. The most significant difference is the fact that in 1919 
individual humanitarian ventures led the way, and in 1945 the government coordinated the 
relief effort. Before discussing the impact of this upon SCF, I want to highlight one other 
difference concerning a shift in the understanding of the utilitarian role of children. 
When Save Europe Now called a conference on 16 July 1946 on the question of German 
prisoners of war detained in Britain, Edward Fuller put in a plea for the early return to 
Germany of teacher prisoners. He claimed that, from the point of view of the children in 
Germany, there was an urgent and desperate need for more and younger teachers. 22 The 
government of the day argued that Britain's own industrial needs were paramount, and 
justified the retention of German prisoners of war by saying that their labour was practical 
reparation for the devastation of the war. Victor Gollancz and Edward Fuller had a 
different perspective. They were concerned with the future needs of Gennany, and in 
particular the younger generation. They were also concerned with the future needs of 
Europe. 
20 The World's Children, Vol. 26 No. 1, January 1946. 
21 Gollancz 1946,4. 
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This concern was spelled out by Phyllis Pickard in an article entitled 'Save the Children for 
Whaff. She raised the utilitarian principle which was critical to the first generation of 
SCF, and argued that the safety of British children was inextricably bound up with the 
safety of German children. Saving German children was not only an end in itself but also a 
means to a better future for the whole of Europe. 23 
All these people focussed their attention on Gennan adolescents. When the Secretary 
General of UISE, Dr George Thdlin, first met with the Council of SCIF after the war he 
warned of the disaster in regard to 'children and adolescents', and described the attack on 
the younger generation as both physical and moral. Although Eglantyne Jebb had insisted 
in the first clause of the Declaration of the Rights of the Child that all children must be 
assured of the means necessary for non-nal development 'materially and spiritually', the 
main concern of SCIF prior to the Second World War had been the physical health of 
young children. 24 After 1945 reports of the situation of adolescents in Britain were 
frequent in the SCIF journal, and international work was also extended to the upper age 
group. In Gei-many Revisited Victor Gollancz wrote of a troubling encounter with a young 
German. 
22 The IVorld's Chilch-en, Vol. 26 No. 4, August 1946,147. 
2' 'Save the Children for WhatT, The Morld's Children, Vol. 28 No. 1, January 1948,3. 
24 The Nvord 'adolescent' does not appear in SCF publications until 1938. The disproportionate attention to 
younger children may have come about for pragmatic reasons: the ARA undertook to feed schoolchildren in 
Austria, SCF therefore provided for children under school age. 
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As he came in and I rose to welcome him, I suddenly felt miserable and afraid. For 
this was not the boy I had known - this was someone different, someone, almost 
from another world [ ]. 
Victor Gollancz was not disturbed by the boy's suspected tuberculosis, but by the way in 
which the boy described the frightful corruption which was closing in on him from every 
side. 'He said that decency, humanity, honesty, honour - all were vanishing. ' 
25 How far 
was the moral crisis faced by young people in Germany exacerbated by the conduct of the 
victorious powers? 
In 1919 SCIF had seized the opportunity to frame the moral issues at stake in the 
relationship between the people of the victorious and defeated countries. In 1945 it found 
itself co-opted into an ideological and military crusade of Western governments against the 
East. Instead of going to Germany as individuals engaged in a contentious humanitarian 
venture as they had done in 1919, after the Second World War they went as representatives 
of the occupying power. 26 This was the most significant difference between the two relief 
operations. A contemporary shift in the paradigm in which childhood was understood, 
involving a diminished focus upon the young child as passive and vulnerable and a 
growing focus upon the agency of young people, heightened the uneasiness SCIF workers 
felt with this role. 
25 Gollancz, V. 1947. Germany Revisited, London: Victor Gollancz, 16. 
26 'The Germans know even better than we do that the Western allies are there because they fear the Russians 
- the Russians because they fear us. Why, in God's name, don't we all go, and let the fear go too? ' Wilson 
F. M. 1947. Aftermath: France, Germany, Austria, Yugoslavia 1945 and 1946, Middlesex: Penguin, 67. 
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In November 1943 the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (U`NRRA) 
had been set up. Non-governmental organizations were a subordinate group called upon to 
carry out LJNRRA plans. British NGOs, including SCF, were organized under the umbrella 
of COBSRA. Once the members of COBSRA had the go-ahead from UNRRA to send 
teams to liberated Europe, they were then under further restrictions as to who could 
participate in those teams. Under British wartime regulations, individuals were no longer 
free to take up work when and where they chose. Permission for the release of each person 
had to be obtained from the Ministry of Labour through the Relief Department of the 
Foreign Office. 
This was a far cry from the position in 1919, when NGOs had taken the initiative and 
found the funds to deliver relief. The new procedure was cumbersome. In addition, the 
military were at best ambivalent about the contribution that the civilian LJNRRA teams 
would make to the situation in areas under their control. Francesca Wilson, who had 
experienced the pioneering humanitarian work of the Scottish Women's Foreign Hospital 
Service in Serbia and the rush of aid workers to Republican Spain, now enlisted with 
UNRRA. She was excited by the experiment in inter-governmental cooperation, but also 
Nvrote critically of both LJNRRA preparations and the calibre of its recruits. 27 
Francesca Wilson's comments of most enduring interest relate to the clash of interests 
between the military and civilians. Once in Germany she worked in several camps for 
displaced persons. In her account of her work in F6hrenwald Camp she shows clearly that 
27 Wilson 1947. 
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she saw her task to build peace. She did this by getting former enemies together to work on 
common tasks. 
'Peace will only work, ' I thought, 'when people have practical jobs to do together. 
When we are in a hurry to get sandpits or seesaws made for the kindergartens or a 
stage for the theatres, we think only of the carpenter's skill and not of his 
nationality. ' 
28 
However, her approach to building peace from below starting in the camp, was at odds 
with the approach of the military whichwas driven by the logistical constraints of working 
with a large and depersonalized population across a wide geographical area. She described 
the frustrations she encountered working as a civilian alongside the military. 
Next came an order that our 700 Poles must leave within five hours. The camp was 
to be cleared, we were told, to make way for an influx, that no one had exPected, of 
stateless Jews. The wretched Poles had been flung about more than any other 
people for six years; they had just got their school and kindergarten into swing and 
were preparing a Sunday entertainment [ ... ]. I said to the captain 
in charge of these 
operations: 'I hate the arrny. Why don't you go and fight someone? Why do you 
meddle with civilians, with peaceable human beings? They are counters to you - 
you think you can move mothers and babies and sick people as you move 
28 Ibid., 124. 
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companies and batteries in the war. Why don't you stick to something you 
understand? 
29 
UNRRA's operation was wound down in 1947 and the Marshall Plan took effect in 1948. 
SCF remained in charge of the transit camp in the British zone at Uelzen. Bridget 
Stevenson estimated that between May 1946 and September 1947,1.3 million people 
passed through the camp. SCIF had an office at Uelzen transit camp until it closed on 31 
January 196 1.30 Although far less outspoken than Francesca Wilson, Bridget Stevenson's 
reports demonstrate a similar unease with the way in which decisions were made regarding 
who would receive assistance. 
The Worlds Children of the Spring of 1958 reported that about 12 million of the 50 
million people now in Western Germany did not live there before 1945. Well over a 
decade after the end of the war, the monthly intake of people from East Germany was still 
about 12,000 to 15,000. Many thousands of eastern European refugees remained in West 
Germany: 80,000 Poles, 21,650 Yugoslavs, 15,000 Russians, 31 12,900 HungarianS32 and 
11,000 Czechs. 33 Amongst this mass of People on the move SCIF was only able to provide 
assistance to those people registered as refugees. Under the rules of the British zone transit 
camp it could not provide assistance to ex-enemy people or Gennan expellees. These 
people, however needy, were turned away. Bridget Stevenson's monthly reports 
29 Ibid., 130. 
30 SCF Archives reference FR. 2220,9 February 1961. 
3 'This includes some refugees who came before the Second World War. 
32 This figure does not include refugees following the 1956 uprising. 
33 The lVorlds Childi-en, Vol. 38 No. ], Spring 1958,11. 
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demonstrate the way in which the changing circumstances of people leaving the Eastern 
zone fitted uneasily with the category of political refugee. 
I am convinced that the bulk of those who come here are not in any sense political 
refugees; they come here because life is too hard for them in the Russian Zone, and 
too much is demanded of them. Direction of labour is not peculiar to the Russian 
Occupying Forces, it is merely that the conditions of employment in the [Auer 
uranium] mines are intolerable. Similarly, those who are unemployable can no 
longer manage to keep their families alive under the conditions which exist in the 
Russian Zone. 34 
Bridget Stevenson was in favour of opening the borders not only to people who would fit 
the description of political refugee, soon to be enshrined in the 1951 Geneva Convention 
on Refugees, but also to people who in contemporary phraseology would be known as 
economic refugees. 35 She was grateful for the fact that the Quakers worked without 
political distinction, on the basis of need alone, and that SCIF workers were able to refer 
people they could not help themselves to the Quakers. 36 By working within the 
government transit camp, SCIF had accepted restrictions upon its universalist founding 
principle. 
34 SCF Archives reference SUBS, September 1948. 
35 SCF work in Jordan also highlighted the difficulties of distinguishing between political refugees and the 
indigenous population. In this case, the people who fell outside the category of political refugees would be 
described in contemporary phraseology as 'environmental refugees'. See discussion in the Foreign Relief 
Committee, 'Mrs Adams was of the opinion that the nomadic tribes in South Jordan could be considered as 
refugees in that they had lost their normal grazing ground and lands. ' SCF Archives reference FR. 2215,9 
February 1961. 
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In 1946 LJNRRA had been forced to cease its operation in the Russian-controlled zones of 
Eastern Europe. At the same time UNICEF was created so that children in the East should 
not be cut off from assistance. This starting point was very close to the spirit of SCIF which 
had begun by reaching out to so-called enemy children. Members of SCF could rejoice that 
the universalist ideas of the organization had been adopted by governments, and it was 
now hoped would attract more official support. There was also some conftision as to 
whether there was still a role left for SCF. As UNICEF grew in strength, the editor of The 
World's Children received worried letters from SCIF suPporters. 
Miss Gutteridge asks for guidance because 'UNICEF appeals in all the places 
where the SCIF used to get support and so the committee feels at a loss how to 
proceed. 'Yet' she says, 'the aim is the same'. 37 
The editor concurred, but then went on to say that the difference between UNICEF and 
SCF may be briefly stated by saying that the one is official, the representative of 
governments, the other is voluntary, an informal expression of compassion on the part of 
men, women and children. The voluntary, informal character of SCIF was portrayed by 
Edward Fuller as a strength. 
UNICEF remains an official body; the SCIF is utterly unofficial and while 
independent of goverment grants is free to act at the behest of its Council (through 
the Executive committee) to carry out the intentions of its contributors. It is their 
36 'In a Transit Camp', The World's Children, VoI. 30 No. 9, September 1950,308. 
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almoner among necessitous children not the means of implementing decisions 
which rely ultimately on the approval of governments. 38 
Given the governmental constraints which SCF had been acting under both in the UK and 
in its two major fields of action: Germany and Korea, these words seem to reflect wishful 
thinking on Edward Fuller's part, rather than the operational reality. 
Whatever their differences, both organizations were perceived in Eastern Europe as 
organizations inspired by the West. The JVorlds Children of December 1950 used the term 
'iron curtain' when it described how during the previous two years SCIF had been obliged 
to withdraw is missions from Hungary and Yugoslavia where SCF had been working 
continuously for thirty years, as well as Poland. The SCF projects were handed over to 
national welfare authorities. 39 
Within a Cold War perspective, the guiding principles which had led SCIF to work in 
Hungary and Yugoslavia became open to suspicion. The suspicion centred on the question 
of saving children for what? The utilitarian role of children as the generation of the future 
was not in dispute, but the role of SCIF as an international voluntary organization for 
children certainly was. In both Eastern and Western Europe the role of the state was 
expanding, and in the East it left no room for the voluntary sector. Maggie Black suggests 
37 Fuller, Edward, Memorandum on UNICEF, with special relation to Miss Afayy Guttericige's letter of 14 
August 1956, SCF Archives reference SC/EF/ii. 40. 38 Ibid. 
39 'Chinks in the Curtain', The World's Children, Vol. 30 No. ] 2, December 1950,443. 
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that opposition to UNICEF work in Eastern Europe came initially not so much from 
Eastern European countries themselves but rather from the US. 
It became more and more difficult to persuade the US Congress that UNICEF's 
operations in Eastern European countries offered neither material nor moral 
assistance to the cause of Communism. 40 
However, mistrust fuelled mistrust, and within the Eastern European countries UNICEF 
staff found it harder to go about their work of monitoring relief operations without 
attracting suspicion. The fact that many UNICEF staff were North American and British 
confinned the perception of a Western-run organization. 41 At the end of 1949, UNICEF's 
Hungarian operation was closed, and at the end of 1950 the Polish operation closed. At the 
time the Chairman of the Board of UNICEF was the Polish representative, Ludwick 
Rajchman. He found himself obliged to walk out of UNICEF board meetings in support of 
the USSR position on Nationalist China. 
Although it was possible to speak of a post-war period in Western Europe, and to identify a 
reawakening of the original spirit of SCF as international links were revived, the 
overriding perspective was Cold War. Unlike in 1919, SCF was in no position to frame the 
moral issues at stake between the antagonists. The principle of universalism had been co- 
opted by both East and West as part of their competing ideological and military crusades. 
40 Black, M. 1986. The Children and the Nations: The Story of UNICEF, UNICEF, 59. 
41 The distrust cut both ways. 'Many US citizens -%vho served on the staff of UN relief operations in eastern 
Europe in the post-Nvar years Nvere later investigated by McCarthy tribunals, and suffered serious career and 
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So too had the principle of utilitarianism, as each side disputed the nature of the society 
that children were to be saved for. The pacificism which had been so strong among the 
founding generation was defined by a belief in the possibility of lasting positive peace. By 
contrast, in a bipolar world a more pessimistic view prevailed that only negative peace, or 
the absence of anned conflict between the two camps, was possible. 
The war in Korea 
The idea that the Second World War was not at an end, but that a conflict with 
ramifications worldwide was evolving between East and West was difficult to grasp. The 
British public and politicians were not prepared for the escalation of hostilities that led to 
the Korean war (1950-53), and the participation of British forces in a United States led 
Unified Command. 42 Dora Russell wrote in her autobiography: 
In Britain no one understood what itwas all about. Amid considerable anxiety a 
debate was to take place in Parliament. Fenner Brockway hoped to speak. He asked 
me, if I could find. the time, to go to the office of the New York Times in Fleet 
Street to look out some articles which had come from its American correspondents 
in South Korea. 43 
personal harassment simply because of the geographical accident of their posting. Yet some of the local staff 
left behind were harassed or imprisoned for their UN association [ ... ]. ' Black 1986,59. 42 See for instance Bailey, S. 1992. The Korean Armistice, London: MacMillan, 27; Brockway 1977,159. 
43 Russell, D. 1985. The Tamarisk Tree: VoL3 Challenge to the Cold War, London: Virago, 127. 
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These were very different circumstances from the prolonged build-up to the outbreak of 
armed conflict in the. Second World War. It was hardly feasible under these circumstances 
to expect SCIF as an organization to engage in war prevention. Once war was declared in 
Korea what then was the role of SCH The organization had a clear mandate to alleviate 
the suffering of children regardless of their parents' political beliefs. The extent to which it 
had put this universalism into practice since its foundation had progressively diminished. 
Eglantyne Jebb had advocated the delivery of assistance to children in the defeated 
countries of Europe and Bolshevik Russia. After her death, when Spain was divided 
between Republicans and Nationalists, SCIF kept itself informed of the situation of children 
on both sides of the fighting lines. During the period of Churchill's total war, SCIF sought 
out information from occupied Europe (even though it did not act on it). There is no 
evidence that SCF sought out information from the Communist-dominated North Korea 
during the Korean war. It could be argued that in the new world of the Cold War the stakes 
were too high to work across political divides; however, more significant for SCIF was the 
fact that it had acquired the habit of respectability and was used to working closely with 
the government. Foreign Office policy was clearly going to be focussed upon South Korea 
only. 
Hostilities began when the North Koreans made an offensive across the 38"' Parallel. 
Ceadel described the US counter-attack as crusading. 44 Its purpose was ideological, to 
unify the country and roll back communism. General MacArthur used the same term, 'the 
allied soldier crusading for freedom' he told the Security Council in February 195 1, 'is 
more than a match for the Communist soldier fighting to serve neither ideal nor spiritual 
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purpose. A5 The war was protracted, sweeping up and down the peninsula as first General 
MacArthur's troops counter-attacked from the south, and then the Chinese army attacked 
from the north. Not until mid- 195 1 did the war become relatively static and the vast 
movements of population cease; an annistice divided Korea in July 1953. The total death 
toll was estimated at around three and a half million. Nine million people in the South lost 
their homes or possessions. 46 
There is no mention in the SCIF Council records of any member bringing the situation in 
the north to the Council's attention. Mary Hawkins, who worked for SCIF in Korea from 
1953, questioned the priorities SCIF set for children in the south, however, she did not 
question the fact that SCIF ignored the plight of children in the north. This pessimistic and 
realistic attitude to the way in which priorities for international work were set contrasted 
with the optimistic idealism of the founding generation. That generation had strong links 
with the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, and Eglantyne Jebb 
herself was fined for distributing a pamphlet publicizing the conditions of civilians in 
enemy countries. 
In 1951 the Women's International Democratic Federation sent a delegation to North 
Korea (they were not permitted to enter South Korea) and reported back on the conditions 
they found. 47 According to Dora Russell, they talked with survivors who were seeking no 
more than holes in which to exist. Slaughter had been indiscriminate, open graves revealed 
44 Ceade11989,3. 
45 Quoted in Bailey 1992,5 1. 
46 Black 1992,47-48. 
137 
bodies bound hand and foot or burned by napalm. The delegation sought to go to South 
Korea but this proved impossible. Their talk with American prisoners in the North brought 
about the SOS - Save Our Sons - movement in the USA which helped end the war. 
Members of their delegation, however, suffered in some countries on their return home. 
The German women went to prison. 48 
In England some of the war correspondents began to be horrified at what was going on. 
James Cameron, among them, lost his job on The Piclure Post, which refused to print his 
report. Monica Felton lost herjob as Chairman of the Stevenage new town development 
under the Labour government after she published the pamphlet What I Saw in Korea. 
The first mention of Korea in the SCIF Council records is of correspondence from the 
Prime Minister explaining that no charitable organizations were able to operate in the 
country, and that all assistance to the civilian population was being carried out by the Civil 
Assistance Command of the Eighth Army Headquarters. Any private relief operation had 
to be sponsored by its government, and presented to the United Nations for consideration 
by the Unified Command. 49 When eventually SCIF did secure permission to send workers 
to Korea, they were not allowed to send female workers. The male Australian doctor found 
that he was restricted in the nature of the work he could do, 50 and the contact he could have 
with his South Korean assistant. 51 
47 Organization set up to combat fascism in 1945 in Paris. Some WIDF members Nvere also members of the 
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, founded in 1915. 
48 Russell 1985,145. 
49 SCF Archives reference M 1/ 13,18 January 195 1. 
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The military and SCIF were obviously mismatched, but the Council highlighted two 
particular differences in perspective. The first was SCF's particular focus on children. The 
second was that SCIF was thinking of the long-term needs of Korea's children and wanted 
to develop a lasting project. By contrast, the military mandate was temporary and its 
responses were also temporary. While it aspired to retain its independent identity, SCIF was 
dependent upon the military. Mary Hawkins described the logistical dependence of SCIF 
upon the military, in particular the use of armed guards. 52 
The work in Korea raised other questions that continue to resonate in relief and 
development projects. Post-armistice, the Council minuted that the Koreans resented the 
numbers of expatriates and the level of salaries paid. 53 Already this issue had been raised in 
connection with UNRRA in Europe. 54 Sidney Bailey also cites it as a problem of the UN 
delegation to Korea before the outbreak of war. Although SCIF salaries were not at the 
same level as those of the UN, all expatriate workers were similarly resented. 
None of these issues were raised in the promotional film. 4 Far Oy. The film was a 
poignant statement of child suffering. It does however reflect some of the relationships 
between agencies: Stephen Peet, the film-maker, was himself a Quaker, the funding for the 
film came from the Oxford Famine Relief Committee, and the agency featured as 
providing practical help on the ground was SCF. The Woy-ld's Children published reports 
of the film's showing by the BBC in Britain and then at private events in Australia and 
50 He had to work in existing orphanages only. SCIF Archives reference M 1/] 3 C. 3597,17 July 1952. 
5' SCF Archives reference M 1/13 C. 3661,16 April 1953. 
52 Interview with Mary Hawkins, Perranuthnoe, 12 April 2000. 
53 SCIF Archives reference MI/13 C. 3698,29 October 1953. 
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Canada (countries which had contributed soldiers to the Unified Command) . 
55 The work 
shown was welfarist, and featured a tuberculosis hospital, baby clinic and kindergarten, 
and care was taken to reassure viewers that all this work was supervised by Europeans. 
A Fai- Oy demonstrated the persistence of the patriotic humanitarian viewpoint. Since the 
first full page advertisements in the press for the starving children in Austria, and the first 
film The Russian Famine, appeals to the general public had been made by portraying the 
children as in great need and helPless. It is interesting to notice that in the case of A Far 
Oy despite the simplicity of the appeal, there were several confusing subtexts. Firstly, 
there was a commentary on universalism and the difficulty of targeting assistance. Pusan 
had become the refuge for refugees from the north, and displaced people, however the 
indigenous population were also in need. One of the strongest messages of the film was 
that for every child helped, there was another child who had been excluded. The film was 
saying, we are not universalists in practice but we should be. Secondly, as well as 
reiterating the vulnerability of children in time of war it revealed their utilitarian role. A 
Far Oy showed how children helped other children. Adult viewers would have been 
chastened by the diligence with which a girl of nine carried her baby brother to the 
tubercular clinic. The film was also saying, we think children are helpless but they are not. 
When A Far Oy was made Korea was the largest beneficiary of SCIF funds. Although the 
anned conflict was over and the foreign soldiers had left the country, SCIF had remained to 
try and alleviate the persistent suffering of children. Mary Hawkins spent ten years 
Wilson 1947,78. 
The World's Children, Vol. 39 No. ], Spring 1959,10, 
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working for SCIF in Korea. Upon her retirement from SCIF she wrote about her life's work 
in the pages of The Worlds Children. 
I have been concerned for much of my working life with refugees and displaced 
persons, and in particular with children in need - hungry children, sick children, 
deprived, homeless and lost children; victims of poverty and ignorance, but above 
all victims of man's inhumanity to man. The refugees are still numbered in millions 
and half the world is hungry and people often ask what good one organization can 
hope to do in the face of such immense problems. 
Surely the answer must be in the words of Confucius - 'It is better to light one 
small candle than to curse the darkness'. 56 
By 1962 questions were being asked within SCF about the justification for ftirther aid to 
Korea. In June 1962 The World's Children published an article questioning the need for 
further aid. The article attributed Korea's continuing poverty to mismanagement and 
corruption, and could argue the case for the continuation of SCF's work there only on the 
grounds that SCIF projects were well-managed and free from corruption. 57 Nevertheless 
there were examples of individual Koreans who could offer moral leadership 58 and by 
1964 a plan for the 'Koreanization' of the SCIF international staff had been put in place. 59 
56 'One small candle', The Worlcl's Children, Vol. 52 No. 4, December 1972,69. 
57 'Poverty in Korea', The World's Children, Vol. 42 No. 2, June 1962,33. 
58 For example, SCF was in contact with a significant number of children living without adult support thanks 
to its partnership with a remarkable Korean whose own childhood and youth had prepared him to assist the 
boys who lived on the streets. Kim was found abandoned at a railway station as a child and became a beggar 
boy. Later in life he became a champion boxer. He decided to use his winnings to set up a refuge for beggar 
boys. Each night, disguised as a beggar himself, he, %vould go out looking for children living under bridges, in 
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This chapter began by considering the post-Second World War revival within SCF. 
Renewed international contacts rekindled something of the original spirit of the 
organization. However, this generation was increasingly aware of the structural violence 
behind child suffering. Social, economic and political structures combined to lock children 
into poverty and disadvantage. Whatever its universalist, utilitarian and optimistic 
beginnings, SCIF in the period of the early Cold War was part of a landscape of negative 
peace. SCIF workers in Gennany, the Middle East and Korea chafed at the categorization of 
children and their entitlements according to whether they were refugees, displaced or 
indigenous, but could not renegotiate the rules set by LJNRRA, UNWRA or the Eighth 
Anny. SCIF workers in South Korea found that the national government tolerated social 
conditions in which poverty was entrenched. Above all SCIF was working on one side of 
the Cold War only. 
This period also coincided with the expansion of the role of the state, not only in welfare 
work at home, but also in international relief The United Nations was founded in 1945, 
and the specialist agencies of UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund) in 1946, the 
World Health Organization (WHO) in 1948, and the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugee (LJNHCR) in 195 1. Paradoxically, during a period when state activity was 
increasing, SCF was joined by a range of voluntary agencies. In the previous chapter it was 
doorways, drains. The boys he persuaded to come back to the refuge were provided with shelter, food and 
clothing. SCIF financed a teacher. It, %vould be interesting to know the life outcomes of these boys. In 1994 
SCF published a manual Street and Working Chilr1ren: A Guide to Planning in response to the growing 
visibility of street children living and working in cities across the world. Many of the guidelines reflect the 
work of Kim, thirty years earlier. See 'Self Help Korean Style', The World's Children, Vol. 39 No. ], Spring 
1959,21. 
59 SCIF Archives reference M6/2 ORW. 3026,11 June 1964. 
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seen how the British policy of total war and its consequences for the people of German- 
controlled Europe had prompted the creation of Oxfam. In 1944 Christian Reconstruction 
in Europe (later renamed Christian Aid) was formed. War on Want was founded in 1951 
and Voluntary Service Overseas in 1958. Unlike the British voluntary organizations set up 
in response to the Spanish Civil War, these agencies would be actors with staying power in 
the field of international relief and development. In the next chapter the contrasting actions 
of these voluntary organizations demonstrate the scope available to voluntary organizations 
within an international system based on two mutually hostile Cold War blocs. Despite its 
roots in contentious politics, SCIF is seen to position itself at the end of the spectrum 
closest to govemment policy. 
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Chapter 6 
DECOLONIZATION: THE GAP WIDENS BETWEEN RELIEF AND 
DEVELOPMENT (1960-1975) 
As there are undoubtedly children who are suffering more in Asia and Africa than 
in Europe, we should prove the sincerity of our claim to universality by 
undertaking work in these continents directly we are able to raise sufficient funds 
for this purpose. ' 
Thirty years would pass before SCIF would take up Eglantyne Jebb's challenge and redirect 
its work towards Asia and Africa. In the intervening years SCF had been faced first with 
the recession of the 1930s and dwindling income, and then with the paralysing events of 
the Second World War. After 1945 the extraordinary concentration of refugees in Hong 
Kong and the outbreak of war in Korea compelled SCF to look beyond the European 
theatre of war and into Asia. 
Between 1960 and 1975, SCIF began work- with children affected by a succession of wars 
in Vietnam, Tibet, Congo, Nigeria, Yemen, Jordan, East Pakistan, and Kurdistan. But it 
was the children of the newly independent states of Africa who became the focus of SCIF 
work. By 1961 SCF was, for the first time, spending more money in Africa than in the UK; 
1 Quoted in Breen R., Into Africa: Save the Childrens Long Journey to the African Continent, SCF Archive 
Paper No. 2, February 1997,3; The World's Children, March 1925,90. 
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by 1965, expenditure on Africa exceeded that in Europe; and finally, in 1970, Africa 
became the leading area for SCIF expenditure. This expenditure was mainly concentrated 
on famine relief. 
There is little evidence during this period of the individualist, anti-government roots of 
SCF, and much of its work in Africa was done at the behest of the colonial authorities. The 
most expensive kind of work, food aid, necessitated fund-raising on a large scale and 
brought SCIF into a new relationship with its paymasters among the British public and in 
the British government. 
Within the organization there was an explicit recognition of the need to reassess the roles 
of its. committee members and staff. Priority was given to professional skills and 
experience. For example, the Overseas Relief and Welfare Committee acknowledged that 
it would have to pay wages at least comparable with the National Health Service if it were 
to recruit suitable doctors. Even so, it would still not be paying the salaries doctors could 
get from WHO. 
2 
This period also saw renewed efforts at coordination within the voluntary sector, 
independent of the government. A tentative proposal for a sub-Committee on emergencies 
was reported to the Overseas Relief and Welfare Committee after the earthquake in Persia. 3 
However, it was not until the earthquake in Skopje, Yugoslavia, that the Disaster 
2 SCF Archives reference M6/2 ORNV. 2953, II June 1964. 
3 SCF Archives reference ORW. 2652, n. d. 
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Emergency Committee was formed on 26 July 1963.4 It is noteworthy that this 
coordination was limited to British relief organizations. SCF's relations with the lUCW 
remained cool, and it was still predominantly nationalist rather than internationalist in 
outlook 
This then was a period of geographical expansion and organizational consolidation. Out of 
the range of activities worldwide, this chapter focusses upon SCF's work- in Africa, , 
because of the continent's emergence as the leading area of expenditure for SCF. It begins 
by looking at the background of SCF's work in Africa prior to decolonization. It then 
considers in detail SCF's response to the civil war in Nigeria. This choice reflects the 
significance of the civil war in Nigeria as a formative exPerience for SCF. The civil war in 
Nigeria was not only a turning point for SCF but also for its relationships with other 
organizations. Its long-term travelling companions, the Quakers, the ICRC, and Oxfarn 
were all involved. At an intergovernmental level, not only the UN, but also the 
Commonwealth 5 and Organization of African Unity (OAU), 6 were implicated. Above all, 
the media took an unprecedented interest in the survival of children in the territory of 
Biafra. 
The most significant characteristic of SCF activities during this period was an either-or 
approach to relief and development. This approach was symptomatic of a clear 
demarcation between war and peace. It was also symptomatic of a departure from the 
4 The DEC included SCF, Oxfam, British Red Cross, Christian Aid and War on Want. 
'5 Founded in 193 1. Most of the former British colonies when granted independence chose to be members of 
the Commonwealth. 
6 Founded in 1963 by 32 African governments. 
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guiding principles of the founding generation, and in particular the principle of optimistic 
pacificism. Edward Fuller had distinguished between the role of UNICEF and SCF by 
saying: 
SCF realises that the mission entrusted to it by its founder was not only to cure 
present suffering, but prevent so far as may be its recurrence in the future. 7 
And yet when SCF's work is juxtaposed with that of the range of intergovernmental and 
non-governmental organizations that were active in the tumultuous period of 
decolonization, it did not distinguish itself by being involved with war prevention. Instead 
it earned a reputation for providing rapid relief on a large scale. It also showed little 
political imagination about the construction of peace out of war, and neglected to address 
what was it saving children for. This may partly be explained by the movement of military 
men into the organization who brought with them habits of demarcating wartime from 
peacetime, and an emphasis on logistical expertise and technical solutions. 
Background to SCF's work in Africa 
In the years immediately after Eglantyne Jebb's death, Edward Fuller 8 and Victoria de 
Bunsen9 held a torch for Africa. In fulfilment of her wishes, they encouraged SCF to hold 
7 Fuller, E. Memorandum on UNICEF, with special relation to Miss Mary Gzateridge's letter of 14 August 
1956, SCF Archives reference SC/EF/ii. 40. 
" As editor of The 11"orld's Children, Edward Fuller ensured that the SCFjoumal consistently carried 
references to Africa. 
9 Victoria de Bunsen, sister of Charles Buxton and descendant of Sir Thomas Fowell Buxton, one of the 
leading members of the campaign for the abolition of the slave trade. 
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an International Conference on the African Child in 1931 in Geneva. 10 The proceedings 
remain a remarkable record of the thinking of the day with regard to colonialism and 
racism, and their impact upon the children of Africa. " Although the discourse is dated, the 
intentions behind the contributions would not be out of place in policy discussions within 
SCIF much later in the century. 
For example, the exploitative relationship between colonizer and colonized was criticized 
for its harmful consequences for children. Emil Torday, anthropologist, described how in 
the Belgian Congo limited access to land and the practice of forced labour led to the break- 
up of families as men left the home for work in the plantations, mines and cities. He 
challenged his countrymen in Belgium to put their house in order and 'create a new 
atmosphere of social justice' by developing this great dependency 'with a view to the 
future and not for immediate profit'. 12 
The necessity for sensitivity to different cultural practices was also emphasized. Johnstone 
Kenyatta (later known as Jorno Kenyatta, first President of Kenya) was one of six black 
African delegates present. He countered the Duchess of Atholl's characteristically 
precipitate approach to the problem of female circumcision, by arguing that legislation 
without cultural understanding was an ineffective instrument of change. He pointed out 
'0 Prior to the conference 1500 questionnaires were sent out to colonial administrators, missionaries, medical 
personnel, educationalists and business people. 358 questionnaires were returned. Breen R. SCF Archive 
Paper No. 2, February 1997,6. 
11 Sharp 193 1. 
12 Sharp 1931,46. 
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that the campaign against female circumcision had led 'thousands of children to be kept 
out of schools by their parents, and has thus deprived them of the benefits of education'. 13 
Not only was there a continuity between the problems highlighted by SCIF in the 1930s and 
issues which were of concern to the organization at the end of the century; there was also a 
remarkable continuity in the form of the solutions the organization proposed. At both 
stages of the organization's history it was recognized that solutions imposed from outside 
were ineffective. According to Eglantyne Jebb, the best guarantee of the success of the 
universalist approach was the 'arousing of native interest and native help, and thus 
gradually bringing into being a national movement for the care and protection of 
children'. 
14 
The 1931 conference was prevented from implementing its proposals by lack of funds. 
However, in 1935 it was decided that the most fitting memorial to Eglantyne Jebb would 
be a project in Africa and the money originally collected for a monument in Geneva was 
reallocated to work in Ethiopia. A canteen, infant welfare centre and a playground were set 
up in Addis Ababa under the guidance of a British worker assisted by the Association of 
Ethiopian Women. The Association of Ethiopian Women deliberately excluded European 
women in order to build local capacity for voluntary action. 15 The project was short-lived 
13 Breen, SCF Archive Paper No. 2, February 1997,12. 
14 The JVorld's Children, Vol. 9 No. 9, June 1929,188; see also Breen, SCF Archive Paper No. 2, February 
1997,3. 
" Lady Barton explained to the Child Protection Committee that 'the Ethiopian Women's Work Association 
was entirely composed of Abyssinian nationals and she had made this a rule when she first founded the 
Association. She felt that if there %vere European women in the Association the Ethiopian women would not 
bear their full part, but that if left to themselves would prove equally capable of the work, and this view had 
been justif ied by the work which the Association had done'. SCF Archives reference M 14/17,26 June 194 1. 
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owing to the Italian occupation, nevertheless SCIF continued to send aid to refugees from 
Ethiopia until 194 1. - 
By this time Dr Harold Moody, f6under of the League for the Advancement of Coloured 
People, was a member of the SCIF Council. 16 In April 1944 he proposed a project focussing 
on mothers and small children in Nigeria. A British nurse, Alice Cowper, was recruited 
and in July 1945 set off for lbadan. She remained there only until October 1946 when she 
resigned and handed the work over to the Methodist Missionary Society. With Dr Moody 
taking less and less part in SCF's work the impetus for work in Africa was lost. 
The pressure for work in Africa was eventually renewed from outside the organization. At 
the request of the colonial authorities, SCIF began work in Sudan (1950), Somalia (195 1) 
and Uganda (1959). SCF then found itself carried along by the Freedom from Hunger 
Campaign, launched by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations in 
November 1959. Part of its mandate was to fund pioneering projects to improve food 
production and distribution. Several SCIF projects were funded by the Campaign. Amongst 
these projects was SCF work at Ilesha, in Western Nigeria. 
The gap between relief and development 
In the process of decolonization SCF can be seen to have assumed two distinct roles: relief 
and development. Where the decolonization process was accompanied by violent conflict, 
SCIF became involved as a relief agency. In those former British colonies, where SCIF had 
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ties prior to independence, and decolonization proceeded without armed conflict, SCF 
encouraged the development of national movements for the protection and welfare of 
children. 
Examples of SCF's involvement as a relief agency can be found in both former French and 
Belgian territories. From 1954 to 1962 Algerians had waged war for independence from 
France. SCF drew on its continuous tradition of work with refugees to assist Algerian 
refugee children in Morocco (a French protectorate until 1956). By contrast the situation in 
Belgian Congo provoked an emergency response from SCIF of a kind not seen since the 
Russian famine. Belgian Congo became independent in 1960, but almost immediately was 
pitched into civil war by the secession of the mineral-rich Katanga province. Children were 
among the first to suffer from the shortage of protein foods. The Congo was the place 
where many long-term aid workers first saw children with the greying hair and ballooning 
stomachs associated with kwashiorkor. The SCF Director of Overseas Relief and Welfare 
made this assessment of the problem: 
I then examined the possibility of buying protein foods, such as beans and palm oil, 
from the less affected areas of the Kivu, but I soon realised that any such action 
would upset the existing market prices, and only serve to spread rather than solve 
the problem. The possibility of obtaining fish from Lake Kivu was also 
investigated, but, because of certain mineral properties in the water there, fish were 
very scarce and therefore very expensive. There were, however, plenty of fish in 
16 Vaughan D. A. 1950. Negro Victory: The Life Stoiy ofDr Harold Moody, London: Independent Press. 
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Lake Tanganyika: the near side was still under rebel control, but the far side was in 
Burundi territory ... 
17 
The speed with which SCF and its international sister organizations were able to respond 
to his cabled request was impressive. 
KWASHIORKOR SITUATION KIVU DESPERATE STOP CHILDREN DYING 
DAILY STOP EIGHT THOUSAND POUNDS REQUIRED PURCHASE 
ESSENTIAL PROTEIN FOODS AVAILABLE BURUNDI TO COVER NEXT 
FOUR VITAL MONTHS STOP REQUEST SCF PROVIDE TWO THOUSAND 
POUNDS AND IUCW APPEAL UNION MEMBERS FOR BALANCE STOP 
CONGOLESE GOVERNMENT PROVIDING TRANSPORTATION STOP. 18 
Within 24 hours Colonel Hawkins had received approval from SCIF London to spend 
E2000. Within a week the balance of E6000 had been raised by IUCW members in Austria, 
Canada, France, Sweden, Denmark and Norway. 
'The Colonel', as Colonel Hawkins was known, excelled at the delivery of aid with 
military speed. Since the Second World War military men had moved into positions of 
leadership within SCF. They stand out from the records by the use of military titles. 19 
17 Hawkins, J. V. 'International Cooperation in the Congo', The 11"orlds Children Vol. 45 No. 4, December 
1965,95. 
18 Ibid. 
19 It is harder to identify staff who had deliberately disassociated themselves from the military. In 1948 The 
World's Children reported on the departure from headquarters of Mr A. Digby Holmes. He had been a 
member of one of the early relief teams working among refugees from the Balkans in Egypt, and then spent 
three years in the organization department. The journal also reported his war service: 'During the war, as a 
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These military men brought with them logistical expertise and technical solutions, but little 
experience of direct work with children. Over the next two decades SCF was to become 
more and more associated in the public mind with emergency response to human and 
natural disasters. The role of SCIF as rescue service in a disaster scenario emphasized the 
powerlessness of the populations involved who were perceived as victims suffering the 
consequences of events beyond their control. 
At the same time, another dimension of SCF's work received less publicity. This was 
SCF's work for the long-term development of national movements for the care and 
protection of children, and the prevention rather than the alleviation of suffering. 20 it 
emphasized an active role for the populations of the former colonies. Decolonization meant 
not only the emergence of independent states but also of African government 
administration at a national and local level, and new relationships between these 
governments and society. Where would SCF, as a British non-governmental organization, 
situate itself in these new political constellations? As a British organization it had ties with 
the colonial administration, but as a non-governmental organization its natural partners 
were groups outside the governmental sector. This dual allegiance was reinforced by 
SCF's mission to ensure that both state and society assumed their responsibilities for the 
upbringing of children. At the point of decolonization, SCIF was already present in many 
member of the Pacifist Service Units, Mr. Holmes served as a 'guinea-pig' in experimental medicine and also 
took part in work among 'problem' families in cast London. ' The World's Children, Vol. 28 No. 1, January 
1948,33. 
20 There -%vas concern among Council members that SCF was failing to communicate this part of its work 
effectively. 'Mrs Freeman said she had a recommendation she hoped the Committee would seriously 
consider. She had found that people had three views of the work of the Fund. That the work is limited to 
nurseries and 5 year olds; that the Fund exists to feed starving children; or that it exists to work in times of 
relief. There was a need to have an up to date view of what the fund is doing and she suggested the lead come 
from this Committee. ' SCF Archives reference FR. 2288, II May 196 1. 
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former British African colonies. For example, when Uganda gained independence in 1962, 
SCIF became the country's first approved society. In recognition of the roles of both state 
and society, SCIF contributed to the legislation governing the regulation of homes and 
societies caring for children in Uganda, and ran a family casework service to provide direct 
assistance to children in their homes. 
However, relief to famine-stricken populations in wartime and development of national 
movements for children in peacetime appeared to be an either-or approach. The case of 
Nigeria illustrates that where SCF was present in the country as a development agency it 
did not have the capacity either to forecast or prevent the outbreak of war. It seemed blind 
to the continuum between peace and war. After fifty years' experience of responding to 
conflict, SCIF had allowed a wide gap to open between its relief and development 
activities. 
In the aftennath of the First World War the founding generation had an eye to the future, 
and were mindftil to close the gap between relief and development. I suggest that this gap 
opened as SCF departed from its three guiding principles. First, the departure from 
universalism allowed for invidious distinctions between refugees in obvious need of relief, 
and the wider population whose future depended upon the development of the country. 
These distinctions had particularly disturbed Bridget Stevenson in Germany. Secondly, the 
departure from utilitarianism allowed SCIF to focus upon immediate material needs and 
engage in welfarist activities without regard to the structural violence endemic in society. 
For example, SCF workers in South Korea found that a generation after the end of war, 
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and the establishment of 'negative peace', they were working alongside a national 
government which tolerated social conditions in which poverty was entrenched, and within 
an international system based upon mutually hostile relations between the two Cold War 
blocs. Thirdly, the departure from optimistic pacificism led to a pessimistic assumption of 
the inevitability of armed conflict and the perpetual necessity of relief Universalism, 
utilitarianism and the belief in the possibility of positive peace were all critical to work 
which combined immediate relief to those in greatest need with the development of a better 
future for all. 
The period of decolonization and the instability of the newly independent states brought 
the question of the relationship between relief and development to the fore again. What 
would SCIF do, if anything, to ensure that its presence in the African societies undergoing 
political change contributed to a greater likelihood of political conflicts being resolved 
without recourse to violence? This chapter reveals the very limited assessment made by the 
organization of the likely impact of its activity on potential conflict. It required an 
understanding of the factors which increase the risk of war both within as well as between 
states. 21 These went beyond the incidence of disease and malnutrition, which the health 
project SCF set up in Ilesha, Western Nigeria was designed to address, and encompassed 
issues of identity, inequality, the institutional framework to allow for peaceful change, and 
the international availability of armaments and ammunition. 
21 The pervasive emphasis in current literature upon the increase in the number of civil wars, as opposed to 
inter-state wars, is not wholly appropriate in SCF's experience. Already previous chapters have discussed 
interventions in civil wars in Russia (1918-1922), Spain (1936-1939) and Korea (1950-1953). 
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The civil -*, s, ar in Nigeria 
Nigeria became independent in 1960. SCIF was already present in the country as a 
development agency, and its management of the Ilesha hospital was viewed as an example 
of the goodwill of the foriner colonial power to the successor state. At first the transition to 
independence in this most populous state of Africa augured well. Then in 1966 a military 
coup brought to power a group dominated by easterners, the lbo. A counter-coup placed 
General Yakubu Gowon, a young northerner, in power. Made fearful by massacres of lbos 
living in the north, lbos from all parts of Nigeria migrated to the south-east. In May 1967, 
Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu, Military Governor of the Eastern Region, announced the 
secession of the independent Republic of Biafra. 22 In July the forces of General Gowon 
attacked. 
The newly independent state of Nigeria now risked fragmentation along regional lines. 
Under these circumstances where aid was targeted became of political significance. 
Elizabeth Stamp, Press Officer for Oxfam at the time, suggested that British agencies were 
singularly inept at making a political assessment in this situation for the paradoxical reason 
that knowledge about Nigeria was too readily available. 23 There were many people in 
Britain with links to Nigeria through the former colonial administration. Representatives of 
British financial interests as well as missionaries and forty VSO volunteers remained in the 
22 During the war the name 'Biafra' was unacceptable in Nigeria, and its use still betokens in some minds 
partisanship to the rebel side. The use in this writing is designed for convenience, since there was such an 
entity, and not as anyjudgement of the historical events that eliminated that entity. 
23 Interview with Elizabeth Stamp, Oxford, 7 March 2000. 
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country after independence. 24 When dealing with Nigeria, Elizabeth Stamp claimed that 
agencies made decisions on the basis of opinions they already held or those of people they 
already knew, rather than seeking out new information. 25 
The correspondence between Tim Brierly, Oxfam Field Director for West and Equatorial 
Africa, based in Lagos, and his head office reveals the sensitivity within Nigeria to the 
allocation of aid. 26 Oxfam differed from SCIF in that it was not operational, instead it made 
grants to locally based organizations. Its representative for West Africa was charged with 
identifying recipient organizations and supporting them in the implementation of their 
projects. At this sensitive pre-war stage Oxfam's records show that the role of regional 
representative and contacts with a range of local partner organizations served as an early 
warning system. Seeing the signs of regional division, Oxfam attempted to respond with a 
programme which upheld federal structures and targeted aid according to need. Although 
growing antagonism to British citizens in Eastern Nigeria meant that Tim Brierly himself 
was unable to move freely throughout the country, it was part of his mandate to reach out 
to other organizations working in the parts of the country that were inaccessible to him. 27 
By contrast the records of. SCF focus exclusively on the Ilesha project, its personnel and 
24 Voluntary Service Overseas was founded in 1958. For its history, see Bird D. 1998. Never the Saine Again: 
A Histoiy of VSO, Cambridge: Lutterworth Press. 
25 Anderson, M. B. 1999. Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace - or War, London: Lynne Rienner, 75. 
Anderson confirms the disadvantages of aid workers with prior involvement in a conflict situation: 'They see 
the present situation as inevitable. They often believe solutions can come only from outside, from external 
political actors. ' 
26 In late 1966 Tim Brierly assessed that Oxfam should offer help to the Eastern Nigeria Rehabilitation 
Committee. He was advised by the British High Commissioner in Lagos not to put this offer in writing since 
4any written offer of help might be published in the Press and cause a reaction from the North and other 
Regions who also have similar Commissions (though their problems are less)'. Copy to Oxfam HQ of unsent 
letter from T. G. BrierlY to the Chairman, Eastern Nigeria Rehabilitation Committee, Oxfam Archives 
reference 2209,19 November 1966. 
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logistics problems and data related to the health status of patients. They show no evidence 
of an awareness of or interest in the wider Nigerian setting. When Tim Brierly urged 
Oxfam headquarters to consult with SCF, Ken Bennett (Oxfam Director of Overseas Aid) 
found that Colonel Hawkins had given no thought to possible future needs in Biafra. 28 
In A Safer Future: Reducing the Human Cost of War Ed Cairns outlines a policy for 
international interventions which reflects a dual awareness of immediate needs and of 
measures necessary for conflict prevention. 'Sometimes, seeking to reduce armed conflict 
may produce tough choices: for example, to target aid to an unstable country when another 
is poorer. 29 In the Nigerian context, an assessment of the impact of aid on potential 
conflict of the kind advocated by Ed Cairns might have revealed that, at a time when the 
more prosperous Ibo population felt excluded from power, it would have been helpful to 
have a symbolic presence in the lbo region of Eastern State. The security goal of 
promoting economic and political stability might have loomed larger than the 
30 developmental goal of alleviating poverty in the northern hinterland. 
As the conflict in Nigeria unfolded SCF's work displayed two quite separate strategies: a 
peacetime strategy in Ilesha and a wartime strategy in Biafra. Constrained by this dualist 
understanding of peace and war, development and relief, SCIF departed further from the 
founding principles of universalism, utilitarianism and optimistic pacificism. 
27 Anonymous warning to Tim Brierly, 'I think I should warn you that it would be most unwise for you or 
another to come here [Onitsha, east] There is definite anti-British feeling in the East. You might not be safe. ' 
Oxfam Archives reference 2209,29 May 1967. 
28 Ken Bennett to Michael Harris, Oxfam Archives reference 2209,25 October 1967. 
29 Cairns E. 1997. A Safer Future: Reducing the Hunian Cost of War, Oxford: Oxfam Publications, 59. 
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Relief as a coveted weapon 
The immediate cause of the Biafran secession was the claim on the part of Colonel Ojukwu 
that the East had received inadequate compensation to enable it to cope with more than 1.8 
million refugees. From May 1967 all revenue raised in Biafra, and in particular from the 
oil industry in which Britain had strong interests, would be collected by the breakaway 
government. Colonel Ojukwu insisted that only within a sovereign state would the lbo 
people be provided for and be protected from genocide. General Gowon's war aims were 
to rescue the lbos from the leadership of Colonel Ojukwu and reunite them with their 
Nigerian brothers within a federal state. Colonel Ojukwu sought to internationalize the 
conflict and establish the identity of Biafra as an independent entity. The Federal 
government sought to resist international intervention and to localize the conflict. 
The involvement of international support, whether governmental or non-governmental, 
was therefore a tactic of war on the part of Colonel Ojukwu. Its exclusion was part of the 
tactic of war on the Federal government side. With the fall of Port Harcourt on 21 May 
1968, the Federal government tactic was near success. The Biafrans had lost the oilfields, 
access to the sea, and the airport. 
The Federal Army was in effect placing the people in the secessionist territory of Biafra 
under siege, and part of that siege warfare meant cutting off the supply of food to the area. 
30 Duffield M. Reading Development as Security: Post-Nation State Conflict and Reconstructing Normality, 
draft paper presented at the conference on NGOs in a Global Future, University of Birmingham, 1999. See 
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Letting food through to the civilian population would have relieved the strain upon the 
military, and therefore was not consistent with the siege warfare. This was exactly the 
same tactic as that adopted by Winston Churchill Nvith the blockade of occupied Europe. In 
the same way that Winston Churchill had promised that people would be fed once 
liberated, the Federal Army went out of its way to allow food to refugees from the Biafran 
held territory. 
The children of Nigeria could therefore be divided into three categories with regard to 
access to food: those unaffected by the war in the Federal areas; those affected by the war 
in liberated areas; and those under siege in the secessionist state. According to its founding 
principles, SCIF was mandated to work with all children, whatever their political situation. 
The need was greatest among those children in the secessionist territory, and then among 
the refugees from the conflict. However there were also chronically malnourished children 
in those areas unaffected by war. 31 SCF faced a dilemma now in how it could reach all 
children in need. Adherence to the principle of universalism could be construed as political 
partisanship, because by the very fact of providing succour to the children in Biafra it 
would be undennining the Federal Army tactic. In 1940, SCF had acquiesced in the face of 
Winston Churchill's blockade of Europe, and made no attempt to get aid through to the 
embattled civilian population. What would it do on this occasion? 
description of the implications of the convergence of development and security goals. 
31 Michelle le Jossec, Health Visitor's report: 'I have now been in Nigeria for nearly a year. After three 
months working -%vith the refugees in Federal-held Eastern Nigeria, I started work in Ilesha, Western Nigeria. 
It took a long time to re-adapt myself to a normal life of routine and at first it seemed that all was well in 
Western Nigeria. Unfortunately, it is not so. The needs of the children here may not be, 6as bad or as acute as 
it was in July 1968 in Federal-held Eastern Nigeria, but here also, many children are dýing of malnutrition 
and bad cases of kwashiorkor are many. ' SCF Archives reference P/OS/N7, June 1969. 
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All international agencies were faced with the same dilemma. For some the choices were 
straightforward. The Churches of the Netherlands were particularly strong in their support 
for the besieged Biafran population because they were reminded of their own suffering 
during the famine winter of 1944 to 1945. 
While some Dutchmen feel that the Biafran people have a right to live in freedom 
according to their own choice, others believe equally strongly that secession would 
be unwise. Where all are united is in rejecting the weapon of starvation. The Dutch 
have a good reason for this rejection. They have not forgotten the "hunger-winter" 
of 1944-1945, when their fields were flooded for military reasons, and the 
population was left without means of subsistence. 32 
The ICRC, by contrast, attempted to uphold a position of political neutrality and to make 
arrangements for the delivery of aid with the agreement of both parties to the conflict. It 
was thwarted because the channels for the provision of food were inextricably linked with 
the channels to supply arms. The Biafrans objected to any attempt to establish a separate 
channel for relief open to Federal inspection because this would expose their arms supply 
routes. With hindsight it can be seen that both arms and food were critical to the Biafran 
prosecution of the war and therefore they were detennined to keep relief as a cover for the 
night-time run of arms into Biafra. 
32 Jenner R. An Ecumenical Force in the Humanitarian Vanguard. ý Fighting Africa's Darkest Catastrophe, 
Geneva: Joint Church Aid, n. d. 
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Following the seizure of Port Harcourt, the arrns supply route into the airstrip at Uli was 
also the only route for relief Under these circumstances relief could be said to Prolong the 
war in two ways: first by enabling the population to withstand the siege for longer, and 
also by providing cover for the supply of anns. The Churches were the first to set aside 
such concerns and use the Sao Tome - Uli route for the delivery of relief Flights were 
divided between the Protestant and Catholic Churches and landed at night between 
deliveries of arms. The ICRC delayed, hoping to negotiate permission for designated 
daytime relief flights from San Fernando. This was the position supported by the members 
of the British Disaster Emergency Committee, including SCF, but in June Oxfam. broke 
ranks. 
As far as Oxfam Director Leslie Kirkley was concemed, Oxfarn had a duty to meet a 
'simple humanitarian appeal 03 and provide aid to those in greatest need. He ignored the 
advice of Oxfam's own Field Director, Tim Brierly, based in Lagos. Up till then Tim 
Brierly had been careful to ensure that a near equal amount of Oxfarn aid was channelled 
to Biafra and to areas retaken by the Federal Army, emphasizing that help was being given 
to victims on both sides of the conflict. 34 In June 1968 Leslie Kirkley flew into Biafra on 
the Sao Tome - Uli run. The reaction to the Oxfarn Director's visit to Biafra was 
predictable. 'Do-gooders we don't want' was one headline in the Nigerian press. Tim 
BrierlY's position was made untenable and he resigned. 35 
33 Interview with Elizabeth Stamp, Oxford, 7 March 2000. 
34 Black 1992. 
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During this period SCIF had four medical teams working with refugees in those areas of 
Biafran territory under Federal control. The situation was confused with the Federal Army 
only controlling the roads and main centres. Under such circumstances it is possible to 
understand how the activities of relief agencies using those roads and centres could be 
misconstrued as hostile by the Biafrans. There has been no full explanation forwhy, on 29 
July 1968, an SCF vehicle should have been ambushed by Biafrans. Jonathan Ambache 
and Malachy Riddle died. The team leader, Dr Noel Moynihan wrote to the Director 
General: 
What we cannot understand, of course, is why the Biafrans should have done this. 
They must have known that we were in the vicinity and that we had fed large 
numbers of their own people in the nine days we have been here - nearly 10,000 
per day on average: they must have known that we were driving in white Land 
Rovers with Red Crosses and flying a Red Cross Pennant. 36 
To Dr Moynihan the action was unintelligible. However, the Red Cross had declared itself 
politically neutral (and therefore in the eyes of the Biafran leadership against the 
secessionist cause) and the vehicle was using a road held by the Federal Anny. Above all, 
the principle of humanitarian relief was itself a European import. In the next section it will 
be seen how this principle would be manipulated by the Biafran leadership for European 
35 Interview with Tim Brierly, Oxford, 7 March 2000. However critical he was of the activities of Oxfam 
with regard to Biafra, he returned to work with Oxfam three years later and over thirty years later was still a 
loyal supporter of the organization. 
36 Letter from Dr Moynihan to Sir Colin Thornley, SCIF Director General, SCIF Archives reference P/OS/N7, 
30 July 1968. 
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audiences, but this did not mean international humanitarian missions could expect respect 
from Biafran rebels at the roadside. 
It was not until 22 August that an SCF medical team was able to reach Biafran-held 
territory, flying in with the ICRC from the island of Fernando Po. The SCIF team were all 
briefed in Geneva, and expected to follow ICRC -guidelines. In the face of the Federal 
advance they were evacuated from Biafra in October. Individuals working for SCF in 
Biafran held territory were very frustrated at the ICRC order to evacuate. Sr Regan went on 
her own initiative to Ivory Coast (Abidjan) and then to Gabon (Libreville) in an attempt to 
care for the Biafran orphans who had been evacuated there. She was unsuccessful and 
arrived in London on 25 October 1968. Dr Wallace persistently requested to be returned to 
Biafra, and SCIF sought ICRC backing to emphasize its refusal. He eventually 
accompanied Fenner Brockway's peace mission to Biafran territory. 37 
The ban on direct assistance to Biafran territory drove a stake through the core of 
individual humanitarian workers' beliefs. Their personal commitment to deliver relief 
wherever it was necessary, whatever the political cost, eventually wrought changes in 
organizational policy. First the Churches, 38 then Oxfarn and finally the ICRC and SCF 
began to ply the Uli route. In early September Auguste Lindt, the ICRC representative, lost 
patience with the deadlocked negotiations between the Federals and the Biafrans, and 
departed from the traditional position of the ICRC of acting only with the consent of both 
37 Brockway 1977,252. 
38 Father Byrne of the Holy Ghost Fathers Nvas known as 'The Green Pimpernel' for his outstanding 
contribution to the Biafran relief operation. 
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parties. Rather than wait longer for clearance for its flights from San Fernando Auguste 
Lindt began an airlift without Federal clearance. 
In the same month France took Biafra's side and started airlifting arms into Uli via Gabon 
and Ivory Coast. Both the airlifts of relief and of anns were therefore increasing. 
By April 1969 the ICRC Was running the biggest relief operation it had ever mounted. The 
operation was put in jeopardy by the activities of a freelance operation led by Count von 
Rosen, who put together a number of light aircraft to make bedge-bopping raids against the 
Federal Army. On the evening of 5 June a Swedish Red Cross DC-713 was shot down by a 
Federal plane. By the end of the month, the Nigerian government had brought to an end the 
ICRC's mandate to coordinate the relief operation. ICRC was faced with a choice of 
continuing to fly in defiance of Nigerian policy, or suspending flights and seeking to 
negotiate a new agreement. Negotiations were stalled by Colonel Ojukwu's persistent 
rejection of a neutral land corridor or daylight flights into Uli. In this impasse, ICRC 
abandoned its attempt to provide relief to all and withdrew to the more conservative 
position of political neutrality. 
The collapse of the relief effort opened the final phase of war. By January 1970 fighting in 
Biafra ceased. 
165 
What'vverc SCF and other agencies saving children for? 
Individual representatives of the aid agencies risked their lives, and organizations as 
conservative as the ICRC risked the principles which were at the core of their identity, to 
deliver aid to Biafra. Why did this particular conflict drive them to such extremes? The 
Biafran leadership recognized the universal appeal of the vulnerable child to an audience in 
the powerful nations, and set about building a public relations campaign which would 
harness this appeal for their war ends. The claim that children had a special status in 
themselves and must be spared from starvation was the universalist message portrayed to 
the media and reinforced by the agencies. In fact the protagonists of the war took a more 
instrumentalist view. Children became a means to secure aid, in the form of arms, food and 
medicine, and international solidarity. This abusive emphasis upon children by the 
protagonists appears to have crushed debate of the wider political and social implications 
of the war. 
This section discusses the way in which the response of the relief agencies was 
manipulated by the protagonists of the war. It also points to some of the issues that were 
deliberately excluded from public debate. These issues are related to possible outcomes of 
the war, given victory to either side. They raise the utilitarian question of what the relief 
agencies were saving the children for. 
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Mark-press, a Geneva-based public relations agency, has been credited with Colonel 
Ojukwu's success. 39 It primed the international media with details of the famine situation 
inside Biafra and facilitated journalists' visits. In June 1968 journalist Michael Leapman 
and photographer Ronald Burton made a visit to Biafra for The Sun. After reading their 
reports, the Oxfam Director Leslie Kirkley, contacted the editor of the paper, and a further 
visit was arranged, this time including Leslie Kirkley and the Biafran Peace Delegate, Sir 
Louise Mbanefo. 
The stories in the press in the months that followed combined an emotional appeal for 
starving children, with a description of derring-do under such banner headlines as 
'Churchmen launch plan to smuggle aid to Biafrans'. 40 On the back of this appeal for aid to 
be delivered to Biafran-controlled territory, SCIF was able to appeal for help in assisting the 
41 
population in areas now under Federal control. Without a detailed knowledge of where 
the shifting front line lay, it can be assumed the public would not always have been aware 
of which side the aid was destined for. 
In early July the British government sent an advisory team led by Lord Hunt to assess 
relief needs. The Directors of SCIF and the British Red Cross took part, while Oxfam was 
excluded. Predictably, the Biafrans refused to host the advisory team and dismissed the 
offer of British govemment relief as hypocritical. The Daily Telegraph reported the 
39 Katanga had made similar but less effective use of a public relations agency during the Congo war. 
40 The Stin, 22 June 1968. 
41 The Observer, 30 June 1968. This report of the visit by SCF administrator, John Birch, mentions Enugu, 
Abakiliki and Nsukk-a, areas which bad been under the control of Biafra. 
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Biafrans were 'to be fattened at the expense of the British public -just to be killed by arms 
supplied by the British govemment'. 42 
The propaganda war was not only waged through the international press. The civilian 
population in Biafra were also subject to heavy persuasion from the Federal and Biafran 
military. The aid agencies found themselves joining in. The SCIF team in Awgu hospital, in 
Federal-held Eastem Nigeria helped circulate the Federal Army messages. 
The policy of the Federal Anny seems to be to persuade the population in the 
'liberated' areas to return to their villages, but people are seared by reports of 
'genocide' and remain in the bush. The Red Cross has done much in encouraging 
people not to believe these rumours and to come to the feeding sessions and clinics. 
We have, practically speaking, followed on the advancing anny's heels and as soon 
as an area has been captured we have delivered messages in English and lbo 
language to the bush population, inviting them to come to our clinics, and we have 
to a great extent been successful. 43 
For those still trapped inside Biafra, they were subject to a multitude of pressures which 
remain undocumented. Not only were they encouraged to come to feeding centres, but also 
to give up their children to orphanages or for evacuation. It remains unclear how children 
42 The Daily Telegraph, 4 July 1968. 
43 'Survival-Medicine in Nigeria' Gustav WeissgIas and Helen Milne from the Save the Children Fund Team 
1, A,. vgu, Nigeria and Awgu Hospital, January 1969, SCF Archives reference P/OS/N7. 
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were attracted to the orphanages and selected for the evacuation programmes, and there is 
a suspicion that this was part of a pattern of soliciting aid for unaccompanied children. 44 
The Daily Mail of 15 July 1968 announced that a group of doctors and social workers were 
planning to fly 10,000 babies from beleaguered Biafra to Britain. The scheme was 
designed to take advantage of the fact that the planes were leaving empty after delivering 
arms and relief SQF was clear about the detrimental effects upon the children of being 
uprooted. In response to an airlift of children from Vietnam in 1974 The Worlds Children 
published an article underlining this view: 
Save the Children is in no doubt whatsoever about its attitude. Children, in the long 
run, are far better off looked after in their own surroundings. Uprooting and 
transferring them to a country which has a totally alien character, culture, and 
people, not to mention language, is likely to cause more emotional problems, over 
many years, than it cures. 45 
Unlike the airlift of Vietnamese children, the airlift of babies from Biafra to Britain did not 
take place. Thousands of children were however airlifted from Biafra to Gabon and Ivory 
Coast. 
44 Interview with Eric Greitens, Refugee Studies Programme, Oxford, 9 March 2000. 
45 'Vietnam: The Choice Facing Us', The World's Children, Vol. 55 No. 2, June 1975,2-3. However, SCF's 
position on evacuation was inconsistent. It had a long and uncritical involvement with Youth Aliyah. 'Youth 
Aliyah's concept of child rescue and rehabilitation is today universally accepted. ' The Worlds Children, Vol. 
55 No. 4, March 1976,18. 
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Virtually absent from the press reports, the records of inter-agency meetings held in Lagos, 
or Biafran propaganda, is any discussion of the role of the child in relation to its family or 
to the wider Biafran community. This is perplexing given the way in which the conflict 
was portrayed by the Biafran leadership as a struggle for the survival of the lbo people. 
Cultural survival is often associated with protection of children as bearers of cultural 
identity. 46 The Biafran propaganda and its reflection in the British press give an image only 
of the child as a potentially starving child. 
Wynne L. Griffiths of Oxfarn reports on a meeting with the Biafra Relief and 
Rehabilitation Organization in London I August 1969: 
He [Father Simon Okeke] did not think the Federal attempt at starvation would 
succeed as money was coming in which would prevent this. (I got the impression 
that they [the Biafran leadership] were prepared for 'millions' to die as long as they 
won - what do the 'millions' think? ) 
The extent to which Colonel Ojukwu's war aims were shared by the Biafran people is 
hardly mentioned in the press or the agency reports. How far this interpretation of the war 
reflects a contemporary incapacity to see Africans defining their own agenda, and how far 
it reflects a genuine rift between the Biafran leadership and the people is open to question. 
The way in which the British press ignored the interests of the recently fonned OAU in 
46 See Minority Rights Group International, ed., 1997. War: The Impact on Afinoritj, and Indigenous 
Children, London: Minority Rights Group International. 
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supporting the Federal position and the unity of Nigeria adds weight to the former view. 47 
All the heads of newly fonned African states were threatened with secession. The Oxfam 
Press Officer remembers how the Biafran secession was hotly debated in the Kenyan press 
because of the tension in the country around the question of what form of government 
would succeed that of Jomo Kenyatta. 48 The implications of the Biafran secession for the 
future stability of Nigeria or the rest of the continent appear to have played no part in the 
debates within the relief agencies or in their own press releases. 
The Biafran child had succeeding in capturing the imagination of the British public as a 
starving child, not as a child belonging to a larger family or community or as a child with a 
role to play in the Africa of the future. This image was at odds with Eglantyne Jebb's 
utilitarian perspective. 
Constructing the peace: closing the gap between relief and development 
The evidence of a rift between the Biafran leadership and the people within the secessionist 
territory brings to the fore the question of bad leaders in provoking and perpetuating 
violent conflict. 49 During the war the Biafran civilian population were sacrificed to the 
intransigence of Colonel Ojuk,, vu, but after the cessation of hostilities they were treated 
with magnanimity by General Gowon. By many accounts he seems to have presided over 
47 Oxfam Canada were more concerned about the issue of secession than Oxfarn UK, given sensibilities to 
the position of Quebec. 
49 Interview with Elizabeth Stamp, Oxford, 7 March 2000. 
49 Cairns 1997,63. See also the role of 'the undefeated psychology' of Syngman Rhee in South Korea, Bailey 
1992,208. 
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an 'amazingly generous'50 end to the war. In retrospect Tim Brierly can only explain this 
good leadership on the part of General Gowon as a reflection of his sincere Christianity. 
During their visit in July 1968 the British Relief Advisory Team had already been much 
impressed by the discipline and mercy shown by the Federal Army. 
We were much impressed by the assistance given by the Arrny, in the forward 
areas, in emergency relief within their means. In general, we were persuaded that 
officials were concerned to bring the lbos back into partnership, within the context 
of one Nigeria. A spirit of vindictiveness among responsible people whom we met, 
was notable by its absence. 51 
Oxfam medical teams also reported on a high degree of information sharing and 
cooperation with the Nigerian military. 
Following this clue (of refugee children) I took a Land Rover and headed north 
towards the front hoping to meet either Nigerian troops or refugees before I met 
rebel troops. I met the Nigerians who were surprised to see me. They were very 
friendly and helpful and indeed had been helping cope with the refugees by digging 
yams in abandoned farms - most were too weak to do this themselves and showed 
me a houseful of orphans fed out of their own rations. Sure enough there were 
50 Yarrow, C. H. M. 1978. Quaker Experiences in International Conciliation, New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 259. 
51 Hunt, J. (Lord) and Thomley, C. Nigeria: British Relief, 4dvisorj, Alission, 5-19 July 1968, SCIF Archives 
reference P/OS/N7. 
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2000+ all living 60-100 in a school class room. Kwashiorkor I estimated at 40% 
among the children of which half were severe so probably there 3 -400 who will be 
dead this week unless we can do something quickly. 52 
Reports from SCIF relief workers based in Biafra after the end of the war testify to the rapid 
resumption of commerce and industry with the repair of the railway and pumping stations, 
and also credit the Federal Anny with helping to lower the incidence of looting and theft. 
There were apprehensions that relations between the victorious Nigerians and the defeated 
lbos would be difficult. SCIF decided not to involve itself with the rehabilitation of schools 
in liberated areas because the schools in Eastern Nigeria were looked upon as sites for 
Federal military government propaganda. Colonel Hawkins returned from his visit to 
Nigeria in April 1969 also doubtful whether any long-term project sponsored by the British 
would be acceptable to the lbos, because of the British association with the Nigerian 
government. 53 In the event, SCIF administered a L5 million grant-in-aid from the British 
government to Nigeria including building equipment for the rehabilitation of educational 
institutions damaged during the war. 54 
The importance of optimistic pacificism as a motivating ideal to a whole societY is borne 
out by post-war Nigeria. General Gowon appears to have believed in the possibility that 
the lbo people could be welcomed back as brothers within the greater Nigerian family. 
52 Letter from Patrick Kemmis, leader of relief/medical team operating near Iko Ekpene, 17 November 1968, 
Oxfam Archives reference Nigeria/Biafra Oxfam Bulletin and home-produced materials. 
53 Hawkins, Col. J. V., Director of Overseas Relief and Welfare, SCIF Report on Visit to Nigeria 9-19 April 
1969, SCF Archives reference P/OS/N7. 
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This faith coloured his leadership and permeated the military. With the exception of the 
Quakers, who worked steadily to keep channels of communication and conciliation open 
between the two warring parties, 55 international relief agencies had little part in 
constructing the peace. 
The war in Nigeria did force agencies which had always insisted upon the apolitical nature 
of their work to recognize their political rolps as providers of relief. The description of 
relief as 'a coveted weapon' of politicians by Eglantyne Jebb within the context of the 
Russian Famine in 1923 has a particular resonance. 56 
After the end of the war SCF switched paymasters. While it had financed its relief 
operations from funds raised largely in response to media appeals, driven by the Biafran 
propaganda machine, immediately following the cessation of hostilities it administered a 
E5 million grant-in-aid from the British government to the Nigerian government. How 
wary was it of the consequences of the friendship of politicians and was it sufficiently 
politically astute to be aware of the ends to which this aid might be put? The path it trod 
during the Nigerian civil war suggests an organization that lacked the capacity to take the 
initiative. It was made aware by Oxfam of the impending crisis, and when its relief 
operation got undenvay SCIF placed its staff under the umbrella of the ICRC. Throughout 
the war SCIF was ready to collaborate in plans for relief with the British government, 
notwithstanding the role of the British government as the main supplier of arms to the 
Federals. 
54 SCF Archives reference SC/MJA/HMG 7/1. 
55 Yarrow 1978,179-260. 
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During the Nigerian civil war the ICRC foundered on its principle of political neutrality 
and its inability to speak out on behalf of the victims of war. In protest, Bernard Kouchner, 
an ICRC doctor in Biafra, founded Midecins sans Fi-ondires, with a mission both to 
provide medical assistance to the victims of war and to bear witness on their behalf. 57 This 
was the beginning of a trend towards revolutionary humanitarianism which would not 
stand on ceremony at borders or embassies. It was a trend in which SCF would have no 
part. The only place where it did eventually agree to support cross-border work without 
seeking the pennission of the government was in Iraqi Kurdistan. 58 Despite its own roots 
among anti-government internationalists, SCIF allowed the dictates of political neutrality to 
overrule the principle of universalism and abandoned its attempt to reach children within 
Biafrqn-held territory. It could be argued that the cessation of relief to Biafra hastened the 
end of the war, however, there is little evidence that SCIF took the decision to abandon its 
attempt to reach children within Biafran-held territory on these grounds. 
The second of the founders' guiding principles - utilitarianism - which emphasized the 
need not only to save children in themselves but for a future purpose, fared little better. 
When the battleground moved to the media, SCIF did little to engage the public with a 
utilitarian understanding of children as part of a larger society, whether Biafran, Nigerian 
56 The Record, July 1923. 
57 Groenewold, J. and Porter E. 1997. Morld in Crisis: The Politics ofSurvival at the End ofthe 20'h Centuty, 
London: Routledge. 
5" 'It had been made quite clear to the Field Director and doctor before their departure that the team should 
remain in Iran as in accordance with the general policy of the Fund, it never works in a country without the 
permission of the Government of that country nor without its invitation. The Field Director realized this but 
asked that, in view of the need in the area, the Committee should support him in the decision he had made'. 
SCF Archives reference ORW. 5933,13 February 1975. 
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or African. Instead it reinforced the Biafran war tactic by portraying the starving child in 
need of rescue by international help. Although the effects of kwashiorkor were particularly 
devastating for babies and young children, there was little attempt made to extend the 
ready public sympathy for this young age group to older generations. 
As the Federal Army gained control of more and more Biafran territory, SCF's decision to 
provide help behind the lines meant that it could get assistance to an increasing proportion 
of the Biafran population. The generous terms on which General Gowon made peace also 
bore out the close working relations SCIF sustained with the British and Nigerian 
governments. However, there is no evidence on record that SCIF deliberately adopted a 
policy based on an optimistic view of Biafra's future within Federal Nigeria. From the start 
of the war an early warning system and measures designed to avert violent conflict were 
missing from its development activities in Nigeria, and as the war progressed it responded 
rapidly to relief needs but did little to prepare for the construction of the peace. 
SCIF emerged from the war confident in its role as an operational agency, capable of 
delivering large-scale relief However, its capacity to assess the political context within 
which the relief was delivered appeared diminished. Even post-war, there is little evidence 
of a debate within the organization over the desirability of the convergence of security and 
developmental goals. As an agency with a particular mandate for children, SCIF appeared 
to be missing the vital understanding of the dynamic role of young people in the generation 
of their society and the motivating power of optimism in effecting change without resort to 
violent conflict. 
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Chapter 7 
ROLLING BACK THE DARKNESS (1976-1989) 
SCIF had emerged from the war in Nigeria confident in its role as an operational agency 
capable of delivering large-scale relief. ' As television brought pictures of famine in 
Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Sudan into people's homes, SCF's income soared. By 
1985, at the height of the publicity surrounding famine in Ethiopia, the Fund's income 
reached a level comparable to the value of its income at the time of the Russian famine of 
192 1. The generation of relief workers that responded to these events were expected by 
their supporters to roll back the darkness. They were driven by media images of famine, 
and popular initiatives such as Band Aid and Live Aid, not merely to influence a handful 
of individuals, but to feed the world. 
This period also coincided with the UN Decade for Women (1975-1985) and the Nairobi 
Conference (1985). Through the course of the 1980s the development agenda would 
become less preoccupied with economic issues and refocus upon political and institutional 
problems, including gender issues. 
1 The 'India Diary' of Dr Hickman reflected the confident belief in the efficacy of international agencies by 
comparison with national agencies. 'Dr Hickman who was involved in the massive feeding programme in 
Nigeria following the civil war, said that in that country SCF teams had been feeding as many as three- 
quarters of a million children a week with high protein food, and saw their health rapidly improve. But in 
India, they were watching the health of the children steadily deteriorate because plans for an elaborate 
supplementary feeding programme remained only on paper. Large quantities of high protein food, 
desperately needed by the younger children, stayed stacked in Indian Red Cross warehouses! 'India Diary' in 
The World's Children, Vol. 51 No. 4, December 1971,74. 
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In this chapter I begin by outlining the scale and range of SCIF activities from 1975-1989.1 
then look at the kind of leadership which was appointed to the organization to manage the 
growing expenditure and geographical span of programmes. Until 1985when SCF 
appointed Nicholas Hinton as Director General, this leadership was made up 
overwhelmingly of military men. The chapter then focuses upon the Lebanon programme 
where one Field Director, Frances Moore, was present for sixteen years. She was given the 
scope to construct a multi-sectoral programme and build up a team of national staff. Over 
the troubled period following the outbreak of civil war in 1976, SCIF developed a 
programme which contained within it the seeds of many of the ideas which became part of 
the global strategy developed by SCF in the late 1990s. 
I find that these ideas are a reinterpretation of the three themes identified as the founding 
principles: universalism, utilitarianism and optimistic pacificism. Their implementation 
and propagation were to depend upon a sea change within the organization. By the 1990s 
the leadership of SCF would have its roots not in the military, but in the voluntary sector. 
International staff would be more likely to make a career of this kind of work, and greater 
emphasis would be placed upon the contribution made by national staff. SCIF would also 
reflect the influence of the human rights movement and redefine its role as the champion of 
child rights. 
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The scale and range of SCF overseas activities 1975-1989 
Africa remained the leading area for SCIF expenditure, and within Africa emergency relief 
predominated. Sixty years on, this emergency relief was not dissimilar to the relief 
operation mounted in Russia from 1921 to 1923. The distinguishing features of this 
response were humanitarian neutrality, scientific targeting, feeding centres and 
implementation by external agencies. 2 
Through the 1970s refugees from Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda and Chad fled to one of 
Africa's poorest countries, Sudan. By 1980, SCIF was providing relief to refugees across 
the Horn of Africa. In The Worlds Children the refugees' predicament was attributed to 
natural and political factors: severe drought and the continuing battle in the Ogaden 
between Somalia and Ethiopia. Confusion over the delivery of relief supplies also 
exacerbated the situation. 3 When in the same year SCF reopened its programme in 
Uganda, 4 its resources were concentrated upon tackling a famine in Karamoja in the 
remote North-East. By 1984,, when fighting between guerrillas and army was at its height 
north of Kampala, SCF (together with Oxfam and UNICEF) became involved in a major 
rehabilitation programme in the Luwero triangle. The relief work in the Horn of Africa was 
at its most extensive in 1985 to 1986. Over the five years from 1983, income grew from 
f 16 million to E108 million; SCF had become a leading actor in the 'hunger business'. 5 
2 Slim, H. 1994. 'Editorial' in Disasters: The Journal ofDisaster Studies and Managenient, Vol. 18. No. 3, 
September 1994,189-191. 
3 The Worlds Children, Vol. 61 No. 3, September 1978. 
4 This had closed under the regime of Idi Amin. Guy Blest, Field Director, found that one of the SCF clinics 
was still functioning, staffed by local people - some, %vearing their Save the Children badges. The World's 
Children, Vol. 61 No. 3, September 1980,3. 
5 The Hunger Business, Channel 4, shown 12 November 2000. 
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During this period a number of factors combined to entrench a pathological approach to 
individual children. The emphasis was on the logistics of relief and the exercise of power 
to deliver assistance to the powerless. In order to provoke a response of shock and 
sympathy from the public, the media and the relief agencies portrayed children as helpless 
victims. For examples, pictures of children in their mother's arms were trimmed to show 
only the child. 6 
This approach not only portrayed children as victims, it cut them off from their social 
world. In its appeals for assistance for children in the Hom of Africa, SCF did little to 
engage the public with a utilitarian understanding of children as part of a larger society, 
whether defined as the family which nurtured the child, the local community or the wider 
African population. By contrast, the stark political situation in southern Africa obliged 
SCF to recognize children as inextricably bound up with societies in conflict. In southern 
Africa SCIF worked in the front-line states. Here the main obstacle to development was 
clearly identified not as natural disaster, but the war caused by South Africa's relentless 
pursuit of its policy of regional destabilization to maintain apartheid. 7 
By the time that Princess Anne made a tour of SCF projects in Africa in 1988, this 
understanding of children as part of a social world had permeated The World's Children: 
6 Focus on Iniages, SCF image guidelines, 199 1. 
7 The Worki's Children, Vol. 68 No. 1, March 1985,2-3. 
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One theme linking many visits HRH The Princess Royal made during her recent 
African tour was the difficulties facing children in conflict: another was the 
detennination of their communities and governments to tackle these difficulties. 8 
Three years later SCF introduced its first image guidelines. They covered all forms of 
communication aimed at describing or representing the work of Save the Children, 
internally and externally. Focus on Iniages signalled a shift away from the portrayal of the 
child as victim and recipient of aid. The guidelines noted that: 
The vast majority of overseas staff are recruited from the countries where Save the 
Children works. Images of 'dominant' white project workers dispensing aid to 
6passive' local people contradict Save the Children's collaborative way of working. 
They also encouraged images which accurately portrayed the child as a member of a 
family or wider society showing resilience and coping capacities. Focus on Images 
encouraged pictures of a child with disabilities making his way towards the outstretched 
hands of his grandmother, rather than pictures of the same child seen in isolation with his 
crutches. 9 The relationship between the media, international NGOs, and the people in the 
host country continues to be the subject of reappraisal. 10 
8 'Our President's African Tour' in The World's Children, Vol. 69 No. 2, June 1988. 
9 Focus on Images, 199 1. 
'0 Research in progress, Eric Greitens, PhD candidate, Refugee Studies Centre, Oxford University. 
181 
In 1989 SCIF began work in war-stricken Angola. In the same year war broke out in Liberia 
and two years later spread to Sierra Leone. SCF would struggle to apply lessons learned 
from the Horn when it responded to these conflicts. 
It was not only in Africa that SCF was responding to conflict. In Asia, the Fund began new 
areas of work with Afghan refugees in Pakistan in 198 1, and with people displaced by 
violence in Sri Lanka in 1983. In Central America, SCIF was the first international agency 
to send a medical team into Nicaragua after the ending of the civil war in July 1979.11 
One war which SCF ignored was the inter-state conflict between Iran and Iraq. It is worth 
noting that, despite difficulties of access, the Swiss children's agency, Term des Hommes, 
did succeed in developing an educational project among the Iranian child prisoners held by 
Iraq. 12 
With the major exception of the Iran-Iraq war, SCF demonstrated a capacity to react to 
human suffering and fund and staff country programmes. These proliferating country 
programmes then had their own momentum. As SCF responded to the immediate needs of 
children in emergencies it often omitted to Put these needs in the context of their longer- 
term interests and development. SCF then found that it had to keep responding to 
emergency needs. Within this cycle of relief, the three founding principles were put in 
jeopardy. 
'Facing a famine' in The World's Children, Vol. 61 No. 1, March 1980,8. 
BroxNm, 1.1990. Khomeini's Forgotten Sons: the Stoiy of1ran's Boy Soldiers, London: Grey Seal. 
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For example, where relief was delivered through channels controlled by the host 
government, such as in EthioPia, SCIF was unable to ensure that relief was universally 
available to all children in need. Where funding wa§ dependent upon messages generated 
by the media, SCIF did little to engage the public with a utilitarian understanding of 
children as part of a larger society including their immediate carers, and wider community. 
Lastly, the principle of optimism became distorted and self-centred. In the 1980s, SCF 
staff possessed an optimisin about their own capacity to deliver relief, but showed little 
optimism about the capacity of the societies in which they were working. 
During this period the range of work was so wide and the expansion happened so fast, that 
much necessary reappraisal is still taking place. For example, research is now being 
undertaken into the human rights abuses perpetrated in the Luwero triangle, Uganda, and 
the particular question is being asked as to why representatives of SCF, Oxfam and 
UNICEF working in the area did not act as effective witnesses to these abuses. 13 Many of 
the events of these years were described as disasters and met with a short-term 
humanitarian response. Greater social and political analysis of the processes behind these 
disastrous events was required if agencies were to make appropriate responses within a 
longer-term context. This would require a leadership less committed to logistical goals and 
more committed to the development of policy and ideas to underpin longer-term change. 
13 Research in progress, Patricia M. Diskett, Programme Officer, Disaster Management Centre, Cranfield 
University, 1999. 
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The leadership 
Who led the organization during this expansionist period and what experience did they 
bring to SCH For two decades SCF was under the leadership of a succession of men 
whose previous experience was either military or in the colonial service. They came to 
SCF, a non-govemmental organization, after a lifetime of experience of government 
service. In 1977, for example, the Director General, Overseas Director, Administrative 
Director, and Supplies Officer were all former military men, as were at least six Field 
Directors or Administrators, the Controller of UK fund-raising, two Regional Controllers, 
and thirteen Area Organisers. 14 Some of the women committee members also had military 
connections. 
15 
The Director General during the war in Nigeria was Sir Colin Thomley (Director General 
from January 1965 to March 1974). 16 Prior to joining SCF he had been Governor and 
Commander-in-Chief, British Honduras. He had seen SCF in action as a relief agency. 
When a hurricane and tidal wave hit the colony, endangering his and his family's life, SCF 
were first on the scene with emergency aid. 
14 Breen, R. Coping with Change, How Save the Children has survived over 75 j, ears. SCF Archive Paper 
No. 5,24 March 1995,8. 
'5 For example, Annette Street, Chairman of the Overseas Committee, knew the Chairman of Middle East 
Airlines, and was able to enlist his support in allowing the SCF team and some freight to fly MEA free of 
charge. She ended her letter saying: 'I can recall dining with you and your wife in Beirut many years ago 
when my late husband was Military Advisor to King Hussein - happier days. ' Letter from Annette Street to 
Sheikh Najeeb Alamuddine, 24 November 1976, SCF Archives reference P/OS/L3. 
16 As Director General he was a member of the advisory team sent by the British government to Nigeria in 
July 1968. 
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His successor, Sir John Lapsley (Director General June 1974 to July 1975) was introduced 
to readers of The Woi-lds Children in the following way: 
Sir John Lapsley retired from the Royal Air Force last October. His most recent 
appointment has been as Head of the British Defence Staff and Defence Attach6 in 
Washington since 1970. In that role he was involved in selling large quantities of 
defence material, including the Harrier 'jump jet' to the Americans. 17 
The JVorlds Children gives no indication of readers' reactions, but the wording of this 
announcement may be a reflection of the degree to which Cold War attitudes were 
entrenched among supporters of SCF. 
Air Commodore William Hibbert had acted as Deputy Director General for ten years 
before he succeeded Sir John Lapsley as Director General (August 1975 to July 1976). He 
commented upon SCIF involvement in Vietnam when he retired: 
One lesson which stands out prominently in my recollections is the unique value to 
The Save the Children Fund of its consistently non-aligned and non-political stance 
[ ... ] Again, in the Vietnam War, the Save the 
Children Fund was able to give 
financial help to the children in the North without prejudicing the position of its 
field teams on the other side of the firing line in the South. 18 
17 The World's Children, Vol. 54 No. 2, June 1974. 
18 The lVorld's Children, Vol. 56 No. 2, September 1976. 
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He was followed by John Cumber (Director General March 1976- December 1984). 
Although he had had a long career in the colonial service, he had also had two years' 
experience with SCF as Field Director in Sudan and two years as Director of Overseas 
Relief and Welfare. 
The greatest change came about when Nicholas Hinton was appointed in 1985. His 
background was neither in the military or the colonial service. He came from the voluntary 
sector. At the time of his appointment he was Director of the National Council for 
Voluntary Organizations. 19 He was joining SCF at a time when both in Britain and 
internationally the relationship between the state and civil society was in flux. Throughout 
the 1980s there was uncertainty over the future of state support for UK welfare services. 20 
Under the guise of structural adjustment there was a major setback to the construction of 
the state as service provider in many developing countries. By the end of the decade, state 
structures in socialist countries in Europe and elsewhere would be on the point of collapse. 
The civil war in Lebanon 
Of the proliferation of country programmes during this period I have chosen to focus upon 
SCIF work in Lebanon, not because it was important in scale, but because it demonstrates 
significant qualitative changes both in the nature of Nvar, and in the response of SCIF to 
19 The World's Children, V61.65 No. 3, September 1984. 
20 Nicholas Hinton reintroduced to The Morld's Children the kind of commentary on contemporary events 
and debate about the role of SCF, that had not been seen in the journal since Edward Fuller gave up the 
editorship in 1958. See for example The World's Children, Vol. 70 No. 2, June 1989. 
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children living with war. When appealing for funds for Lebanon in 1983, Joe Wingfield, 
Deputy Director Overseas Department, described the country in the following words: 
Lebanon is an unusual situation in that it is neither a natural disaster that has 
happened, nor a war that has ended, meaning that this limbo situation is going to 
continue for some time. 21 
Protracted conflict, collapse of the state, ineffective international intervention, and the 
devastation of civilian livelihoods, became all too familiar aspects of conflict in the latter 
part of the twentieth century. 22 In the absence of effective government in Lebanon, 
organized crime flourished and foreigners were targeted. Southern Lebanon had also seen 
the emergence of the efficient parastatal entity, Hizbollah, dedicated to its own project of 
4positive peace' around which the population could rally. 
These circumstances posed a challenge to the relationships between SCIF and government. 
In Lebanon SCIF would have to negotiate with diffuse centres of power, and acknowledge 
that internal fragmentation and cross-border interests were as important as national 
boundaries. The maxim that SCIF would not work in a country except at the invitation of 
the government might still hold at the airport. However, in order to gain access to children 
21 SCF Archives reference PIOS/L3, II January 1983. 
22 See special issue on Complex Political Emergencies in Third lVorld Quarterly, Vol. 20 No. 1,1999. 
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and their families SCIF would have to engage with brokers and rely upon those with 
effective local power, described in the Lebanese context as wasta. 23 
Under these circumstances, SCF had to develop new responses to children living with war. 
The work in Lebanon demonstrates how, under the consistent guidance of Field Director 
Frances Moore and with the participation of Lebanese and Palestinian partner 
organizations and staff, the principles of the founding generation could be reinterpreted 
and could be put into practice. 
First among these was universalism. Wars in the last quarter of the twentieth century were 
increasingly to be civil wars, intra-state rather than inter-state. 24 Under these circumstances 
SCIF needed to develop ways of reaching all sectors of the child population in a divided 
society. The Nigerian civil war demonstrated the discordance between political neutrality 
and universalism. Adherence to the principle of political neutrality had led SCIF to 
withhold assistance on an impartial basis. By contrast, universalism, as understood by the 
founding generation of SCF, was a positive creed inspiring them to hold out assistance to 
all children on an impartial basis. At a time when social divisions in Lebanon hardened 
along sectarian lines, SCIF succeeded in maintaining and extending a non-sectarian 
programme accessible to children of all faiths. It also succeeded in working with both 
Lebanese and Palestinians. At the level of the household, this period saw the awakening of 
gender awareness and a renewed commitment to reach the girl child. 
23 Amin Maalouf's novel The Rock of Tanios, set in the early nineteenth century, is a reminder that the 
organization of power in this way Nvas not only a late twentieth century phenomenon. Maalouf, A. 1995. The 
Rock of Tanios, London: Abacus. 
24 The Iran-Iraq war was the major catastrophic exception. 
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Second was the principle of utilitarianism. By the late 1970s, SCF's reputation as a rescue 
service in a disaster scenario was assured. While famine in the Nigerian civil war had been 
clearly understood as a political rather than a natural event, when in the 1980s famine 
struck in Ethiopia it was blamed on the failure of the rains. The populations affected were 
perceived as powerless victims suffering the consequences of events beyond their control. 
The Lebanon programme began from a different perception. It depended upon the 
participation of Lebanese and Palestinian partner organizations and staff, and its activities 
were maintained with the support and protection of the local community. Lebanese and 
Palestinian society contained within it not only victims, but also the agents of change. 
There. was also a generational dimension to the SCF Lebanon programme. Elsewhere SCF 
had targeted mothers and young children. By contrast, in Lebanon, as children grew up, the 
programme developed activities with them as young people. Another indicator of this 
forward-looking dimension was that education became as important to the programme as ' 
health care. Girls were particularly targeted as agents of change. 
As SCF became more confident of the consequences of its approach in Lebanon, it 
strengthened its advocacy role. Whereas in Nigeria its operation had been dependent upon 
ICRC, in Lebanon SCF prided itself on an identity distinct from ICRC, UNICEF, and 
UNWRA, and sought to influence their programmes and particularly their impact on the 
lives of children. 
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Third was the principle of pacifistic optimism. Civil wars are particularly brutal and a 
grave challenge to the optimist. The very smallness of the population and geographical 
area of Lebanon meant that SCIF staff were confronted with this brutality more directly 
than had been, for example, during the forced population transfers within Ethiopia. Before 
the term 'ethnic cleansing' had gained currency, internal borders between communities 
within Beirut and the surrounding mountains were being 'straightened out' by the 
'elimination' of neighbourhoods and villages. Not only were children suffering maiming, 
killing and displacement, but also the psychological torment of trying to make sense of 
these events. 
The development of the Lebanon programme demonstrates how SCF workers were able to 
preserve a degree of optimism combined with a pessimistic realism about the likely 
duration of the war. In response to the question of what are you saving children for, their 
goals were realistic. They worked with children and their communities to enable them to 
cope better with the consequences of war. However, the strengthening of coping strategies 
did not amount to a strategy for positive peace. 
SCF in Lebanon: reinterpreting the founding principles 
'The Lebanon programme was really mine for a long time. ' 25 
Frances Moore Nvas SCF Field Director in Lebanon for sixteen years from 1982. When she 
looks back on that period she recognizes the particular freedom open to her as a Field 
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Director to develop the country programme. She was on the spot, analysed the needs and 
developed programmes in response. SCF favoured this opportunistic and flexible 
approach. The brief overview of activities which follows demonstrates the historical 
continuity of the programme in Lebanon, and the extent to which changes introduced by 
Frances Moore were linked into existing activities. The principles motivating these 
changes are then analysed in more detail in the next section. 
SCF's involvement in Lebanon began in 1948, providing health care services for 
Palestinian refugees fleeing their homes during the first Arab-Israeli war. It was in 
Lebanon that Mary Hawkins had her first appointment in 195 0.26 In 1958 SCF began a 
small educational sponsorship programme to enable children from especially 
disadvantaged families to attend school. When civil war broke out in 1976, SCF sent a 
medical team led by Mary Hawkins to Lebanon. It was her task to identify a gap in the 
relief available to the displaced which SCIF could effectively fill. In her progress report of 
12 December, she wrote: 
A fourth clinic is being established in a hotel next to La Siesta, called Khalde. This 
is one of the worst refugee settlements I have ever seen (or smelled). It has to be 
seen to be believed. All the occupants here are from Maslakh on the outskirts of 
Beirut where there was a massacre, and 40,000 inhabitants were displaced. The 
area was then destroyed and bulldozed. These people are Kurds. They are living in 
25 Interview, %vith Frances Moore, Oxford, II October 2000. 
26 SCF HQ was in Tripoli. Mary Hawkins herself lived for two years in a tent in the camp of 4500 
Palestinians near the Syrian border. There was no telephone and no transport, and so as the only nurse living 
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absolute squalor with blocked sewers, no water supply in the building (which 
means that the little girls and the women have to carry cans or buckets of water on 
their heads up many flights of stairs). They appear to have had very little help or 
distribution of relief goods compared to other centres. 27 
By April Mary Hawkins was reporting that SCF's medical team was nearing the end of the 
emergency programme, but although this had helped the refugee children, the situation was 
a depressing one. No official plans had been drawn up for resettlement, and most of the 
refugees had no hope of a livelihood. 28 
Mary Hawkins had identified long-term needs, but the SCIF medical team was not in a 
position to meet them. Five years later, at the time of the Israeli invasion in 1982, an 
expatriate medical team was again sent to Lebanon, and upon its withdrawal all remaining 
funds were allocated through Lebanese partner organizations. The decision was taken on 
the following grounds: 
Already there are signs of the danger of being involved in the complex political 
tangle that is Lebanon. The MOH [Ministry of Health] are demanding funds be put 
in their hands. This ministry is barely operational. The smaller organizations are 
very effective but are all 'political'. Discreet placement of funds with these 
organizations sees that the assistance reaches those who need it most and by 
in the camp she was the first person to be called on in a medical emergency. Taped interview with Rodney 
Breen, 5 December 1997, SCF Archives. 
27 Mary Hawkins, Progress Report, 12 December 1976, SCF Archives reference P/OS/L3. 
28 Minutes of the Overseas Committee, OD 6722 Lebanon, 14 April 1977. 
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spreading the funds around, possible accusations of taking sides are avoided. 29 
There was no shortage of funding or trained medical personnel among either the 
government or the Palestinians. However, in the administrative chaos, these funds were not 
immediately available, and it was decided that SCF could provide some protection for the 
population until the dust settled. 
Frances Moore was living in the Lebanon at the time. She joined SCF, and it appears that it 
was her sustained commitment to the country, combined with the opportunity provided 
through SCF, that allowed her to address the kind of long-term developmental issues that 
had frustrated Mary Hawkins. She inherited a record of two distinct forms of activity: 
emergency medical care and an educational sponsorship programme run by a local NGO. 
Under her guidance the two strands were woven together, and by the time she handed over 
the programme it was based on multi-sectoral basic services centres designed to provide 
for communities' long-term needs, but also able to respond in an emergency. Most 
significantly the programme evolved to include no other expatriate staff, instead it was 
built by, and its success depended upon, Lebanese and Palestinian staff. 
At the time of the Israeli invasion SCF was providing assistance to three of the Palestinian 
refugee camps. The clinic at Bourj al-Barajneh was reopened on Friday 12 November 1982 
by HRH Princess Anne, in her capacity as President of the British and Commonwealth 
29 Richard Grove-Bills, Field Director, Beirut, 8 September 1982, SCF Archives reference P/OS/L3. 
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Save the Children Fund. 30 It was later developed to provide an integrated and 
comprehensive range of services covering health, education and social welfare. 31 
SCF also maintained its support f6r alternatives to institutional care. It continued to 
provide financial assistance as well as guidance and counselling to help extended families 
absorb abandoned and orphaned children. The programme was backed up by the 
organization of weekend and summer camps, as well as after-school clubs. In order to 
extend the human and material resources available to children, SCF ran nurse aide and 
childcare workers' training courses, and developed a school book loan scheme which 
aimed to give the poorest children access to the books they needed for their studies. A 
closer look at the way in which the above activities evolved, reveals the ideas which 
underpinned the programme that Frances Moore developed. 
Universalism: more than a non-sectarian programme 
There are many possible descriptions for the lines along which Lebanese society fractured 
during the civil war. The most obvious is sectarian. I therefore look first at the way in 
which SCF succeeded in maintaining a non-sectarian programme. Sectarian differences 
were entrenched in the Lebanese constitution and governed appointments of every 
off Cial. 
32 
I During the war social divisions in Lebanon hardened along sectarian lines. At 
30 Robert Fisk reports that 'this caused a convulsion in the British embassy in Beirut who were fearful of 
offending Amin Gemayel's regime' and that 'David Roberts, the ambassador, arrived in the Commodore 
Hotel on the night of the royal visit, exploding with xvrath that journalists should have even suggested the 
princess might have met Palestinians. ' Fisk, R. 1992. Pity the Nationjebanon at War, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 465. 
31 Lebanon, Country Report, Save the Children Fund, April 1994,5. SCF Archives reference P/OS/L3. 
32 Government appointments were made on the basis of a ratio of 6: 5 (Christians: non-Christians). 
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the outbreak of the war SCF had links dating back to the 1950s with the Lebanese Union of 
Child Welfare (LUCW). The LUCW was set up as a member of the International Union of 
Child Welfare, and by 1976 it was an umbrella organization for about twenty-eight Muslim 
and Christian member organizations. Trust both between its members and between the 
Union and SCF had been well established prior to the war, and withstood the strains of the 
war. 
33 
SCIF in Lebanon was in a similar position to Oxfam in Nigeria at the outbreak of the civil 
war. It was non-operational and instead made grants to locally based organizations. Just as 
has been seen in the case of Oxfam practice in Nigeria, the contacts with a range of local 
partner organizations were able to form the basis for an early warning system, or bank of 
indigenous knowledge, at a time when political forces were pulling the country apart. 
Ensuring that funds reached the LUCW and keeping in touch with staff and the sponsored 
children was the minimum that SCIF could do when war broke out. However, such human 
ties could be very enduring. 34 
SCF's emergency response was to send in medical teams on both sides of the sectarian 
conflict. Three nurses answered an appeal from a hospital on the Christian side where the 
organization of the children's department had collapsed as a result of the war. Meanwhile 
on the Muslim side, the medical team led by Mary Hawkins began work among the 
33 A visitor from the UK -vvrote %vith respect about the LUCW, its principled approach and frugal 
administration. See Extracts from Mr Napier Bax's 'Notes of his volunteered visit to Lebanon to convey the 
Sponsorship Monies to the Lebanese Union of Child Welfare and survey the needs of the children', II 
December 1975, SCIF Archives reference P/OS/L3. 
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refugees in the hotels and beach huts. The importance of meeting people's urgent needs 
without delay is underlined by this comment: 
We had asked everybody for help, all the big world-wide organizations. For a year 
they came to look at us, to survey us, to poke us, to probe us and to photograph us 
and they did nothing. Yet you come and then within five minutes you are actually 
helping us. Bless you all at the Save the Children Fund. 35 
Two other themes in the civil war were particularly relevant to the position SCIF took in the 
country. The first was the degree to which the Lebanese civil war was in fact a Palestinian 
war. The second was the contested role of the state. 
Following the defeat of the Arab states in 1967 there was an influx of Palestinians into 
Lebanon from the northern part of the West Bank. In 1970 Palestinian organizations were 
expelled from Jordan. These new arrivals were a ma or element in the destabilization of j 
Lebanon. The Palestinians were perceived as Muslims by the Maronite Christian 
population, who blamed them for upsetting the demographic balance which had 
historically favoured the Christians. Since the Lebanese border was the only border over 
which the Palestinian organizations could attack Israel, their presence in the South drew 
Israeli fire. 
34 In an interview held in October 2000, Frances Moore said that one of the staff of the LUCW was still 
workingwith SCF twenty-five years later. 
35 The lVorld's Children, Vol. 57 No. ], March 1977,17. 
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SCF had first begun work in the Lebanon not with the Lebanese population but with 
Palestinian refugees. It was part of a regional programme of assistance to the refugees 
extending to both banks of the Jordan as well as the Gaza Strip. This assistance to 
Palestinians was implemented in parallel to a continuing programme of assistance to 
Jewish refugees through Youth Aliyah, and from time to time questions were raised about 
the distribution of aid between the two groups. In 1980 Annette Street raised the issue with 
the Overseas Welfare Committee: 
As you know, I am concerned that the Fund appears to be giving so much aid to 
children in Israel and less to other children in that part of the world. 36 
The very strength of the ties between Youth Aliyah and SCF, may have encouraged SCF to 
make an equivalent commitment to assist Palestinians. 37 This organizational commitment 
was reinforced by the individual loyalty of people such as Mary Hawkins who had worked 
alongside Palestinians in their times of most distress and had a particular respect for their 
cause. 38 In its work with Palestinians in southern Lebanon, SCIF was able to refer to and 
draw on a reserve of trust earned by its work with Palestinians in the other places where 
they had sought refuge. 
The other theme in the civil war which was relevant to SCF was the struggle over the 
nature of the state, and in particular interventionist welfare policies. The disintegration of 
36 Memo to DOD cc Chairman, Overseas Committee from Annette Street, 19 November 1980, 
SCIF Archives P/OS/L3. 
37 In June 1982 Youth Aliyah enabled SCIF representative Joc Wingfield to reach Sidon via Israel. 
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the central authority of the state, as well as the disintegration of the Lebanese anny, 39 and 
the territorial consolidation of communities in mini-states, were evidence of more complex 
lines of division than sectarian interests. The brutality with which small enclaves of people, 
who stood in the way of this territorial consolidation, were eliminated is a measure of the 
degree to which ambitions were focussed upon local power. SCF bad a history of working 
with new states to build up their child welfare. In Lebanon, if SCF were to strengthen state 
welfare services it would be lending authority to a heavily contested vision of the state. 40 
SCIF had valuable historical links with a number of non-state actors in Lebanon, most 
notably the LUCW and the Palestinians. However, the extent to which it developed these 
partnerships in Lebanese civil society and amongst the Palestinian refugee population, 
would be a marker of its own position in relationship to the contested Lebanese state. SCIF 
took the position it had assumed in so many other countries: it worked with the Ministry. of 
Health to strengthen state sector health services, and at the same time maintained its 
partnerships within Lebanese and Palestinian civil society. 
These multiple alliances were pragmatic. In order to practise a universalism which reached 
out to all children, SCIF negotiated with many different gatekeepers to gain access to 
children. Centres of power were diffuse and political neutrality meant not just working on 
both sides, but on all sides. The lines between military and civilian -were also blurred. SCIF 
38 In December 1997 Mary Hawkins had just received a Christmas card from Fathi Arafat, brother of Yasser 
Arafat and head of the Palestinian Red Crescent Hospital in Beirut, 1976. Taped interview with Rodney 
Breen, 5 December 1997, SCF Archives. 
39 Note that in the civil war of 1958 the Lebanese army did hold together under General Chehab. 
40 The role of SCIF in strengthening state services in situations where the state's welfare role is contested is a 
recurring theme: see for example the discussion of Afghanistan during the period 1977 to 1979 in Chapter 8. 
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staff had to remind themselves that they were there to assist all children, whether in the 
company of armed men or carrying arms themselves. 
Team members must realise that the camps house families in which some of the 
older male members are combatant and Nvill be seen carrying guns. It is quite 
impossible to avoid this. 41 
SCIF had to forge its own interpretation of universalism. This was not equivalent to 
bilateral aid to the sovereign state. Nor was it equivalent to assistance to non-combatants 
only. Instead SCIF had to negotiate access to all children whatever their circumstances. 
Utilitarianism 
Not since the founding generation has it been so fruitful to identify features of SCIF work 
which reflect the principle of utilitarianism. Much of the Lebanon programme described in 
this chapter was designed not for its intrinsic merit, but with its consequences in mind. The 
most significant factor was the emphasis upon national rather than international staff, and 
reflected an optimistic view of the capacity of the Lebanese and Palestinian people which 
is discussed in greater detail below. 
The second factor was the generational dimension to the programme in the Lebanon. It was 
not confined to young children, instead it accompanied them as they grew into young 
people. One reason behind the emergence of these youth activities was the history of the 
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Palestinian programme which extended across generations. The Palestinian schoolchildren 
sponsored by SCIF were enabled to attend school and remain in families rather than 
institutional care but they were 'very much poor relations'. 42 The SCF youth activities 
developed to give these 'poor relations' a sense of ownership, and they developed in 
buildings where SCIF was already running kindergartens 'on the understanding that 
A3 
orphans were the inner core of the committee and could invite others in. Dunng the 
period from 1982 to 1990 the streets were dangerous, and young people needed a place out 
of hann's way. 
44 
When asked why the SCF Lebanon programme evolved to include such an important 
element of activities for young people, Frances Moore referred to the work of Fatah with 
the Palestinian youth. Until the Israeli invasion Fatah had organized activities among the 
Palestinian youth. When these were shut down, the young people were targeted by the 
occupying force. SCF then developed its youth activities to provide a safe constructive 
activity to protect the Palestinian young people from the occupiers. 
The clubs could therefore be seen as a fusion of bwo visions of the up-and-coming 
generation. Fatah had an explicitly political goal of organizing Palestinian young people as 
the cultural bearers of the Palestinian nation. One reading of the goals implicit in the SCF 
programme was that SCIF was nurturing a generation rooted in family, who valued 
recreation and education, and had the habit of service to the conu-nunity. These two visions 
41 Project document 1976, SCF Archives P/OS/L3. 
42 Interview with Frances Moore, Oxford ,II 
October 2000. 
43 ]bid. 
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were overlapping but did not coincide. For example, SCF insisted that the youth clubs 
were places for activities other than fighting. Frances Moore explains: 
In youth clubs we would welcome fighters but theywere not allowed to bring their 
guns. There was a very clear distinction: they came to the club to do other things. 45 
She described an incident where the youth club was closed because of the entry of armed 
fighters. The parents went to the local committee who put pressure on the boys to allow the 
club to reopen. The local community not only provided protection for the club; it also 
became involved in taking care of some of the activities. 46 
Frances Moore attributed such successes to the local staff- 
If your local staff are trustworthy themselves, and known by the community, and 
have credibility, in the end you'll be able to win through, but we had to take it step 
by step. 
Another possible area of diversion between Fatah and SCF, was the priority SCF attached 
to equal opportunities for girls and boys. High amongst SCF priorities were activities for 
girls. SCIF staff were aware that vulnerable individuals within a family, the very young, the 
44 A similar development can be seen in the Northern Ireland programme and it would be interesting to know 
what communication there was between the Northern Ireland and Lebanon programmes during this period. 
See 'Update on Ulster', The World's Children, Vol. 61 No. 3, September 1980,11-14. 
45 Interview with Frances Moore, Oxford, II October 2000. See also Chapter 8, where the importance of 
local ownership is observed in Tajikistan and Afghanistan. 
4" Alia Shana'a, South Lebanon Clubs/Summer Camps, Nahir El Barid, Friday Club Report, 6 February 
1993, SCF Archives reference P/OS/L3. 
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very old, and people with disabilities, were usually looked after by the eldest daughter. 47 
Youth activities for girls were designed to give these caters an opportunity to enjoy 
childhood and adolescence. At the same time, there was a growing recognition of the 
added value for the next generation of educating girls. At headquarters SCF broadened its 
vision of child welfare from the health sector and appointed an education adviser and a 
disability adviser. 
The divergence in the views expressed by Mary Hawk-ins and Frances Moore reflected a 
tension critical to the organization as a whole. Mary Hawkins had seen SCF as having a 
special contribution to make in the medical field, where, she felt, it was possible to act 
independently of politics. 48 Frances Moore deliberately broadened SCF's sphere of activity 
in Lebanon and emphasized education, and in particular girls' education. Like Mary 
Hawkins, she described herself as practically rather than ideologically driven. However, 
the development she oversaw moved SCF closer to politically contested areas. For 
example, SCIF in Lebanon was distancing itself from the state and to a lesser extent the 
male-dominated civil society and moving closer to the family. As the Lebanese analyst, 
Suad Joseph has said, 
47 Interview with Frances Moore, Oxford, II October 2000. See also Chapter 8, where this pattern is bome 
out in family roles observed in Tajikistan and Afghanistan. 
48 Interview with Mary Hawkins, Perranuthnoe, 12 April 2000. 
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Family was and remains the central social institution for most people in Lebanon. 
Family became even more important with the paralysis of the state during the civil 
war, 1975-1 990.949 
At a time when much of the women's human rights movement was pressing for changes 
from the state, Suad Joseph has argued that women in Lebanon, as in many Arab states, 
could not feel the impact of the state in their lives. They felt the impact of their 
communities, and in particular the men of their communities. The kind of work Suad 
Joseph, and other advocates of women's rights in the Middle East, have been doing to 
reconstruct women's human rights within the context of family, has political resonances 
with SCF's approach to children. After the collapse of the state in Lebanon, and the 
fragmentation of society, SCF had been obliged to recognize the locus of change for 
children as the family. In many ways social transformation within the home where culture 
was created and maintained, would be a far more ambitious and complex undertaking than 
promoting legislation for change. 
The last factor in the utilitarian design of the SCIF Lebanon programme was the importance 
of advocacy. SCIF was confident that it was pioneering exemplary work in the promotion 
of the well-being of children in the Lebanon. Value was added to these projects if they 
were seen to influence others, a point which was well understood by Eglantyne Jebb. She 
attached great importance not only to the Declaration of the Rights of the Child but also to 
the lUCW as a channel for the dissemination of good practice. After her death this aspect 
49 Joseph, S. 1993a. 'Research Note: Family and Women's Human Rights', SouthAsia Bulletin, Vol. 13 No. 1, 
148-151. 
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of her work was diminished. SCIF had been diverted from the specific focus of child 
welfare, and international advocacy was limited to recommendations on health in particular 
on behalf of refugees in emergency situations. 
Under Frances Moore's guidance, SCF in the Lebanon began to act as a local and regional 
advocate for improved child welfare. It did this in several practical ways. First it 
encouraged other agencies to borrow from models developed in SCF projects: 
Frequently it can be noticed that projects starteý by SCF are copied either by other 
voluntary agencies or by UN agencies such as UNICEF. This is particularly 
noticeable in UNICEF's new Family Welfare programme funded by a legacy from 
Mrs Grelak in which the orientation and training is largely concentrated on social 
workers in the home, a programme similar to that involved with SCF's 1600 
sponsorships. 50 - 
It also seconded SCIF staff to UNWRA. However, it was found that staff were only able to 
identify with UNWRA without difficulty when engaged in emergency work. The SCIF 
priorities of child protection and the development of good practice along the orphan 
support model were not priorities for UNWRA. This was a period when intergovernmental 
organizations were also reassessing the role of NGOs. 51 
5" Field Director's report to Overseas Committee, June 1985, SCF Archives reference P/OS/L3. 
51 Zizzamia, A. 1987. NGOIUNICEF Cooperation: A Historical Perspective, UNICEF History Series, 
Monograph 5. 
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The revival of the principle of utilitarianism had far-reaching implications for SCF, all of 
which would overlap with the political agenda of other bodies, whether organizations 
engaged in nation-building, or movements for women's human rights. Ironically this 
coincidence of interests would push SCIF to affirm its distinct identity. 
Optimistic pacificisin 
The brutality of civil war confronts the optimist with overwhelming evidence for a 
pessimistic view of human nature. I argue it is under these very circumstances that 
optimistic pacificism cannot be jettisoned. 
Optirlistic pacificism as a principle can be understood in several ways. It is a pilot light in 
uncertain times. 52 After the Israeli invasion the Palestinian clinics in south Lebanon had 
been blown up and looted. The male staff had either been killed or were in detention 
camps. The female staff were described in The Worlds Children as 'too demoralised to 
work'. 53 However, this description may not give due weight to the other demands on the 
women's time following the onslaught on the camps: demands which an international 
worker did not have. At this critical time, SCIF nurse Diana Lacey restarted her routine 
work: the mother and baby clinics on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays; ante-natal 
clinics on Tuesday, Thursdays and Saturdays. 
52 In speaking of the peace movement in Britain, Martin Ceadel refers to the 'absolutist obstinacy needed in 
periods of adversity (Nvhen it could be no more than a pilot light). ' Ceadel 1996,23. 
53 'Lebanon: a taste of normality', The lVorld's Children, Vol. 65 No. ], March 1984,6-7. 
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In the midst of such insecurity, Diana says, the first and most important thing you 
can do is to try to bring back a sense of nonnality, a feeling that there is such a 
thing as what used to be everyday reality... 'They needed to see something 
working, ' she said. 54 
Diana Lacey stressed the importance of being seen in the camp every day as 'a known 
quantity'. Her motivation was similar to that of Mary Hawkins who thirty years earlier had 
deliberately moved from Tripoli to live with the Palestinians in their camp on the Syrian 
border. 55 
Optimistic pacificism reflects not only a commitment on the part of SCF to the people 
living through civil war, it also reflects a particular view of the individual and of the 
community. In the view of the optimist, both individual and community are characterized 
by resilience. The staff involved in the Lebanon programme from 1975 to 1990 were 
optimists to this extent. However, they were not optimistic pacificists to the same degree as 
the founding generation of SCF. They had limited ambitions to enable children to cope 
better with the suffering of war. They did not have ambitions to prevent further war. 56 
Optimistic pacificism was a resource which became more significant the longer the civil 
war endured. In 1976 Andr6 Karam, the Save the Children US Field Director in Lebanon 
reported that: 
54 Ibid. 
'55 It should be said that in her inimitable pragmatic way, Mary Hawkins explained her action in terms of 
Gsaving time and petrol'. 
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These are times of stress, fear, panic and uncertainty. What makes it bad is that this 
abnormal situation has been with us for a long time. Children ask questions to 
which parents cannot answer or simply do not have satisfactory replies. One such 
question is 'Who is fighting whomT 'When will the fighting stopT 'How can we 
escapeT 'When can I go back to school? 157 
An optimistic view of the individual is borne out by the very questions asked by the child 
quoted above. The child was trying to make sense of the violence, did believe it would 
58 have an end, and maintained hopes of attending school. 
Frances Moore admitted that all children suffer from pressures caused by the psychological 
strain of the civil war, but underlined that: 
Not all children show obviously in their daily behaviour the effects of their terrible 
surroundings. Some are withdrawn, some aggressive, but when their family is still 
intact they manage amazingly well. 59 
56 Both Mary Hawkins and Frances Moore were quite clear in interview that SCF had a role in relief and 
development and no role in war prevention. 
57 Save the Children Federation USA, Report from Lebanon, Andr6 Karam, Director, II November 1976, 
SCF Archives reference P/OS/L3. 
58 That these kinds of optimistic questions persist is confirmed by wNvxv. savethechildren. ora. uk/eyetoeye/ 
2000; by interviews with child combatants in Sierra Leone by Krijn Peters and Paul Richards - see 'Fighting 
Nvith Open Eyes: Youth Combatants Talking about War in Sierra Leone' in Bracken, P. and Petty, C., eds, 
1998. Rethinking the Trainna of JVar, London: Free Association Books, 76-111; and in Afghanistan by 
Patricia Sellick - see Sellick P. 1998. The Impact of Conflict on Children in Afghanistan, R5dda Barnen, 
Save the Children Federation Inc., Save the Children (UK), UNICEF, May 1998. 
59 The JVorld's Children, Vol. 68 No. ], March 1997,2-3. 
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By contrast, in the aftennath of the 1982 Israeli invasion the discussion turned not around 
resilience but around the psychological and emotional harm done by the war. In Lebanon, 
as well as elsewhere, there was a growing trend to regard children who had witnessed the 
violence of war as war-damaged. This pessimistic view implied an irrecoverable deficit. 
Frances Moore remembered how one Lebanese woman tried to describe to her the limits of 
resilience: 
It's almost as if I'm a piece of elastic and I'm being stretched, and then Nvhen the 
war stops I go back to where I was before, but my elasticity is not quite as strong as 
it was. Next time it happens I can't go back as far as I did the first time. 60 
Each phase of war stretched people that much more and made them less able to cope. 
During the 1980s the SCIF Lebanon programme began exploring ways of creating a safe 
environment for the child. This meant looking beyond the child to his or her immediate 
carers and local community. Frances Moore uses the phrase 'the fabric of life' to describe 
the backdrop to each child's life. However, it did not overtly work for war prevention. In 
interview, both Mary Hawkins and Frances Moore have been clear that SCF had a role in 
relief and development and no role in working for the prevention of war. 
However, they were both prepared to make the first incremental step away from direct 
work- with the individual child. The best way, according to Frances Moore, to ensure that 
relief reached the child, and to ensure the child's development, was through the family. As 
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a UK-based agency, SCIF had learned the lessons of the Second World War evacuation 
programme, and recognized the overriding importance of the home environment and 
continuous contact with parents during wartime. It then took this experience abroad and 
Nvas in many ways ahead of UNICEF in finding altematives to institutional care. 
It was around this innovatory work that the partnership with the LUCW developed. While 
there were Christian and Muslim orphanages where the government paid for schooling, 
there was no safety net for providing assistance within homes. Children therefore entered 
an institution in order to get free education. Sponsorship by SCIF enabled them to stay with 
their families and pay to go to school. 
However, SCIF was not only concerned with maintaining ties between children and their 
families, it was also building a new set of commitments. SCIF staff demonstrated a 
commitment to children who were not their kith and kin, as Frances Moore said, 
Our workers there put their own children into school each day and say goodbye to 
their families, never knowing what may happen before they get home again. Very 
few business organizations in Lebanon have managed to keep their staff coming 
into work through all the shelling, fighting and general disruption the way SCIF is 
doing. ' 61 
60 Interview with Frances Moore, Oxford, II October 2000. 
61 'The Children of Lebanon' in The World's Children, Vol. 68 No. ], March 1987,2-3. 
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This wider sense of responsibility towards children extended to the youth clubs. The youth 
clubs were able to function as a place where combatants left their arms at the door, not 
because they were neutral places run by an international organization, but because they 
belonged to the local community. Again, Frances Moore attributes this sense of ownership 
to the work of the national staff. 
It is in this context that SCF has appeared critical of the UNICEF initiative to cultivate 
children as a zone of peace. 62 Following similar initiatives in El Salvador and Uganda, in 
1987 UNICEF organized a ceasefire to allow for the immunization of all children in 
Lebanon. UNICEF was able to attract international publicity and support for the 
immunization campaign. However, June Goodfield, researching her book The Planned 
Miracle, encountered marked anger at SCF. According to SCF, estimates from the 
American University in Beirut showed an immunization coverage during the four to five 
years prior to 1987 of between 80 and 90 per cent. The rich obtained vaccines for their 
children through private medicine, but the Lebanese Red Cross, the Mouvenlent Social and 
various other local agencies and charities had maintained a high level of immunization 
amongst poorer children. The competition between the mini-states set up in Lebanon 
during the civil war years had been played out in the field of child welfare: in Sidon, for 
instance, a mini-government headed by Mustapha Saad ran social programmes for Sunni 
Muslims, with properly established cold chains to keep vaccines refrigerated, where people 
could bring their children for vaccination at any time. 
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The real reason for their [SCF staff's] irritation was that by getting all the publicity 
UNICEF could undermine these ongoing efforts and erode the morale of ordinary 
locals who, exposed to the dangers for twenty-four hours a day, had been beavering 
away for years. 
63 
SCIF also took issue with UNICEF's peace education programme. This programme was 
also inspired by the idea of children as zones of peace. From 1989 UNICEF hosted peace 
camps at which children from different cultural and religious backgrounds could meet and 
get to know each other. Young people aged 18-25 with scouting and similar experience 
were trained by UNICEF as camp monitors. The UNICEF annual report comments that: 
UNICEF staff were surprised less by the happy intermingling of the smaller 
children than by the lack of mutual distrust displayed by the monitors, who proved 
able to discard attitudes absorbed from their elders and confirmed by a lifetime 
surrounded by violence. 64 
It would be interesting to know whether there is any data monitoring the impact of these 
peace camps. Evidence from other divided societies shows that bringing children and 
young people together for finite periods of time after which they return to their own 
communities has only a superficial effect. In Northern Ireland none of the SCIF playgroups 
or clubs included children from both sides of the denominational line, with the exception 
62 Children as a zone of peace was an idea promoted %ýithin UNICEF by Nils Thedin, Chairman of Radda 
Barnen. See Vittachi, V. T. 1993. Benveen the Guns: Children as a Zone ofPeace, London: Hodder and 
Stoughton. 
63 Goodfield, J. 199 1. The Planned Miracle, London: Scribners, 160. 
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of the Playgroup at the waiting room for the Maze Prison. Although integration was a 
laudable aim, SCIF did not deem it practical, and concentrated instead on providing havens 
from violence for children of each community. In the 1970s, Hill House, in southern 
England, hosted children from both communities for holidays, but this SCF programme 
was under review. 
The benefits of integration are of doubtful value... Whereas living, playing and 
fighting together may soon dispel century old myths held about one side or the 
other, once the children return home to the rigid sectarian hatred generated all 
round from parents and peers, friendships are quickly eradicated. This point is now 
being seriously considered by the organisers of many hundred of mixed holidays 
organized during the last few years. Unless the children meet again the exercise is 
of little use ... 
65 
In looking at SCF's contribution in Northern Ireland, Simon Clark- begins by saying; I 
One expects so much simply because one wants to see, indeed one needs to see, 
something which gives one grounds for optimism. Ulster has never had it so good 
. so 
far as the sheer amount of help in terms of money and manpower for children's 
welfare is concerned, and it is easy to sit back and say: 'How marvellous - we are 
achieving something really tangible'. 66 
64 UNICEF Annual Report 1991, New York: UNICEF, 199 1. 
6-"Away from it all', The World's Children, Vol. 54, No. 1, March 1974,24. 
6'5 Clark, S., SCF Senior Press Officer, 'The Battle for Childhood' in The World's Children, Vol. 56, No. ], 
June 1976,17. 
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The UNICEF peace camps in Lebanon were tangible evidence of integration. However, 
their long-term benefit is dubious. Removing the children temporarily from their 
communities generated a relatively pristine, politics-free zone which avoided the more 
complex and intractable problems of their day-to-day living circumstances. 67 It answered 
the need of UNICEF and the donors to see something which gave grounds for optimism, 
but did not address the children's needs. 
The model that SCIF adopted in Lebanon was slightly different. Summer cam . ps were held, 
and year in year out, children from Palestinian camps were taken to the Druze mountains 
where the local children were then invited to participate in camp activities. Frances Moore 
distinguishes this kind of inclusive programme from the artificial one-off activity of 
bussing children from different communities to a separate location. The programme she 
describes is opportunistic rather than contrived and its effect is built upon from year to 
year. She is optimistic about the potential for building integrated activities with 
communities but her optimism is tempered by a realistic assessment of the repetition 
required to cement trust. . 
67 For a child's eye view of these problems, see 'eye to eye' - photographs taken by children from the Balata 
and Nahir El Barid refugee camps in the West Bank and Lebanon. These are included in a special website 
and an exhibition which was touring the UK and the Middle East in 2000, 
w,, v%v. savethechildren. org. uk/eyetoeye/ 2000. 
213 
Lessons learned 
The accelerated expansion of SCF's work in the 1980s led to a diverse range of 
unconnected programmes. From these programmes I have chosen to focus upon Lebanon 
because there are lessons to be learned which were of particular significance for the 
following decade. During the 1990s, SCIF reassessed much of its work both to give it 
internal cohesion, but also to make the organization a more effective international actor. 
One lesson was the experience of civil war in Lebanon. This protracted intra-state conflict 
with cross-border implications forced a reappraisal of the principle of universalism. 
Universalism was seen to mean nothing more nor less than each and every child, whether 
living in East or West Beirut, a refugee camp or zone of occupation, whether combatant or 
non-combatant. During the civil war SCIF was only able to act effectively because it could 
draw on existing partnerships within both Lebanese and Palestinian society. Unfortunately 
this is not a model that is replicable in an area where SCF does not already have contacts 
prior to the outbreak of conflict. However, it does demonstrate the importance of 
establishing contacts in areas on the verge of conflict before trust breaks down. 68 
A second focus of learningwhich would be of critical importance to SCIF in the 1990s was 
the relationship between the state and civil society, and SCF's own role as an international 
non-governmental organization. In Lebanon SCIF maintained partnerships with both local 
NGOs and government ministries. It carved out a role for itself in the promotion of child 
68 SCIF Global Programme StrateU, 1997. Programme priorities include 'improved pre-positioning and 
assessment in countries likely to be the site of future emergencies'. 
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Nvelfare and distinguished itself from UN agencies and the ICRC by its goals and 
methodology. In its Lebanon programme it had a utilitarian regard not only to the intrinsic 
merit of its programmes but also to the added value of their consequences. It placed an 
emphasis on Lebanese and Palestinian staff as agents of social change, developed a 
generational dimension to its programmes with the inclusion of youth activities, and acted 
as an advocate and catalyst for child welfare work locally and regionally. 
Lastly, the vision of SCIF staff in Lebanon was optimistic in a number of ways. SCF staff 
served as a pilot light for both Lebanese and Palestinians through the most oppressive 
years of the civil war. The significance of an optimistic view of human nature can be seen 
in the position SCF adopted in the initial debate around individual responses to war 
trauma: a debate which exploded in the 1990s. It can also be seen in its long-term goal of 
community ownership of projects. However, this optimistic view was limited to the 
individual and community and was tempered by a requirement of incremental progress. 
This contrasted with UNICEF's initiatives under the rubric of children as a zone of peace. 
It should be stressed that SCF's work in the Middle East showed no evidence of the 
survival of the optimistic pacificism of the founding generation which believed in the 
settlement of disputes without recourse to war. 
The repositioning which was to take place in the 1990s raised questions for the identity and 
integrity of SCF. Few staff would be as long-serving as either Mary Hawkins or Frances 
Moore, who together brought memory and cohesion to SCF's work in the Middle East. 
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SCF would therefore require a way of continuously inspiring new staff and instilling them 
with a common set of organizational values. 
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Chapter 8 
AFTER THE COLD WAR: THE CONTINUING RELEVANCE OF 
ORGANIZATIONAL VALUES (1990-99) 
This chapter differs from earlier chapters in that it aims to be prescriptive as well as 
descriptive. In the opening chapter I described the vision of the founding generation and 
the set of organizational values which were key to the realization of that vision. The central 
historical chapters analysed how these organizational values influenced later generations, 
and how as the century progressed, SCF's institutional memory was weakened. In this 
chapter I will discuss how those organizational values have continuing relevance to 
decision-making by SCF staff, and advocate their 'rediscovery' and reinstatement. I use the 
three guiding principles of universalism, utilitarianism and optimistic pacificism as a 
framework to view my own experience working on behalf of SCF in Afghanistan and 
Tajikistan. 1 
In 1995, as a new member of staff with SCF, I was given less than a week's induction and 
then put in charge of the SCIF programme in Tajikistan. Tajikistan was in the throes of civil 
war and SCIF had been working there for just over a year. I had little access to the 
institutional memory of SCF, and instead brought to my work the values I had absorbed 
11 was present in Afghanistan from March to September 1995 as the representative of the British Agencies 
Afghanistan Group, a consortium of ten agencies including SCF. I then returned to Afghanistan on behalf of 
UNICEF and the Save the Children Alliance from June 1997- September 1997 to conduct research into the 
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from previous employment in other agencies. I was no Bridget Stevenson or Mary 
Hawkins, and instead of staying for a decade, moved on within two years. The SCF 
Tajikistan programme has now had six programme managers in as many years. 
My appointment coincided with a period when SCIF was developing a global programme 
strategy (GPS) in an attempt to bring coherence and cohesion to its wide range of 
unconnected country programmes. The GPS was finalized in 1997.2 It was drawn up in 
response to the expansion of SCF during the 1980s, and the increasing pressure from 
governmental donors upon SCIF (as well as other NGOs) to operate within a contract 
culture. One reaction to this pressure was for NGOs to reaffinn their independent and 
voluntary identity, and focus upon the significance of organizational values. 3 
Although 1990 saw the close of the civil war in Lebanon, the following years were marked 
by an increase in the number of protracted social conflicts across the globe. Within these 
protracted social conflicts the codes of practice developed by the ICRC in the late 
nineteenth century for inter-state conflicts did not apply. 4 For example, one field 
commander for anti-opposition forces in Tajikistan described how the war in Kurgan 
Teppe was fought by both sides 'without rules, and without wounded, only corpses'. 5 
impact of conflict on children. For the intervening period, from October 1995 to May 1997,1 was the SCF 
rogramme manager in Tajikistan. 
SCF Global Programme Strategy, 1997. 
3 See for example Boli, J. and Thomas, G. M., eds, 1999. Constructing JVorld Culture: International Non- 
Governmental Oi-ganizations since 1875, Stan/ord: Stanford University Press; Korten, D. C. 1990. Gelling to 
the 21" centuty: Voluntary Action and the Global Agencla, West Hartford: Kumarian Press; Uphoff, N. 1996. 
Learningftom Gal Oya: Possibililiesfor Participatorj, Development and Post-Neivionian Social Science, 
London: IT Publications. 
4 1864 First Geneva Convention. 
5 Human Rights Watch/Helsinki Watch Memorial, Human Rights in Tajikistan In the Make of Civil JVar, 
New York, December 1993. 
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Teenage boys in northern Afghanistan explained the war to me in this way, 'they are 
fighting for power and when they lose they escape by plane and poor people are killed and 
wounded. 16 Julia Groenewold of Midecins sans Fronflb-es puts the argument that the 
deliberate slaughter of civilians was not new. 
What is new, however, is the presence of humanitarian organizations on the 
ground. These are the international entities, notably NGOs and UN relief agencies, 
with no ostensible government ties. They are being given implicitly, and in some 
cases want to be given, a part in protecting civilians. In other words, they place 
themselves in one of the fundamental roles of a government: that of ensuring the 
collective safety of its populace. 7 
In the 1990s, Afghanistan and Tajikistan were both defined by the UN as complex political 
emergencies. The term was also applied to Somalia, Iraqi Kurdistan, Rwanda, Bosnia, 
8 Chechnya, Liberia and Sierra Leone. This list is not exhaustive, but in all these cases I 
prefer to use the terin protracted social conflict. 9 In each of these countries NGOs and UN 
relief agencies were present as witnesses to atrocious acts against civilians, and they have 
been castigated for their failure to ensure the safety of the people they worked alongside. 10 
In this protection role, individual representatives of NGOs and UN relief agencies were 
faced with tough choices between two goods, and hellish choices between two evils. SCIF 
6 Interview with boys aged 13 to 17, Mazar-i-Sharif, Afghanistan, August 1997. 
7 Groenewold 1997, xx. The record of SCF in the Russian Civil War from 1920 to 1922, and SCF and Oxfam 
in northern Uganda in the 1980s, are examples that reinforce Groenewold's argument. 
8 See Third JVorld Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 1,1999. 
9 The terrn complex political emergency implies that these crises are short-lived. 
10 For the human cost of this failure in Rwanda, see Gourevitch, P. 1999. JVe ivish to inform You that 
toniorrois, we will be killed with ourfandlies: Storiesfroin Rit, anda, UK: Picador. 
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representatives in such areas of violent conflict were often making decisions without 
communication with regional or international headquarters and under time constraints. 
What guidance could the organization give its representatives to ensure that their decisions 
were informed by organizational values? 
The GPS was a five-year strategy, not a detailed planning document, and was designed to 
be translated into a variety of more specific operational plans and procedures at every 
level. It made clear the parameters within which programmes must be developed in future, 
but then left room for local initiative and judgement. It established a number of priorities 
for work in emergencies which reflect some of the issues raised in earlier chapters. ' 1 For 
example, it was one of the strengths of SCIF in Lebanon that it had a continuous history of 
involvement in Lebanon and the region prior to the outbreak of the civil war. The GPS 
recommended 'improved pre-positioning and assessment in countries likely to be the site 
of future emergencies'. However, when wars broke out in areas of the former Soviet Union 
and Eastern Europe, SCIF felt compelled to provide assistance despite no involvement with 
these areas since the 1940s. 
The GPS was a tool for strategic planning: none of the recommendations address the issue 
of how individual staff exercise theirjudgement to make the immediate tough and 
sometimes hellish choices with which they will be confronted. These questions are most 
" 'Developing emergency funding strategies, including an emergency reserve fund. Improved pre- 
positioning and assessment in countries likely to be the site of future emergencies. Exploring new 
mechanisms for swift response. Improving human resource management in emergencies - e. g. through the 
retention of a core pool of experienced staff, additional emergency response capacity, and improved 
coordination mechanisms. Improving the promotion of Save the Children's approach, particularly during 
non-emergency periods. Bringing communications staff into the planning of emergency response and 
ensuring access to adequate information from the site of the emergency. ' GPS, 1997. 
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often discussed in the form of increased risks to staff safety and security. 12 However, 
SCF's international staff were not only concerned to protect themselves, 13 they were 
present in the area of conflict because of a special mandate to protect children. Security 
guidelines could not adequately help them make the choices in front of them. Caught by a 
moral dilemma, short of time and cut off from advice, one of the most effective ways for 
individuals to choose a moral response is to think of a moral example. What would X do in 
this situation? If individual examples provide the most effective form in which values can 
be encapsulated, then there must be an attempt to bind the individual moral example into 
the organization. To this end Hugo Slim has asked whether some form of 'organizational 
conscience' might be able to act in place of more rigorous deliberation. 14 
Is it possible that some relief agencies are cohesive enough in their inner values to 
make some urgent moral judgements spontaneously? Might field workers at the 
sharp end of a moral problem be able to claim that they are somehow acting on the 
conscience of the organization as a whole without requiring that the organization 
intellectualize the implications first? 15 
12 'Security at work' special issue of Forced Migration Review, Vol. 4, April 1999. 
13 Cutts, M. and Dingle, A. 1995. Safetyfirst. Protecting NGO employees who work in areas of conflict, 
London: SCF 
14 The Red Cross Code of Conduct, to which SCF is a signatory, was developed as an attempt to encourage a 
principled and consistent response from agencies working in conflict. However, Goodhand's observations in 
Sri Lanka support Slim's uneasiness about the practicality of putting such codes into operation. Goodhand, J. 
Save the Children Agency Survey, (unpublished) March 1999, Draft Notes, 19. See also the proposal for a 
professional body of relief workers in Relief and Rehabilitation Network 1995. Roomfor Improvement: The 
Management and Support ofReliefand Development Workers, London: Overseas Development Institute. 
15 Slim, H. 1997. Doing the Right Thing: ReliefAgencies, Moral Dileininas and Moral Responsibility in 
Political Emergencies and War, Sweden: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. 
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This crucial nexus of inner values and individual actors is one of the prime justifications 
for my choice of case studies for the 1990s. Based on my own inside knowledge of the 
parameters withinwhich programme managers were working, I make a critique of SCFs 
work in Afghanistan and Tajikistan and propose alternative courses of action. At the sharp 
end of the problem, I interpret how the fieldworker in Afghanistan and Tajikistan could be 
guided by the inner values I identified in the founding vision: universalism, utilitarianism 
and optimistic pacificism. These are the values I associate with an organizational 
conscience. SCF was a very minor actor in both Afghanistan and Tajikistan, however, the 
decisions made by its representative could be of significance. 
Although we cannot know for certain what the consequences of individual and 
group efforts will be, because of the probabilistic and uncertain nature of the world 
around us, we can reasonably presume that it is possible for individuals to alter the 
course of events and thereby to affect outcomes. 16 
The SCF fieldworker is part of a value-driven organization. I will explore the ways in 
which his or her work is enhanced by the simultaneous interpretation of these values by 
policy makers at headquarters in relation to longer-terrn planning and international 
advocacy. 
The two case studies offer particular and complementary insights. These insights are 
significant within the context of post-Cold War understanding of conflict. A dominant 
paradigm emerged after the Cold War in which war was located within other cultures, and 
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explained in terms of biological and environmental detenninism. These shared causal 
beliefs led to a common policy enterprise which was at odds with the universalist approach 
of SCF. This dominant set of beliefs, values, and techniques of persuasion formed the 
backdrop to all SCF's work in war-tom societies in the last decade of the century. Against 
this backdrop I explore the particular relevance of universalism as a guiding principle for 
SCF work in Afghanistan. This involves probing the way in which an organization with a 
mission to uphold the universal rights of children was perceived within an observant 
Muslim society. During the period under consideration, neither of these two protracted 
conflicts attracted large voluntary donations of aid, and there was therefore a powerful 
requirement to adopt a utilitarian approach and target scarce resources. The nature of the 
resources available differed in the two countries. Although both Afghanistan and 
Tajiki. stan had a similar position on the periphery of the global economy, international 
financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank were 
present in Tajikistan only. I examine the relevance of utilitarianism to decision-making in 
the design of the Tajikistan programme. Lastly, both were situations of protracted social 
conflict in which, following the collapse of the state, rational actors mobilized political and 
economic support to protect their interests. Everyone was aligned in some way, though 
their leaders offered no detailed project of positive peace. This means that the two case 
studies pose a particular challenge to the optimist. 
16 Uphoff 1996. 
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Civilization and barbarism 
At the time of SCF's foundation, Britain was waging economic war against the defeated 
countries of Europe in the pursuit of national interest. In the eyes of the cartoonist David 
Low and the readers of the SCIF journal this national interest was short-sighted greed. 17 
Writing in 1928 Eglantyne Jebb identified the epoch in which she lived as one of intense 
18 
nationalism and compared nationalism with 'the old days of tribalism and the tribal god'. 
In 1935 David Low again published a cartoon with SCF. This time when he depicted the 
war in Abyssinia he ironically labelled the bombing as 'civilization' and the undisturbed 
village as 'barbaric'. 19 David Low and Eglantyne Jebb both used the labels tribal and 
barbaric as a criticism of their own societies. Within the paradigm of values, beliefs and 
techniques of persuasion that dominated post-Cold War interpretations of conflict, these 
labels were routinely applied by international policy makers in the UK and the US only to 
other societies. The invidious consequences of this 'them and us' practice can be seen not 
only within government policy, but also within the policies of those minor actors that came 
under the influence of the dominant public discourse. These included SCF. 
In his journey to the ends of the earth, Robert Kaplan began in Sierra Leone and ended in 
Afghanistan. 20 Both countries were wracked by wars producing abject suffering. Three 
central ideas underpinned his journey. First, cultural identity was an essential and durable, 
rather than context-dependent, feature of social systems. Different cultures and 
17 The Record, Vol. I No. 18, August 1921,283. 
18 Jebb, E. 1928. 'The World Policy of the Save the Children Fund' in Fuller 1928,564. 
19 The Morld's Children, Vol. 16 No. 2, November 193 5,23. 
20 Kaplan, R. 1996. The Ends of the Earth: A Journey at the Dawn of1he 21" Centuty, Random House. 
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civilizations were thereby prone to clash. Second, war in the post-Cold War world had 
changed. States had lost the monopoly of military violence, and the weapons were readily 
available and cheap. Third, insulation, not intervention, was the rational response of the 
major powers to such small, localized and essentially uncontrollable anned conflicts. 21 The 
ideas that underpinned Robert Kaplan's analysis of the situation in Sierra Leone and 
Afghanistan leached into the public domain via the media and US government policy 
makers. 22 They undermined the universalism enshrined in the United Nations Charter, and 
legitimated an abdication of responsibility on the part of the international community for 
the suffering that accompanies protracted conflict. 23 They were made shockingly explicit in 
the UK application of the Convention of the Rights of the Child to all children in the UK 
except refugee children. 24 
The Afghan anthropologist, M. Nazif Shahrani, described how the conflict in his country is 
often analysed. 
25 
Some blame the multiethnic composition of Afghanistan's population, living in 
hostile mountainous terrain and enamoured of fighting and settling scores with 
21 Richards, P. 1996. Fightingfor the Rain Forest: IYar, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone, Oxford: 
James Currey, xiv. 
22 Kaplan's article 'The Coming Anarchy' in Atlantic Monthly, February 1994, was faxed by Tim Wirth, 
Under-Secretary at the US Department of Global Affairs, to every US embassy round the world. Richards 
1996, xiv. 
23 A milder reflection of these ideas can be found within SCF 'Violence is deeply rooted in the history and 
culture of the Central American countries. State institutions have historically maintained control over highly 
unequal societies frequently through violent means; those struggling forjustice have likewise resorted to 
violence in order to achieve their aims. The family unit has often come to reflect the inequalities in society, 
reproducing an authoritarian and violent atmosphere. This culture of violence (my italics)... ' Save the 
Children, Country Report: Central America, September 1996,13. 
24 SCF campaign 'Don't prejudge us', , v%vw. savethechildren. org. uk/campaigns/forgotten/index. html. 25 Sbahrani, M. N. 'The Future of the State and the Structure of Community Governance', in Maley, W., ed., 
1998. Fundamentalism Reborn: Afghanistan and the Taliban, London: Hurst, 212-242. 
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guns - that is, a kind of absurd biological-cum-environmental detenninistic 
solution that says 'Afghans can't help it, violence is in their genes'. 
At a more popular level, the same ideas manifest themselves: 
Since staggering up the ice-covered Karik Pass and entering the Ramgul Valley in 
the Afghan province of Nuristan four days earlier, we have been threatened by five 
savage-looking mujahadeen - armed militia - had heard of three murders, two 
robberies and have been warned about a notorious band of cut-throats whose lair 
was unavoidably on our path. 26 
The war in Afghanistan was thus presented as a behavioural problem. Afghans were 
innately barbaric, and there was no common set of values uniting their human condition 
with those of these commentators. 
Faced with civil war in Afghanistan and Tajikistan, commentators have explained the 
conflict both as a product of the culture of violence of Muslim Central Asia, and also as a 
product of the irreducible and age-old differences between ethnic groups. Vanessa Pupavac 
has seen similar explanations grafted onto the conflict in her own country, and has 
criticized the associated intemational programmes directed at former Yugoslavia. 
26 Bealby, J. 1998. 'Journey through the Land of Light', Traveller (NvNvNv. travelmag. co. uk/features/ 
feat5. htm). 
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Whereas in the past Western missionaries spoke of the need to civilize the natives, 
today's aid workers speak of the need to instil tolerance and promote peaceful 
conflict resolution skills and democratic values. UNESCO's Culture of Peace 
Programme which see the wars in El Salvador, Mozambique and former 
Yugoslavia as being the result of a culture of violence epitomises how such 
attitudes towards the Third World are expressed in today's politically correct 
language. 27 
She challenged UN agencies to shift the blame for poor child health from parents and 
recognize the economic and political context for falling living standards. 
UNICEF's programme emphasizes health and nutritional education. However, the 
fall in nutrition is a result of impoverishment not ignorance. 
Like the people of former Yugoslavia, the people of Tajikistan had enjoyed relatively high 
standards of living for a long period and had no recent experience of receiving 
international relief and assistance. The population of Tajikistan did, however, have seventy 
years of experience of being the focus of Soviet policies of intervention. The Western 
agencies suffered by comparison. 
27 Pupavac, V. Theories ofConflict and Children's Rights. Paper presented to the Second Convention of the 
European Association for the Advancement of Social Sciences, on Conflict and Cooperation: University of 
Cyprus, Nicosia, March 19-23,1997. 
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These Western activists are just like the Soviets, but at least the Soviets gave us 
schools and hospitals along with their ideology, these give us only their ideology. 28 
Individuals in Tajikistan had grown up expecting to live out their lives within the 
predictable security of the Soviet Union. After 1992 it could be said that they had to learn 
new forms of behaviour to cope with insecurity. 29 However, they too were sceptical of 
international aid programmes which did not meet their needs for food, shelter, and the 
rehabilitation of health and education services. The trauma consultants that first appeared 
in aid programmes in the 1980s, and were introduced to Lebanon by Radda Barrien (Save 
the Children Sweden) as early as 1983, epitomized this behaviourist approach. Even in 
30 Afghanistan, where families had proved their resilience over decades of war, UNICEF 
channelled scarce resources into a trauma consultancy and individual casework .31 The 
children interviewed in Kabul reported that their greatest desire was for help in 
contributing as breadwinners to the family income, but the recommendations from the 
research were for a counselling programme. The proliferation of trauma projects framed 
29 Uzbek writer quoted in Akiner, S. 1997. Central Asia: Conflict or Stahility ofDevelopment?, London: 
Minority Rights Group International, 292. For a critique of the socio-psychological model of conflict see also 
Duffield, M., Evaluating Conflict Resolution: Context, Models and Methodology, a discussion paper prepared 
for the Chr. Michelsen Institute, Bergen, Norway, May 1997. 
29 'Most communities suffering famine have responded to the crisis a number of times in their history. 
Famine victims do not respond to stress from a position of ignorance, but from a position of knowledge. 
They have knowledge of both the stress processes their community suffers and the long term consequences 
of their individual actions. ' Walker, P. 1995. 'Indigenous Knowledge and Famine Relief in the Hom of 
Africa' in Warren, D. and others, eds, 1995. The Cultural Dimension ofDevelopinent: Indigenous Knowledge 
Systeins, London: Intermediate Technology Publications, 147-154. See also Waite, M. 1997. 'The Role of the 
Voluntary Sector in Supporting Living Standards in Central Asia' in Falkingham, J. and others, eds, 1997. 
Household lVelfare in Central Asia, London: Macmillan, 221-249. One of the most remarkable features of 
the colleagues I worked with in Tajikistan was the flexible way in which they adapted to new work practices. 30 Ressler reports in Children in Siluation ofArnied Conflict: a Guide to the Provision ofServices that 
virtually no unattended children are found among Afghan refugees. Ressler 1992, UNICEF, 145. 
31 Gupta, L. 1997. Psychosocial assessment of children exposed to war related violence in Kabid, Kabul: 
UNICEF, see also Sellick, P. 1999. The Ethics of Conducling Research with Children in Conflict-Affected 
Areas: Issuesfrom Afghanistan and Tajikistan, Paper presented to the Conference Researching on 
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the problem as internal to the children, without contextualizing them. Although SCF has 
contested the shared notions of validity underlying the trauma approach, other members of 
the Save the Children Alliance have not been so quick to distance themselves from this 
behaviourist approach. 32 
Afghanistan and TaJikistan are adjacent and share many features of geography, however 
throughout most of the twentieth century they had very separate political histories. The 
state and organized civil society evolved very differently, and their populations developed 
contrasting expectations of international aid. To propose standardized international aid 
programmes, or to put the same label on both conflicts, is to neglect the context-dependent 
nature of culture. This context is influenced both by local interests and also by integration 
in the. global economy, of which international aid is a part. 
If SCF were to acknowledge the context-dependent nature of culture would this entail a 
denial of universalism? There is a significant difference between saying that people are 
prone to clash over cultural resources, and that different cultures are prone to clash. The 
very different political histories of Afghanistan and Tajikistan prior to 1989 serve to 
illustrate this. In Afghanistan people who continued to define themselves as Tajiks 
deployed their cultural resources in combination with the rest of the population to resist the 
Humanitarian Assistance in Conflict Areas, 8-10 May 2000, Post War Reconstruction and Development 
Unit, University of York. 
32 'Inexcusable is the role played by UNICEF, which was incredibly insensitive to the needs of distressed 
children. In their search to justify that the western model (trauma healing) should function equally well in all 
settings, psychologists were sent to talk to a group of children about memories of seeing their parents killed, 
and provoking the children to a state of deep distress. This is morally unacceptable. Also, the children were 
not prepared well in advance and no provision was made to deal with the after effects of such trauma 
interviews. ' This critique was written by a Rwandan employed by SCF-UK to assess the impact of trauma 
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Soviet Union. The survival, mutation and cohesion of culture of these people was in part a 
function of the massive displacement of the population. Within the context of oppression 
and resistance, flight and displacement, an Afghan identity crystallized. 33 
When in Iran we prayed to God to help us set Afghanistan free. We listened to the 
radio, and when we heard bad news about the village we felt sad. Most of the time 
there was very little news. Life was better in Iran, but here we feel more free. 34 
By contrast in Ta ikistan, the Soviet Union decimated indigenous cultural resources and j 
people who might have once defined themselves as Tajiks adopted Soviet cultural labels. 
To the census agents' question, 'Who are youT, people often replied 'Alhamdollah 
['Thank God'], I am a Muslim. ' In response they were told to go to Arabia. At a 
second attempt, the answer might be, 'I am a Persian speaker. ' 'Then go to Iran, ' 
they were told. 'I am a Tajik': 'Then get out of Uzbekistan. ' 'But Bukhara (or 
Samarkand) is my native town. ' 'Then declare yourself an Uzbek. 9 35 
counselling among children in her home country. SCF 1996, (unpublished), 4-5. Evidence for a compelling 
critique of the current discourse on trauma has been gathered by SCF in Bracken 1998. 
33 Of the 500 children interviewed, those who had returned to Afghanistan from Iran and Pakistan, showed a 
greater pride in being Afghan than those who had never left. Sellick 1998. 
34 Interview with girls aged 14 to 17, Enjeel district, Herat province, August 1997. 
35 Jahangiri, G. 1994. 'The Premises for the Construction of a Tajik National Identity' in Djalili, M. -R. and 
others, eds, 1994. Tajikistan: The Trials ofIndependence, Richmond: Curzon, 14-41 (p. 35). 
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The attack upon Tajik cultural resources was particularly brutal and systematic in regard to 
gender roles and relations. 36 
The development of the two conflicts after the demise of the Soviet Union was also very 
different. In Afghanistan, groups competed to show who had been the greater defender of 
cultural resources. In Tajikistan there was a cultural vacuum, as people repudiated the 
Soviet past, and had not yet invented its replacement. In contrast with Afghanistan, the 
violence of the conflict in Tajikistan was highly personalized. As one woman refugee from 
Tajikistan told me in Herat, Afghanistan: 
Our war was different from the Afghans' war. We know our enemies. Here you 
don't see Nvho drops bombs on you from the plane in the sky, but if I go back to 
Kurgan Teppe I will have to cross my enemy in the street. 37 
So how did SCF, as a minor actor in many different areas of conflicts, put its values into 
practice in different cultural contexts? SCF's fundamental values as outlined in the GPS 
began with a commitment to the realization of children's rights. However, there was no 
reference in the GPS to children's rights in a cross-cultural perspective. It is worth 
remembering the guidance given within the early history of SCF as to how these 
universalist values could be put into practice across cultures. Eglantyne Jebb's original 
conception of the rights of the child was a set of rights arrived at within each society. Some 
36 Buckley, M., ed., 1997. Post-Soviet Women: From the Baltic to Central Asia, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press; Massefl, G. J. 1974. The Surrogate Proletariat: Afoslem Women and Revolzitionary 
Strategies in Soviet Central Asia, 1919-1929, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
37 Interview with Makbfirad, City Camp, Herat, Afgbanistan, 4 August 1997. 
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of these early sets of rights are still extant, for example the charter of children's rights 
developed in India. 38 She understood that child rights would gain universal legitimacy only 
when conceived and articulated within the widest possible range of cultural traditions. 39 
This universalist vision translates into a very different interpretation of conflict from that 
adopted by Robert Kaplan, and more notably Samuel Huntingdon . 
40 Different cultures are 
not prone to clash, instead different actors clash over the control of cultural resources. 
The next section examines SCF's intervention as a minor actor within the conflict to 
manipulate gender relations within Afghanistan. I argue that the decisions made within 
SCF reflected the influence of the dominant paradigm of cultural essentialism, led to a 
misinterpretation of universalism, and neglected the importance of legitimacy within 
Afghan society. 
Universalism and the rights of girls in Afghanistan 
SCIF played a very minor role in the struggle for control of cultural resources in 
Afghanistan. Its first programme in Afghanistan began in the hamlet of Shewaki ten miles 
south of Kabul in 1977. The Shewaki clinic was to be part of a network of SCF-supported 
health clinics south of Kabul. As elsewhere, SCF aimed to enhance government services. 41 
The government at that time was led by Muhammad Daoud Khan. He was trying to reduce 
his dependence on the Soviet Union by making increasing overtures to the West and 
38 'An Indian Parallel', The World's Children, Vol. 3 6 No. 6,19 1. 
39 CE An-Na'im, A. A. 1992. Human Rights in Cross-Cultural Perspectives: A Questfor Consensus, 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 3. 
40 Huntingdon, S. P. 1997. 'The Clash of Civilisations? ', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72 No. 3,22-49. 
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strengthening links with Iran. If the state were able to gain substantial revenues from 
outside powers, it would be absolved of the need to establish systems of accountability to 
the people, for example through local taxation. 42 The small contribution SCF made to the 
extension of government health services should be seen against this background. 
In April 1978, Daoud was overthrown and killed in a coup orchestrated by the People's 
Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). The PDPA set about introducing rapid reforms 
of land tenure in the countryside and a mass literacy campaign aimed at girls and boys, 
women and men. It was only able to maintain its authority with the support of invading 
Soviet troops. 
However short-lived SCF's programme in 1977, this experience should have left the 
organization with a memory of the political sensitivity of gender issues and the way in 
which external support could be counter-productive. It is worth remembering that at the 
same time SCIF made the decision to close its project in Messaad in Algeria because of 
difficulties in gaining access to women, and reopened a project in Douera where gender 
relations were less strict. It was with this setback in mind that some members of the 
Council strongly advised against starting work in Afghanistan. 43 Abd Allah Ahmad An- 
41 See for example contemporary work in Nigeria. 
42 Johnson, C. 1998. 'Afghanistan: NGOs and Women in the Front-line', Community Developinent Journal, 
Vol. 33 No. 2, April 1998,117-123 (p. 117). 
43 Mr Pollitzer considered that this proposed project could be one of the least successful enterprises ever 
embarked on by the Fund and stated that the end result was extremely speculative. From his reading of the 
papers, he doubted the possibility of reaching productive cooperation -%vith the local authorities. He 
considered that the Fund would ultimately be faced with a situation similar to that which it had ultimately 
faced in Algeria. Ile reiterated that he must voice serious misgivings about this project. SCF Archives 
reference ORW. 6377,13 May 1976. 
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Na'im has described the struggle for control over the cultural sources and symbols of 
power as an internal struggle between dominant and dominated groups. 
Within a society dominant groups or classes maintain perceptions and 
interpretations of cultural values and norms that are supportive of their own 
interests, proclaiming them to be the only valid view of that culture. 44 
Dominated groups or classes may in their turn, hold different perceptions and 
interpretations. In Afghanistan in 1977 these dominated groups included non-state 
stakeholders such as the Ulema [religious leadership]. SCIF witnessed the failure of 
Daoud's government to build a consensus which would bestow legitimacy on emerging 
cultural values, and the danger of outsiders being interpreted as agents of an alien culture. 
Despite this experience, when SCF returned to Afghanistan in 1994 it chose to make 
gender the main platform of its policy in Afghanistan, and to adopt a top-down approach. 
How did this come about? 
When SCIF returned to Afghanistan, it was to insert itself in a very different pattern of 
relations from that which existed in 1977. There was no question of assisting a national 
government in a project of state-led development. Instead it would either be engaging 
directly with civil society, or with a parastatal organization distinguished by its coercive 
powers and the fact that it was still actively prosecuting a war. 45 
" An-Na'im 1992,20. 
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In 1994 SCF made a strategic decision to wind down its relief work- in the camps in 
Pakistan and begin development work inside Afghanistan. It chose Herat province on the 
Iranian border, away from those areas where Pakistan-based NGOs had been involved in 
cross-border activity and a habit of dependence had already formed. With the backing of 
the Governor of Herat Province, Ismail Khan, SCF moved into the education sector where 
it would be opening up opportunities to rural girl pupils, providing the next generation with 
the skills needed to rebuild their country, and encouraging independence from aid. It was 
hoped that the opening of schools would be interpreted as a sign of stability and lead to the 
return of more refugees from Pakistan and Iran. 
In 1995 1 found the city schools filled to overflowing. A year earlier SCF had provided the 
following educational statistics for the city: the number of male students was 23,347 and 
the number of female students 21,663. The government continued to pay teachers' salaries 
and to offer free schooling. Places were available to all children, Herati and non-Herati 
alike. However, resources were very scarce: schools operated a two-shift system and most 
teachers needed a second job to make ends meet. Among parents the desire for education 
for both boys and girls was very great. Returnees from Iran had grown used to a higher 
level of educational service and were particularly demanding. 46 
From 1994 to 1995, SCF in Herat was building rural primary schools, and had plans to 
become involved in teacher training. The whole programme was developed in tandem with 
45 Goodhand, J. and Hulme, D. 1996, NGOs and Complex Political Emergencies: lVorking Paper No. 1, 
University of Manchester and INTRAC, 40. 
46 Sellick, P. Emergency Preparedness in Herat: A Report preparedfor the British Agencies Afghanistan 
Group, Afay 1995, British Agencies Afghanistan Group, 1995,13. 
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the Ministry of Education. It was often the case that where a primary school for boys 
existed, SCIF built a primary school for girls. Sometimes it met with opposition to this 
allocation of resources. The priority on the part of SCIF was a school building for girls, but 
on the part of the most vocal in the village was for additional school space for boys or a 
secondary school for boys. In such cases, SCF could rely on good relations with the 
Ministry. The school openings were shown on Herat TV and women teachers and girl 
pupils ivere invited. 
On 6 September 1995 the Taliban entered Herat. There had been no planning within SCIF 
for such a scenario. 47 
At this critical point there was a change in personnel within SCF. The incoming 
Programme Manager, Angela Kearney, was the only female head of agency in Herat. As a 
woman, -the Taliban refused to meet with her. The SCF staff had all been recruited locally, 
and reflected the composition of the Herat Population. They were primarily urban and 
aji , and saw the Taliban as occupiers of Pashtun rural origin. The most senior member 
of staff left Herat and made his way to the US, leaving the new Programme Manager with 
no adviser. The second most senior member of staff was a young ex-mujahid who had 
fought for ten years with Ismail Khan, the ousted governor of Herat. SCF found itself in a 
very vulnerable position. 
47 The victory of the Taliban surprised most observers. 'They (the Taliban) have no intention of threatening 
Gen. Rashid Dostam in the north and Gen. Ismael Khan in Herat in the west - two leaders who, incidentally, 
have good relations with Pakistani and US intelligence. ' The Econondst, 5 January 1995. However, a failure 
to use the tool of scenario planning is evident in other SCF programmes, e. g. Sri Lanka: 'What is noticeably 
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Mandated by SCIF to promote the rights of all children, the new Programme Manager was 
faced with a set of tough choices. She had little support from other agencies in Herat, all of 
whom were headed by men. Few agencies present elsewhere in Afghanistan had 
experienced the Taliban restrictions. 48 A delegation from SCF headquarters came to try 
and find a way out of the deadlocked situation in early 1996, without success. 
Consequently SCF, supported by SCF-US and the International Save the Children Alliance 
(ISCA) '49 decided on 8 March 1996 to suspend their education and non-emergency 
programmes in the regions where girls or women were denied access to education, or 
where the employment of women had been prohibited by the regional authorities. 50 
From its outset SCF had upheld universalist principles and also emphasized the particular 
role of girls from a utilitarian perspective. 
A people's progress very largely depends upon how far their women can conserve 
the intellectual and spiritual gains of each successive generation by handing them 
on to the generation following, and the education of girls is therefore a question of 
great moment to the whole world. 51 
lacking, considering the unstable and constantly changing environment is evidence of alternative planning 
tools like scenario building. ' Goodhand 1999 (unpublished), 20. 
48 MERLIN had a health programme in Taliban-controlled Kandahar, and had agreed that its female doctor 
should xvear the chadri. 
49 ISCA resulted from cooperation between the organizations of Save the Children in Scandinavia and SC 
(USA) at the time of the 1976 earthquake in Guatemala. 
50 SCF argued that it was not withdrawing from Afghanistan as a whole, because it would be transferring its 
programme to the nortb,, wbere Dostum permitted education for girls. When the Taliban eventually took 
control of Mazar-i-Sharif SCF then had to live with the consequences of its earlier decision in its negotiations 
with the Taliban. 
51 Jebb, E. 1928. 'The World Policy of the Save the Children Fund' in Fuller 1928,563. 
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However, the founders of SCF had also taken the view that the child population should not 
be penalized either for the policies of their parents or their rulers. This did not mean that 
SCIF in its early years was uncritical of those it worked with: it had high standards for those 
organizations which became partners in the UISE, and non-govemmental organizations 
which did not meet those standards were excluded from UISE. 52 However, compromises 
were made with governments in order to maintain a channel of influence with those 
governments and a channel for assistance to children. SCIF wavered from this position in 
the Second World War when it failed to join the campaign against sanctions upon the 
civilian populations of Nazi-controlled Europe. The growing use of sanctions in the 1990s, 
particularly against Iraq, prompted SCF to revisit the argument. It concluded that sanctions 
were a 'blunt instrument' imposing suffering on the poorest and most vulnerable. It pointed 
out that 'there is also an undercurrent perception that sanctions are mostly an imposition by 
ý 53 the "Firsf' world upon the "Third" . The uncompromising stance of SCIF towards the 
Taliban deviated from this position. 
As a protest against the gender policy of the Taliban, SCF's withdrawal from Herat was 
ineffective on two counts. First, SCF was a very minor actor in the lives of Afghans, and 
the Taliban, by contrast, were a major actor of which SCF, along with most other 
international agencies, was alarmingly ignorant. For SCF to assume a confrontational 
position was to precipitate an end to the relationship before it had even started. The Taliban 
already had more important conflicts on their hands, with the armed opposition. Secondly, 
SCIF failed to take into account the political and military context of the Taliban's gender 
52 Jebb, E., Afemo on the Policj, ofthe SCF, Geneva, 9 July 1928, SCIF Archives reference EJ. 277. 
238 
policies. Having sent their young troops to the front line to defend their policies, they were 
not going to change them to satisfy SCF. 
Not only was control over gender roles and gender relations an indicator of who was in 
power, it was also a way of defining the authority with which that power was exercised. 
The Taliban, like their predecessors, used their gender policy to promote themselves as an 
Islamic authority. 54 There was a double edge to the Taliban insistence on gender 
discrimination. Not only was control over gender symbolic of Islamic purity, it was also 
symbolic of the imagined ethics of the Pashtun village as opposed to the TaJik town. This 
had not been an issue in Kandahar where the majority of the population were Pashtun and 
55 Sunni. However, it became evident when the Taliban entered Herat where the majority of 
the population were Tajik and there was also a significant Shi'a minority. Overnight the 
Taliban became military victors in an ethnic conflict. The conquerors were not only 
distinguished by their dress and beards, but also by their adherence to the moral code of 
Pashtunwali, and use of the Pashtu rather than the Dari language. 56 
SCF's action was open to interpretation as an agent of an alien culture on three grounds. It 
could be interpreted as anti-Taliban because SCF had worked in partnership with Ismail 
Khan, anti-Islamic because it was a Western agency, and anti-Pashtun because it was based 
53 SCF's Evidence to the House of Commons International Development Committee's Enquiry on the Future 
of Sanctions, April 1999. 
54 The Islamic concept of Rhad encompasses a restrictive, communitarian activity to restore peace and order, 
see Malik, I. H. 1998. 'Islan-dc Discourse on Jihad, War and Violence', Journal ofSouth Asian and Afiddle 
Eastern Studies, Vol. 21 No. 4, Summer 1998,47-78 (p. 57). The Taliban rapidly gained support after an 
incident in October 1994 when they successfully fended off an attack on a trade convoy south of Kandahar. 
Their original success in establishing 'negative peace' has been underrated. 
55 An established way to overcome fragmentation among the Pashtun is to invoke Islam, and mobilize around 
Islamic networks, dominated by the Ulenia, the Sunni Islamic clergy. 
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among the Tajik population in Herat. These were the issues for which men were dying at 
the front. When SCIF closed the programme in Western Afghanistan and reopened a 
programme in the north, controlled by the Uzbek, General Dostum, the Taliban's 
suspicions were as good as confirmed. 
The Taliban were the dominant group and proclaimed their interpretation of Islamic 
cultural values and nonns to be the only valid view. If SCIF were to show solidarity with 
the dominated groups, and in particular with the female students and teachers who had 
filled Herat's schools, it would be entering into an internal struggle. Only if it was guided 
by the groups it was trying to support would it be able to give effective support. If it did 
not listen to these groups but instead broadcast its own message, it risked doing them a 
disservice. The strong message coming from the population of Herat was that it was better 
for schools to remain open for boys only, than for all schools to be closed. 57 
Afghans who opposed the Taliban restrictions on girls' education and female employment - 
argued that if boys were educated then they could educate their sisters and be the teachers 
of their daughters in the future. Many Afghan parents argued that international agencies 
should not withdraw their support for boys' schools because if boys were not educated 
they would never value education for girls and there would be no future generation of 
teachers for either boys or girls. The continued opening of schools for boys also kept alive 
the question of the access of women to employment since the majority of teachers were 
women. The policy adopted by SCF, far from being understood as a message of solidarity, 
56 Both are official languages of Afghanistan. 
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was interpreted as a double blow to both boys and girls. By placing so much emphasis 
upon the way in which the Taliban had institutionalized gender inequity, it also detracted 
from the lesson learned in Lebanon that the greatest locus of change for children was the 
family. Long before the Taliban had prohibited attendance of girls, it had been common for 
girls living outside the urban centres of Herat and Kabul to be refused pennission to attend 
school by their fathers. 58 Afghans who supported female education gave the utilitari. an 
counsel that the best defence of the future generation of girls would be to put greater 
resources into schools for boys. 
In Hugo Slim's discussion of the moral examples that aid workers turn to, he mentions the 
importance of people from within the host community. 59 There were people who shone 
forth as moral examples within the Afghan community, from which SCF could have taken 
60 a lead. In the particular sphere of education, there were individual Afghans who had the 
skills to negotiate a space for education for girls and boys within a framework acceptable 
to the Taliban. 
The Aschiana project in Kabul provided several daytime drop-in centres for girls and boys 
working on the street where they could get a meal, a wash, and attend classes. It extended 
its activities under Taliban control. Its success could be attributed to several reasons: first 
the individual example of its director, and secondly the way in which the project was 
57 At the women-only prayers held on Wednesday at a shrine in Herat, I observed that teenage girls were 
praying for their schools to be opened, not for the boys' schools to be closed. July 1997. 
58 Sellick 1998. 
59 Slim 1997,5. 
60 For a comparison with the kind of leadership available in a culture dominated by Christian churches, see 
'OD and Churches in Development', Organisational Developinent Consultancy: Strengthening the Capacity 
ofNGOs?, ODC News, Issue No. 4, December 1997. 
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embedded in a set of values which were incontrovertible across Afghanistan. The children 
involved worked on the streets as rubbish collectors, shoe-cleaners and water-sellers, to 
gain a livelihood for themselves and their families. The project was concerned with their 
survival, protection from hazards, health and cleanliness. In addition, there were 
elementary classes. 61 The international NGO, Teri-e des Honnnes, was careful to be guided 
by the Afghan director in the nature of support it gave to Aschiana, for example it was the 
Afghan director who negotiated all agreements with the Taliban authorities. 62 
The internal struggle over values took place at a myriad of levels. Afghan defenders of 
female education could influence the people closest to them without ever taking a public 
stand. In Zabul I visited a home school for girls run by the wife of the local Taliban 
commander. 63 She had negotiated with her husband for his support. Any publicity from an 
external organization would have jeopardized her negotiations. 64 
The Islamic Coordination Council, an Afghan NGO, made a direct link between the stand 
taken by international agencies on the gender issue, and the participation of school-age 
boys in the war. 
61 See also Terre des Homines, 1996. 
62 UNCHS (Habitat) has had similar success in resolving issues affected by Taliban gender policies, by 
emphasizing the local ownership of project assets. Sewing machines confiscated by the Taliban have been 
returned to the local community at the request of the local community. Personal conununication, 1996. 
63 August 1997. 
64 When women choose to make public demonstrations of their objections to the Taliban gender policies, 
there is a place for public support. In winter 1996, women marched against the closure of public bathhouses 
in Herat. A number were beaten and jailed for their pains. In such a situation a message of solidarity might be 
the most useful contribution that an external agency could make. See for example the full page 
announcement by ECHO and Alidecins dit Monde in International Herald Tribune, 9 March 1998. 
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More emphasis on the gender issue will affect the rights of male [boys in schools] 
and will cause adverse results. In other words closing the schools will cause flow 
and rush of young generation to the frontlines, because the only income for them 
will be to go to warlords to afford the minimal living requirement of their 
families. 65 
SCIF argued that it had taken a principled stand in Afghanistan. I contend that this was a 
distorted version of the positive creed of universalism. Under the guise of gender equity 
SCF ended up pressing for equal disadvantage for both boys and girls. If SCF had 
combined its universalist values with a cross-cultural perspective of the kind advocated by 
Abd Allah Ahmad An-Na'im, and weighed up the utilitarian value of maintaining 
education for boys, I argue it would have made a more effective contribution to the future 
of the children in Afghanistan. Its decision to withdraw from Herat was particularly ill- 
advised given the drift towards cultural essentialism amongst international policy makers. 
This decision could be interpreted as confirmation that there was no common set of values 
uniting the people from whom SCIF drew support with the people living in Afghanistan. 
Utilitarianism: understanding and measuring the dynamic impact of current 
interventions on future generations in Tajikistan 
My reappraisal of the SCF programme in neighbouring Tajikistan leads me to a similar 
conclusion. Decision-making was principled, but did not take into account utilitarian 
65 Islamic Coordination Council, statement to conference, 'From Rhetoric to Reality: The Role of Aid in 
Local Peace Building in Afghanistan', Post War Reconstruction and Development Unit, York, January 1998. 
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values, and the programme that resulted was only of limited short-term benefit to children. 
What could SCF have done in TaJikistan in order to strengthen its capacity to encourage 
change across generations and alleviate suffering for children in the longer term? I suggest 
that SCIF required a stronger understanding of the processes which underpin generational 
change, and indicators to measure whether its interventions were effective. How SCF 
could acquire that understanding and what indicators it could use are the subject of this 
section. 
SCF began its work in Tajikistan by identifying children living in female-beaded 
households in the war-affected south as particularly vulnerable to poverty. It then 
developed a programme of assistance to these households which borrowed heavily in its 
design from SCF's work in Iraqi Kurdistan. This involved the distribution of agricultural 
assets and the development of a revolving loan programme. Five years later the agency 
was locked into the same programme with larger-scale funding, this time from the 
Tajikistan Social Investment Fund (TASIF), a governinent agency financed by the World 
Bank. 66 
This Pilot Poverty Alleviation Project followed a development model of channelling 
international assistance through the national government to the poorest of the poor. This 
was a principled approach apparently consistent with SCF's universalism, but I question 
whether it was combined with either a utilitarian perspective or an optimistic belief in the 
66 Two other international agencies Nvere also involved: Save the Children - US and the Aga Khan 
Foundation. The World Bank made a credit to the government of Tajikistan through the government- 
appointed Tajikistan Social Investment Fund (TASIF), and the three international agencies then implemented 
the programme. 
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possibility of peace. I have already referred in the context of the civil war in Nigeria to Ed 
Cairns' argument that aid should not necessarily be targeted to the poorest of the poor, but 
rather towards mitigating instability and the risks of war. 
The conditions which increase the risks of war are evil in themselves which need to 
be remedied: gross inequality, a weak and corrupt government, and the denial of 
people's basic rights. When large numbers of citizens experience social, political 
and economic exclusion war becomes more likely. 67 
Ed Cairns challenged the view of development behind the poverty alleviation project. If 
SCF had adopted his utilitarian view to transforming the protracted social conflict in 
Tajikistan rather than alleviating its worst effects, it might have focussed on the future 
fighters, the adolescent boys. Instead it deliberately excluded this group. If a boy aged II 
to 18 was present in a female-headed household, he was assumed to be able to make an 
economic contribution to the household, and it did not qualify for SCIF support. 
The GPS stated that one of the aims of the global programme was to 'respond to the 
situation of children in emergencies in ways which put their immediate needs in the 
context of their longer-term interests and development. In the context of Tajikistan, SCIF 
needed to find out whether the programme had had any impact upon the new generation of 
adolescent girls, who might have been aged ten when SCIF first encountered them, but by 
the fifth year of the programme were 15 and approaching childbearing age. Were these 
67 Cairns 1997,59. See also Macrae, J. and Zxvi, A., eds, 1994. War and Hunger: Rethinking International 
Responses to Complex Emergencies, London: Zed Books in association xvith Save the Children Fund (UK). 
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girls less likely, thanks to SCF, to be forming female-headed households without the 
means to provide adequate nutrition to their children? This question could not be answered 
in isolation from an understanding of the circumstances of male adolescents. SCIF did not 
have this understanding. It was working blindfold and risked being locked into policies 
which did not respond to circumstances as they evolved. 
One of the questions put by a gathering of male refugees in Sakhi refugee camp, Mazar-i- 
Sharif, to a visiting delegation from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) was the following: 'Why should we go back to Tajikistan, if we then have 
to leave and go and find work in Russia? 168 The refugees' prime concerns about returning 
to Tajikistan, and in particular the southern Khatlon province, were personal security and 
economic opportunities. They also asked questions about the position of male adolescents 
whose schooling had been disrupted and who were of an age to be conscripted into the 
anny 
When the OSCE, in conjunction with UNHCR, was trying to encourage the voluntary 
repatriation of refugees it had therefore to provide reassurance to the men, who would take 
the decision for the household to return, on two counts: firstly political survival, and 
secondly economic survival. To provide effective reassurance would mean challenging the 
conflict entrepreneurs who habitually used organized violence to assert economic control. 
68 Personal Observation, Sakhi camp, Mazar-i-Sharif, Afghanistan, 20 March 1997. Sak-hi camp was 
established by the LJNHCR to house refugees from Tajikistan on 27 December 1992. This visit took place as 
the Tajik refugees were preparing for their fourth Nowritz [New Year, 21 March] outside their country. The 
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When wars occur 'outside' the global economy, emergency aid often remains the 
only major response by Western governments to these distant 'unimportant' wars, 
which do not immediately threaten important economic interests. 69 
The inadequacy of emergency aid in providing an incentive for refugees to return to 
Tajikistan was recognized to a certain extent by the international community: the OSCE 
was present in a protection role, and, unusually, the World Bank took the decision to invest 
in a country still torn by military conflict. 70 How could either agency measure its 
effectiveness? 
Measuring a contribution to peaceful change is not easy. However, amongst the indicators 
agreed between the World Bank and TASIF for the Pilot Poverty Alleviation Project were 
indicators to measure the increase or decrease in security in the project area. As a partner 
in the project SCIF had to develop such indicators. This required a shift from an emphasis 
upon poverty alleviation to conflict mitigation. Quantifiable poverty alleviation indicators 
developed in the pilot project included the nutrition and health of children, whether they 
possessed shoes and their home was warm. Below is an exploration of what conflict 
mitigation indicators might look like. 
The social fault lines important in the area where SCIF was working had the following 
history. Before the war the province of Khatlon was divided into the provinces of Kuliab 
dialogue was conducted in Russian, the head of the delegation was a woman from Denmark, and the hosts 
were Afghan. 
69 Cairns 1997,47. 
70 Tajikistan was also unique in having a resident Human Rights Watch delegate. 
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and Kurgan Teppe. The dried-up marshes of the province of Kuliab were populated with 
people from the foothills in the 1930s. Kurgan Teppe had been irrigated since the 1940s 
and 1950s for the cultivation of cotton and other crops. The area was populated mostly as a 
result of Stalin's policy of forced migration, under which a significant portion of Kurgan 
Teppe's population was moved in from the mountains of Garm and the Pamirs, as well as 
Kuliab. Since one of the particular problems of Tajikistan is shortage of land suitable for 
cultivation, the local population of Uzbeks, Arabs 71 and Tajiks did not look favourably on 
the arrival of the newcomers. Even where the new groups were settled in the same kolkhoz 
(collective farm), they fon-ned their okvn neighbourhoods. People from Garm who were 
moved to the district of Vakhsh during the 1940s and 1950s hardly mixed with the other 
groups, marrying among themselves, preserving their local traditions and religious 
practices even though they worked on mixed kolkhoz. 72 They prospered and their houses 
were marked out as multi-storey. People from Kuliab and Khodjand had long been linked 
economically: cotton cultivated in Kuliab was treated in Khodjand. This economic link 
was transformed into a political alliance in the 1970s by the investment of funds in the 
Kuliab region, the integration of some of the elite of the region, and by promises of 
autonomy for the Uzbeks of Kuliab. 
During the war neighbour was pitted against neighbour in the mixed town of Kurgan 
Teppe, and kholkhoz was set against kholkhoz. At first the opposition based on the alliance 
between the people of Gann and the Pamirs was victorious and the homes of Kuliabis were 
burned and looted. As victory passed to the Kuliabis in October 1991 most of the villages 
71 The Arab community settled in the Kabodian area during the 17 th century. 
72 Jahangiri, G. 1994. 'The Premises for the Construction of a Tajik National Identity' in Djalili 1994,14-4 1. 
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believed to have supported the opposition were systematically looted and burned. This 
second round of fighting was fuelled by revenge and left households from Garm and the 
Pamirs suffering the worst effects of the war. 
SCIF provided assistance in the form of agricultural assets to all women in Bokhtar district 
of Khatlon province caring for children on their own, whether the father was dead or 
merely absent. Some fathers remained as refugees in Afghanistan, others were in prison, or 
had remarried and were living with a second family. The main reason why men did not 
return with the women and children to Tajikistan was security. The government failed to 
investigate and to take measures to counter discrimination and attacks by armed, pro- 
government civilians against returning refugees and internally displaced persons. This 
created an environment of fear and impunity. Circumstances in the town of Kurgan Teppe 
and the districts of Bokhtar and Vakbsh were especially critical. 73 
When upon my arrival in Tajikistan I asked the SCIF fieldworkers, who by then had been 
with the project for one year, what was the most important change they remarked on since 
they began their work, they mentioned improved security. One clear sign of this was that 
there were more men around in the villages. In the early days it was the men who had been 
most fearful. Women and children used to undertake the journey to town in their place. 74 
Human Rights Watch confirmed that young men Nvho had retumed to their villages by May 
73 Human Rights Watch Report, May 1995,3. 
74 Conway, D., Bokhtar District Needs Assessment Report, January 1995,12. SCF Tajikistan archives. 
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1995 feared deeply for their personal safety and rarely left their homes or kolkhoz; this 
isolation made it more difficult to assess the real threats to their physical safety. 75 
Evidence from the SCIF project points to the possibility of mapping freedom from fear in 
terms of freedom of movement, and mobility as a measure of personal security. In a village 
where all the inhabitants shared a group identity, there could be a high degree of security 
within the village. Only once the villagers ventured out of the village and risked encounters 
with members of other groups did they fear for themselves or their possessions. 76 
In Saripul village the Ganni inhabitants were harassed when they used the Kuliabi- 
controlled bus service to go to the provincial centre of Kurgan Teppe. They contacted an 
Uzbek who owned a bus and arranged with him that he would provide a service for the 
village. However, the Uzbek was then threatened by the Kuliabi bus company and 
prevented from providing the service. This situation was described to me in terms of one 
regional group controlling the activities of another. 
Restricted mobility not only affected adults travelling to market or to work. Children too 
could be affected. Schools which had a catchment area of several villages, spanning 
different groups, were the site of bullying. Children from one village were beaten on their 
way to school in another village. The fear affected parents, teachers and children alike. 
When children from one village were repeatedly beaten their parents made plans to build 
75 Human Rights Watch Report, May 1995,11. 
76 Harriss, J. Report on the Evaluation ofPhase One ofthe Female Heacled Households'Economic Activities 
Project, Tajikistan, Kathmandu: SCIF South Asia Regional Office, August 1995,14. SCF Tajikistan archives. 
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their own school. 77 The teachers at another school Nvere reportedly afraid of disciplining a 
particular group of children for fear of retributions from their parents. 78 
Added to an estimate of people's mobility in their own village, and the local market town, 
should be an estimate of their mobility in reaching the capital. Dushanbe was the site of 
public offices, institutes of higher education, specialist hospitals and the airport, access to 
which was required by all citizens. However it could be said that Dushanbe was a 
microcosm of Tajikistan, with suburbs divided according to the region of origin of their 
inhabitants. These divisions extended to the alleys of the main markets and were being 
perpetuated from one generation to the next: Green Market was divided up between child 
barrow-pushers of different regional origins. 79 
Immediately after the end of the civil war, travel within this map of local prejudices could 
be highly dangerous. After pro-govemment forces bad regained control of Dushanbe 
individuals carrying passports showing they originated from Garm or Pamirs were 
summarily executed. Beginning in mid-December 1992, Popular Front soldiers and other 
pro-govenunent forces stopped buses and trolley buses, stopped people on the streets, and 
deployed forces at Dushanbe airport in order to check individuals' documents. 80 
77 Female Headed Households Project Diary, December 1994. SCF Tajikistan archives. 
78 Female Headed Households Project Diary, Day 82. SCF Tajikistan archives. 
79 Personal observation, 1996. 
so The Gorno-Badakhshan (Pamiri) Soviet created a commission to investigate the deaths. It gathered a list of 
more than 300 Pamiri deaths by making rounds in morgues, at mass graves and in private homes. Human 
Rights Watch Report, December 1993,4. 
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Within an unstable political situation, the mobility of particular categories of people may 
be especially critical as an indicator of increasing or decreasing security. I want to 
highlight here the freedom of movement of adolescent boys and girlS. 
81 
While the personal security of returnees in the villages appeared to have improved during 
the life of the SCIF project, young men remained particularly at risk. Reports of night-time 
raids on villages to round up conscripts to the government forces were present in the 
earliest days of the project diary, and adolescent boys continued to be at risk of forced 
recruitment into the government forces. In both Dushanbe and Kurgan Teppe the market 
was routinely sealed and adolescent boys rounded up. Buses between the two towns were 
also stopped by army recruiting agents. Students were meant to be exempt from military 
service for the duration of their studies, however students were forcibly recruited from the 
82 83 
main street leading to Dushanbe university. In one instance a school was raided. This 
resort to forced recruitment is in part explained by the breakdown of the compulsory 
system of pre-draft military training and conscription. 84 
There were individual responses to the forced recruitment, but to my knowledge, no 
concerted action on the part of young people, parents or international agencies. Parents 
with the necessary financial means would identify the recruiting officer and pay for the 
freedom of their son. In 1996 the going rate seemed to be approximately $ 100. Other 
81 See Turner, S., Angiy Young Men in Canips: Gender, Age and Class Relations in Burundian Refugees in 
Tanzania, UNHCR Working Paper No. 9. wxv%v. unhcr. ch/ref%vorld/pub/,, vpapers/Nvpno9. htm 
'2 Personal observation, Rudaki Street, Dushanbe, November 1995. 
83 Interview, Russian School, Dushanbe, April 1996. 
8' Jones, E. 1985. Red Arniy and Society: A Sociology of the Soviet Military, London: Allen and Unwin, 64. 
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parents would approach ICRC or the OSCE who then might trace the missing young 
person, but could not secure his release. 
The young untrained men were sent to fight in the area of Tawildara, where from August 
1994, the most serious fighting between government forces and the opposition since the 
civil war took place. In areas of Tajikistan under the control of the opposition, young 
85 
people were forcibly recruited into opposition forces. In Afghanistan, Human Rights 
Watch estimated that in 1993,3000 - 5000 young Tajiks were undergoing military training 
under Islamic Revival Party auspices in different parts of Kunduz and Takhar. 86 
While there were no reports of female recruits to the government or opposition forces, 
adolescent girls were also vulnerable to abduction. 87 In August 1995 the SCF evaluator 
reported that in the worst affected villages: 
People are still afraid of 'men' who arrive in the night, threatening them and 
sometimes taking women away. Thirty four men from this village have disappeared 
since the war (theoretically) finished. In other villages, however, people said that 
they had felt fairly safe for the last year or more. Several women, however, 
reported that they had married off daughters of only 15 or 16, since the war because 
of concems about their security. 88 
85 Interview, Nowabod, Garin, January 1996. 
86 Human Rights Watch Report, December 1993. 
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Adolescent girls Nvere also targeted in a number of hideous attacks in the Garm region. 
Accused of un-Islamic. behaviour, three young women were taken from their homes and 
murdered. Other adolescent girls in the area then feared to go to school and to be seen 
outside their homes. 89 
Human Rights Watch interviews made in Bokhtar district in December 1995 with village 
elders began by describing how the security of young Garrni men had improved greatly 
over the past year. However, the elders went on to acknowledge that most of the young 
men in those villages had left Tajikistan for Russia or another CIS state, in order to flee 
harassment and the floundering Tajik economy. The Human Rights Watch delegate 
concluded that the departure of the young men was a way of resolving their problems with 
the Kuliabis. 90 By 1997 it was an increasingly common scenario that the women and young 
children would return, and the man would go as a migrant labourer to Russia with the older 
children. 91 
The reasons why the older children did not stay in Tajikistan were twofold: there was a 
fear of conscription and rape as boys and girls became adolescents, and older children were 
also harder for the woman to feed. SCF's programme was helping the woman feed the 
remaining children, but doing nothing to prevent their eventual migration. Poverty 
alleviation indicators which measured the nutrition and health of children demonstrated the 
87 Carolyn Nordstrom raises the question of why it is difficult to gather information about the specific 
experiences of girls in war. She writes with reference to Mozambique. Nordstrom, C. 1997. Gii-Is and 
Marzones: Ti-oubling Questions, Uppsala: Life and Peace Institute. 
88 Harriss 1995. SCF Tajikistan archives. 
89 Interview, Nowabod, Garm, January 1996. 
"0 Human Rights Watch Report, May 1996,2 1. 
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project's success. Conflict mitigation indicators which measured the mobility of male and 
female adolescents might have led to a reassessment of priorities. 92 
If SCF were to understand and promote change over generations, then it required an 
understanding of the processes which perpetuated social conflict. It needed an 
understanding of the social structures around which society in Tajikistan was organized, 
the sites of power to be contested, and the interests of other international actors. An 
analysis of society in Tajikistan based on ethnic (or regional) identities was simplistic: 
individuals had personal histories which complicated their allegiances. Power was located 
not only in fighting forces but also in the control of economic assets, protection rackets and 
cross-border trade. 93 As shown in the case of RuSSia, 94 international actors' interests could 
be promoted by confused and contradictory policies. 
This kind of knowledge is commonly held by few international delegates with the possible 
exception of the ICRC and Human Rights Watch. Too often, international delegates are 
briefed on the causes of the conflict, when what they will be most concerned with are its 
ongoing consequences. As Jonathan Goodhand has underlined in his study of NGOs 
working in conflict situations: 
91 See also Pilkington, H. 1997. ' 'For the sake of the children': Gender and Migration in the Former Soviet 
Union', in Buckley 1997,119-140. 
92 Goodhand 1999 (unpublished), 10. Goodhand observes that peace and conflict issues were not factored in 
to project appraisal, monitoring and evaluation of SCF work in Sri Lanka. 
93 There is evidence for continuity between the war economy and the earlier illegal commerce under the 
socialist system. Jahangiri, G. 1994. 'The Premises for the Construction of a Tajik National Identity' in 
Djalili 1994,45. 
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Conflict entrepreneurs have a sophisticated understanding of community level 
dynamics and institutions and exploit this knowledge. For NGOs to compete with 
the claims of the conflict entrepreneurs, and build viable constituencies for peace 
they need far greater understanding of the terrain they operate in. 95 
This expertise is even more vital when the armed conflict is not across a front line between 
two opposing camps. 96 
One further cautionary note needs to be made in relation to the emphasis placed in this 
section upon the utilitarian value of analysis. The knowledge of the researchers is always 
partial, but brings with it a certain power. One of the flaws in the promotion of urgent 
action-oriented research in situations of protracted social conflict is that this can be 
understood to mean that the group of people encountered by the researchers are then in 
some way entitled to humanitarian assistance. The analysis provided by SCIF in southern 
Tajikistan persuaded other agencies to start work in southern Tajikistan, regardless of the 
undocumented need elsewhere in the country. A review of the literature relating to Afghan 
children revealed a disproportionate amount of information relating to refugee children and 
a meagre amount relating to the population of children displaced within Afghanistan. This 
94 Russia has organized dialogue between both parties in Tajikistan, while providing full support to one party, 
the Communist old guard. Lynch, D., Russian 'Peacekeeping'Strategies in the CIS 1992-96: The Cases of 
Moldova, Georgia and Tajikislan, D. Phil. International Relations, Oxford University 1997,233. 
95 Goodhand 1997,6. 
96 Since the Leninabad-Kuliab alliance bad regained control of the state in December 1992 the violence had 
become highly organized. However, these organizations did not have a formally recognized leadership and 
membership, norwas their sole function to engage in armed conflict. 
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difference has also been reflected in the scale of humanitarian assistance that has been 
made available to each group. 97 
Optimistic pacificism in Afghanistan and Tajikistan 
In my discussion of universalist values and their application to Afghanistan I have 
focussed upon the possible contribution SCIF could make to building a local consensus 
around child rights and advocated the maintenance of boys' access to education. Only once 
military actors in Afghanistan had ceased fighting over gender relations as a cultural 
resource and symbol of power would girls as well as boys be able to access education. In 
my discussion of utilitarian values and their application to Tajikistan I have focussed upon 
the reasons for the creation of female-headed households and advocated the development 
of programmes to increase economic opportunities for men and to protect young males 
from recruitment. Only if the economy and people's freedom of movement were freed 
from the control of organized violence, would men be able to find jobs to provide for their 
families in Tajikistan, and maintain a tax base for essential children's services in the fields 
of health and education. Both conclusions point me in the direction of the overriding 
importance of peace to the future of children in Afghanistan and Tajikistan. 
Young people living in areas of protracted social conflict have made it abundantly clear 
that their primary aspiration is for peace, not just negative peace, but positive peace which 
affords them opportunities for education, training and employment. 98 
97 Sellick 1998. 
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Here [in demobilization camp] we are just hanging about talking about our 
problems to care givers and playing football. What we need to do is get back to 
school and start learning something. At the very least let me learn how to make a 
cutlass blade so I can go and brush a farm. 99 
In response, SCIF staff at all levels have to reject the despised impossibility argument and 
be optimistic about a peaceful outcome. A pessimistic prognosis of protracted social 
conflict is to deny the aspirations of children in three ways. First, it denies the value of the 
individual child. Second, it is a denial of the potential of the up-and-coming generation to 
lead their country out of war. Third, it is a denial of the capacity of the international 
community to act in partnership with them to build a peaceful future. 
The GPS aimed to put children at the centre of decisions whether to intervene and how, 
and identified the participation of children as a key tool in this process. ' 00 1 argue that this 
participatory approach is essential to an optimistic view, and acknowledges the value of the 
individual child. 
98 The primacy of peace in terms of people's hopes and values is shown by SCF in Sri Lanka, Listening to the 
Displacod, quoted in Goodhand 1999 (unpublished). 
99 Young male ex-combatant in Sierra Leone, quoted in Peters, K. and Richards, P. 'Fighting Nvith Open 
Eyes: Young Combatants in Sierra Leone', in Bracken and Petty 1998,76-111. 
too Much of the history and progress of children's participation is undocumented and unpublished. A useful 
inventory of child participation methods can be found in Johnson, V. and others, eds, 1998. Stepping 
For-ward. Children and Young People's Parlicipalion in the Development Process, London: Intermediate 
Technology Publications. 
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It is sometimes argued that in war-affected areas there is no scope for participative 
research. 101 While the security situation in conflict areas may frustrate regular extended 
interactions with children, delay project development, and create concern among children 
and adults about their continued participation, there is a growing body of evidence that 
children can make significant contributions to research even in situations of protracted 
social conflict. 102 Often researchers are not bringing goods and services, but they will be 
communicating a set of vAlues which can reinforce existing power relations or transform 
them. Participative research methods which lend authority to disempowered and 
disaffected members of the population can contribute to a different kind of society. The 
experience of wasteful, destructive conflict teaches children that some lives are worthless. 
Participative research methodology can offer a different lesson. 103 
In an evaluation of the SCIF project in southern TaJikistan, 104 the involvement of child 
evaluators enhanced the confidence of the team of children. Their involvement gave a clear 
message to those they interviewed, as well as SCF-UK staff, of their centrality to the 
project. The fieldworkers; said that they had leamed 'to look at the world through 
children's eyes' and that 'children can be helpful in finding solutions to problems'. 105 The 
head teachers had seen an example of children's participation which could be helpful to 
them in the development of children's representation on school community boards. 
101 See proceedings of Conference Researching on Humanitarian Assistance in Conflict Areas, 8-10 May, 
2000, Post War Reconstruction and Development Unit, University of York. 
102 Coomaras%vamy, Priya 'Exploring Child Participation: The Sri Lanka Experience', in Johnson and others 
1998,161-166. 
103 Care must be taken to ensure participants join in a research project on equal terms with the researcher. For 
example, if involvement in the research increases the workload of the child without any reward, this is 
sending a message that the child's involvement is of insignificant value. 
104 Parry-Williams, J., Evaluation, Primarily bj, Children Evaluators, ofthe SCF (UK) Female Headed 
Households Project, Tajikistan, Save the Children Fund 1998. 
259 
The centrality of children's participation to the transformation of political processes is 
beginning to be recognized in areas of conflict where they have become shockingly visible 
actors in the violent conflict. 106 Children in Afghanistan and Tajikistan have not yet taken 
centre stage in the same way as children in a number of African conflicts. However, before 
the genie is out of the bottle, there is scope through children's participation at all stages of 
project design to lay the foundation in the younger generation for a more inclusive society. 
Graga Machel finds from her study on The Inipact ofArined Conflict on Children that the 
views of young people are less polarized than adults, and concludes that it is therefore 
critical to the resolution of armed conflict that they are heard. 107 Article 19 has argued for 
greater freedom of expression for young people living with conflict, based on case studies 
from Sierra Leone, Uganda and South Africa. 108 
Circumstances in Afghanistan limit the access to information and freedom of expression of 
young people in multiple ways. I have already discussed the exclusion of girls from school. 
In a society where the vast majority of the population are illiterate, the Taliban prohibition 
on the use of all representational media has hindered the flow of public information. 109 The 
'o-' Ibid., 7 1. 
'('6 Brett, R. and McCallin, M., Children, the Invisible Soldiers, Rgdda Bamen (Swedish Save the Children) 
1996. 
107 Machel, G., The Inipact ofArnzed Conflict on Children, Briefing Notes on the Final Report of the Expert 
of the Secretary General of the United Nations A/51/306,1996. 
10' Article 19,1999. Kid's Talk: Freedom ofExpression and the UN Convention on the Rights ofthe Child, 
London: Article 19. 
'09 SCF-US had to redesign all their mine awareness material removing all images of living creatures, 
including children. July 1997. 
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inhospitable terrain, fragmented transport networks, and the continuing war, all limit travel 
and communication within Afghanistan. 
The use of the media may be a creative response to the limitations upon young people's 
access to information and also provide them with a channel of expression, as well as 
communication across the country. Afghanistan is one of the few places where, in the 
absence of local print media, the indigenous knowledge system for coping with the 
consequences of war has been supported by an external actor. ' 10 The BBC Pashtu and Dari 
service are widely listened to and broadcast not only news bulletins but also a soap opera 
series, Neiv Life Neiv Home, which is set within Afghanistan. SCF could encourage the 
development of programmes for younger listeners. These would garner the views of non- 
combatants and foster a greater sense of their own participation in the future of their 
country. The radio could also broadcast news of initiatives making positive changes in the 
lives of children and young people. ' 11 Creative use of the media could reinforce the idea 
that the younger generation has the potential to lead their country out of war. 
The third level at which the impossibility argument has to be refuted is that of the capacity 
of the international community to act as partners with the next generation to build a 
peaceful future. SCIF is part of an international community of NGOs, the ICRC, UN and 
governmental agencies. When the population of the war-affected area has made clear the 
110 Warren 1995. 
111 The BBC has now taken up this proposal from Sellick 1998, and is developing children's programmes. 
SCF has experience of supporting children's participation in the media elsewhere, e. g. a weekly TV 
programme in Honduras. Save the Children Counuy report: Central America, September 1996. In Tajikistan, 
SCIF attempted in 1996 to develop a television programme made by and for young people which would have 
presented views from around the country. The project failed to gain the cooperation of the state-run studios in 
different regions of the country and no programmes were broadcast. 
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primacy it attaches to peace, action on any other issue such as gender inequity, serves only 
to highlight the lack of commitment by the international community to the critical question 
of war and peace. This is especially the case in Afghanistan, where international agencies 
have been engaged over a prolonged period. 
As Afghanistan shows, however, such states do not fail on their own, solely 
because of internal deficiencies. On the contrary, failed states are states whose 
history leaves them vulnerable to shifts in the international power configuration. 112 
Whether it was within the administration of Ismail Khan, or alongside the Taliban, the UN 
and international NGOs expanded into the space created by the lack of government in 
order to deliver food assistance, clean water, health, education, and agricultural inputs. 
These humanitarian programmes were highly visible in the country, however it was also 
evident to the population that the UN did not have the political will (or capacity) to resolve 
the country's political problems. At worst, the UN and other humanitarian agencies could 
be seen to be profiting from the unresolved conflict. This hostile construction of 
international humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan came to the fore in Mazar-i-Sharif in 
1997. Looting was deliberately targeted at the UN and NGOs and was accompanied by 
very strong anti-Western feelings. Westerners were accused of providing materials and 
money to the Taliban. 113 The UN was also accused of abandoning the quest for a political 
112 Rubin B. R., 'Women and Pipelines: Afghanistan's Proxy Wars', International Affairs, Vol. 73,1997,283- 
296 (p. 284). 
113 In Andakhoi, water cisterns built with UN assistance were explained to me as UN assistance to prepare 
pits for the Taliban to hold prisoners, August 1997. 
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solution to Afghanistan. 114 Such looting was new to Afghanistan, even if it has been a 
frequent occurrence in other situations where international assistance agencies are 
working. 115 
Five years after the first international agencies entered Tajikistan, first world immunity had 
worth thin. International staff of the UN and NGOs were repeatedly taken hostage by 
parties excluded from negotiations with the government, and five had been killed. 
Economic investment in an unregulated economy could be seen as providing further 
resources to fuel violent competition. Both government' 16 and other armed groups' 17 were 
prepared to take advantage of aid invested in local industries to produce goods destined for 
children. 
Representatives of UN agencies and international NGOs working in Afghanistan, whose 
funding predominantly came from Western donor countries, were also aware of the reports 
that the same donor countries were providing support to the Taliban. If these reports were 
confirmed then a sanctions campaign could only appear hypocritical. A more cohesive 
policy would have involved the UN and international NGOs putting their own house in 
order and bringing whatever influence they had to bear on the backers of the Taliban. Such 
a lead had to come from headquarters. 
114 Johnson 1998,119. 
'15 'Security at Work', Forced Migration Revieiv, April 1999. 
116 In 1996 SCF payments to a shoe factory for children's shoes were diverted to the manufacture of army 
boots. 
117 In 1996 coal purchased by SCF for the heating of schools was diverted to an armed group. 
263 
It should be clear in the report that our primar role is not one of peace-making, nor 
even 'adding pressure to the political process for achieving peace'. 118 
This comment from Radda Barnen showed how much distance members of the 
International Save the Children Alliance had put between themselves and the political 
process. It reflected a view of the organization as disconnected from the Western societies 
from which it drew its support and which had a role in fuelling the conflict. 
In contrast, the SCF's report Childi-en at Wat- has a photo of two children sitting on a 
Kabul street, with the barrel of a gun across the foreground of the picture. The conclusion 
to the report printed directly over this photo reads: 
To uphold them [the civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights of the 
child], we need the international will to find political solutions to prevent war, and 
more development aid for countries where people are fighting over scarce 
resources. And the richer countries must stop supplying the weapons which make 
these wars 'against children' possible. Unless this is achieved, future generations 
will continue to be destroyed. ' 19 
118 Correspondence from Tomas Hildebrand, Radda Bamen, February 1998. 
1 ý9 Save the Children, ChilcIren at War, November 1994. 
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By 1996 other commercial international links, besides the longstanding arms trade, were 
emerging and regional interests were beginning to shift. These reflected the development 
of their own economics by the newly independent Central Asian republics. 120 
Iran was moving forward with its plans to serve as that region's major outlet for oil and gas 
to the international market. At the same time the stakes for Pakistan and Saudi Arabia had 
greatly increased. Not just trade routes, but potentially lucrative oil and gas pipelines were 
at stake. In the spring of 1996, press reports revealed that a partnership between the 
American company Unocal and the Saudi company Delta had concluded plans for 
multimillion-dollar oil and gas pipelines from Turkmenistan to Pakistani Balucbistan via 
Herat and Kandahar. 
Sanctions upon Taliban-controlled Herat would be at best a 'blunt instrument' to 
encourage Taliban compliance with a UN Charter which they perceived as Western 
inspired. By mapping the international links between the Taliban and their Western 
backers, it is possible to identify where pressure could be applied more effectively. This 
involves global networks of the kind being developed by Oxfam in relation to its work on 
the social and environmental impact of the oil industry, 121 or by Canadian Partnership for 
Africa in relation to the diamond trade in war-affected Sierra Leone, Liberia and 
120 See Rubin B. R., 'Women and Pipelines: Afghanistan's Proxy Wars', International Affairs, Vol. 73,1997, 
283-296; Tarock, A., 'The Politics of the Pipeline: The Iran and Afghanistan Conflict', Third Morld 
Quarterly, Vol. 20,1999,801-820. 
121 Corporate Accountability in Colunibia, Oxfam Gender and Development Links, November 2000. 
NN, %vNv. oxfam. org. uk/policy/gender/i 100colombia. htm 
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Angola. 122 Such work requires an optimistic view of organizational capacity and 
international partnerships. 
Peace-building has been described by one Afghan NGO representative as 'the honey 
spread on the bread'. 123 It sweetens a proposal and makes it more attractive to donors. If 
this scepticism for a term fashionable throughout the 1990s is set aside, peace-building can 
be recognized as 'the strategy which most directly tries to reverse the destructive processes 
that accompany violence'. 124 The aim of this chapter has been to demonstrate that best 
practice developed in response to the combination of guiding principles: universalism, 
utilitarianism and optimistic pacificism, is underpinned by a belief in the possibility of 
peace. 
Prescription for action 
The tough and sometimes hellish choices faced by the worker in the situation of war, mean 
that 'peace-building' may be limited to keeping a presence, a pilot light. This pilot light is 
a sign of faith in the value of each individual child's life, and the possibility of a peaceful 
future. To maintain it requires the absolutist obstinacy of the pacifists combined with the 
optimism of Eglantyne Jebb. Only International Assistance Mission have kept a pilot light 
burning in Afghanistan since before the Soviet invasion; all other international NGOs have 
come and gone. Longer-serving staff may be a source of moral examples for SCF's many 
122 Smillie, Ian and others, The Heart ofthe Matter: Sierra Leone, Diamonds and Human Security, 
Partnership Africa Canada, 2000. Nv%vw. web. net/pac/. 123 January 1997. 
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short-term fieldwork-ers. However, people from within the community are more likely to 
be able to offer examples of how, within the specific cultural context, to build universal 
legitimacy for child rights. This consensus is most likely to be built around the material 
needs of children, and may require the maintenance of elements of a relief programme. 
At the level of programme priorities, a utilitarian understanding of the factors that sustain 
the conflict, and indicators of social change are required. Programmes which reach across 
the conflict-affected area are vital to a climate of optimism, and creative ways should be 
found of overcoming the logistical difficulties of geography and warring divisions. Tough 
choices will be required between assisting the poorest of the poor and reducing the risks of 
conflict. The Human Rights Watch overseas delegate in Tajikistan, Guissou Jahangiri, was 
exemplary in her curiosity about the conflict and fearless in describing how it fed off 
intemational aid. 
125 
At the level of headquarters, SCIF should investigate and publicize the international links 
that sustain protracted social conflict. It should encourage the rest of the international 
community to share in the. responsibility for the child suffering that accompanies 
protracted conflict. Lastly SCF should add its weight to those international partnerships 
which advocate that those who benefit from the continuation of protracted social conflict, 
reach agreement on its tennination and commence building a sustainable peace. This 
means reassessing SCF's relationships with its governmental donors, including the UK 
124 Ryan, S. 1990, cited in Goodhand, J. and Lewer, N., 'Sri Lanka: NGOs and Peace-Building in Complex 
Political Emergencies', Third World Quarterlj,, Vol. 20 No. 1,1999,69-87 (p. 85). 
125 Guissou Jahangiri's regular contributions to inter-agency meetings in Dushanbe radically changed the 
level of information and debate. Personal observation 1995-97. 
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government, the EU and the World Bank. It also means acknowledging the organized 
power of multinational corporations and local conflict entrepreneurs. If policy makers 
within SCIF find that this creates uncomfortable relationships between the organization and 
its paymasters, then for individual moral examples of contentious action they have to look 
no further than the archive records of members of the Fight the Fainine Council. 
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Conclusion 
In 1919 Eglantyne Jebbkvrote enthusiastically of SCF's plans to purchase milch cows to 
provide milk for the children of the city of Vienna. The SCIF accounts show Cows for 
Vienna -f 10,000.1 Nearly eighty years later, SCIF in Tajikistan was known amongst the 
population of the war-tom south as the organization that gave out cows. 2A hasty 
conclusion would be that the organization had changed little over the course of the century. 
However, the rhetorical and ideological underpinnings of the actions of the founding 
generation and the SCF of the 1990s were very different. The founding generation was 
engaged in contentious political action: SCF purchased cows for Vienna with foreign 
currency at a time when the victorious allies were demanding the compulsory delivery of 
milch cows from the defeated countries. By contrast, SCF's programme of agricultural 
assistance in Tajikistan was developed in partnership with the World Bank and the 
government of Tajkistan to provide a safety net for children living in poverty. It did not 
fundamentally challenge the social and political processes which contributed to the 
creation of impoverished households. 
I have used the paradigm of beliefs, values and techniques of persuasion shared by the 
founding generation of SCIF as the lens through which I have looked at the organization's 
history to reveal its metamorphosis. In Chapter II identified three guiding principles 
which were crucial to the actions of the generation who founded SCIF in 1919. They were 
1 Breen, SCF Archive Paper No. 7, October 1995,14. The cows were given to farmers on the understanding 
that they would pay for the cows by delivering milk to the children of Vienna. 
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universalism, a positive creed reaching out to all children across political divides, 
utilitarianism, in recognition of the dynamic role of young people in generating the future, 
and optimistic pacificism. Unsurprisingly the ideological and rhetorical underpinnings of 
SCF were seen to change over the course of the century. Times change, and organizations 
must change with them if they are to survive. However, SCIF has always defined itself as a 
value-based organization: a paradigmatic shift in the dominant constellation of values 
assented to by its supporters could undermine the very foundations of its identity. Chapter 
8 showed how this was recognized by SCIF (as well as other NGOs) in the 1990s when 
NGOs were experiencing increasing pressure from governmental donors to operate within 
a contract culture. This pressure forced NGOs to reaffinn their independent and voluntary 
identity, and focus upon the significance of organizational values. 
The intervening chapters tracked how far SCIF had departed from the guiding principles of 
the founding generation over the course of the last century. Chapter 2 described the 
extraordinary speed with which the founders translated the three principles into action in 
the defeated countries of Europe and in the Russian Civil War. This momentum was 
slowed by the Depression and a fall in SCF's income, but also by growing divisions within 
the anti-war movement from which SCF had drawn many of its early supporters. This was 
illustrated in Chapter 3 by SCF's response to the Spanish Civil War. By the outbreak of the 
Second World War SCIF had shed its pacifist identity and become patriotic rather than 
international in its orientation. Chapters 4 and 5 portrayed SCIF as the respectable partner 
of the British government in delivering welfare at home and relief abroad, in particular 
2 It was referred to by Tajiks as the 'UN for Cows' in their attempt to differentiate it from the many other 
international organizations that started operating in the country following the civil war. Personal observation 
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alongside British troops in Gennany and UN troops in Korea. The succeeding period was 
known within SCF as the period of the junta. The overseas division was dominated by men 
with a military background. They developed two distinct approaches for wartime and 
peacetime. Chapter 6 explored how far this dualist approach was compatible with the 
guiding principles of the founding generation by examining SCF's role in the Nigerian 
Civil War. By this time the income of SCF had again reached a level comparable with the 
income received at the height of the Russian Famine. Chapter 7 covered the period 1975- 
1989 when programmes proliferated with little cohesion, however, within the work 
undertaken in Lebanon I discovered SCIF upholding the principles of universalism and 
utilitarianism by reaching out to children across political divides and giving critical roles to 
young people as the generation of the future. Chapter 8 was a reflective analysis of my 
own work on behalf of SCIF in Afghanistan and Tajikistan. Particularly striking was the 
primacy attached to peace by the people living with protracted social conflict. This period 
coincided with the development within SCIF of the GPS and a renewed focus upon 
organizational values. 
Two questions are now of particular relevance to this conclusion. First, how significant is 
it that SCF is a value-based organization? Secondly, do the values to which the founding 
generation gave their assent have an enduring significance over succeeding generations? 
The answer to the first question lies in the location of this case study of SCIF within the 
associated historical narratives of war and peace, human rights, and NGO-state relations. 
1995-1997. 
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The history of war and peace produced one overriding lesson. None of the wars that SCIF 
was involved with from 1919 until 1999 was localized. They all had international 
connections. They were either fought by outside powers on foreign soil, or fought with 
weapons (both military and humanitarian aid could be used to fuel and sustain a war) 
procured from outside powers. The enduring connections between the local and global 
economics of war made political ambitions at the end of the century to insulate Fortress 
Europe from the rest of the world appear out of touch with reality. The vision of SCF's 
founders of the ways in which humanity was globally connected was a closer reflection of 
reality. 
The second strand of the historical narrative presented an apparent contradiction. This 
challenged the universal legitimacy of human rights. The founding myth of SCIF is that 
Eglantyne Jebb conceived the Declaration of Children's Rights on Mount Geneva in a way 
reminiscent of Moses receiving the Ten Commandments. However, the 1923 Declaration 
was drafted and redrafted, and the 1959 Convention on the Rights of the Child relied upon 
a rare coming together of political interests during the Cold War. At the end of the century 
the highly publicized derogation of the rights of girls in Afghanistan, and the less well 
publicized derogation of the rights of refugee children in Europe, were absorbed into 
debates about cultural relativism. If they had been part of a public discourse dominated by 
universalism, they would have been seen as reminders that universal legitimacy can only 
be earned through the repeated conception and articulation of rights in plural settings. As 
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Eglantyne Jebb said 'we mustwrite out our belief in deeds before we can communicate 
this belief to others. ' 3 
In two important respects Eglantyne Jebb's blueprint for SCF was and still is an 
appropriate response to the world. Firstly, in a world where local issues have global 
connections she was detennined to build an international, not a national, organization. 
Secondly, in a world where values are constructed and reconstructed in plural settings, she 
combined practical action with advocacy. The first two elements of the blueprint are 
common to many international non-governmental organizations and have enabled a 
plethora of NGOs to achieve consultative status with intergovernmental bodies such as the 
UN. 
However, the third historical narrative casts a different light upon the achievements of SCIF 
as an international organization. In some respects, the history of NGO-state relations has 
been one of advocacy and co-option. Chapter 2 showed how after the First World War, the 
NGOs led the way in encouraging the government to take on new responsibilities. Once 
the government had accepted a responsibility the NGO then remained to goad the 
goveniment to fulfil its role: 
A great deal of our work has been to make governmental action function which had 
lapsed for lack of outside pressure; to act, say, as the spokesmen for refugees with 
overburdened officials whose hands were too full to allow them to realise all that 
3 Jebb, E., Memorandum on ReliefPoliq, SCF Archives reference SC/EJ. 282. 
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was being suffered. Such work is often far harder to carry out than a smaller 
independent scheme, but it is also likely to be more far-reaching in its results. 4 
However, as the state extended its powers both over welfare at home and relief abroad the 
NGOs became contractors. Chapter 4 described how this transformation took place in the 
relations between the British government and SCIF during the Second World War. SCIF 
was unquestioning in its relationship with the British government and refrained from 
entering any other country without the permission of the national government involved 
until the 1990s. The circumstances in the last decade of the twentieth century demonstrate 
a more complex picture. In Tajikistan and Afghanistan the organizing powers of 
government officials were exceedingly limited and SCF found itself dealing with parastatal 
organizations locally. External actors included cross-border conflict entrepreneurs and 
multinational companies as well as national governments. 
The first two historical narratives therefore describe a world where local issues have global 
connections and where values are constructed and reconstructed in plural settings. The 
third historical narrative is a reminder that power is organized in diverse ways. In such a 
world Eglantyne Jebb was convinced of the necessity of building not only an organization 
of office-holders and contracted staff, but a life-saving movement of people ready to 
engage in contentious social action. It is this third aspect relating to the organization of 
power which is most significant for this history of SCIF and explains the centrality I have 
given to organizational values throughout this thesis. The motivating power of values is 
crucial to the success of a contentious social movement during its sustained interaction 
Fry 1926, xxix. 
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with powerful opponents. 5 Whereas an organization may or may not be value-based, the 
central activity of a contentious social movement is evaluative, it involves inscribing 
grievances in overall frames that identify an injustice, attributing the responsibility to 
others, and proposing a solution. 6 
This can be illustrated by a comparison between the donation of f, 10,000 for milch cows to 
Vienna in 1919 and the loan made to the Tajikistan goverm-nent by the World Bank in 
1997. Eglantyne Jebb had an optimistic faith in the capacity of every population to fulfil a 
double duty to its own children as well as to those abroad. The reciprocal donation made 
by the Council of Vienna in 1926 to provide the children of the striking miners in south 
a Wales with milk appeared to confirm this faith. Eighty years later the SCIF programme in 
Tajikistan was funded by a World Bank loan to the government of Tajikistan, which the 
children of Tajikistan would have to repay in twenty-five years time. In its first decade 
SCF was the almoner of supporters belonging to a contentious social movement that 
spanned Britain and Vienna. Eighty years later it was contracted to fill a very different 
role. However, the messages received by staff in Tajikistan were more mixed. Zainab 
Babaeva visited the UK to meet with other SCIF staff from across the Middle East and 
Central Asia. One of her lasting impressions was that individuals were prepared to rattle 
5 'Collective action is often led by organizations, but these are sometimes beneficiaries, sometimes inciters, 
and at other times destroyers of popular politics. The recuff ing controversy about whether organizations 
produce movements or suppress them can be resolved only if we examine the less formal structures they 
draw upon - the social networks at the base of society and the connective structures that link them to one 
another. Sustaining a movement is the result of a delicate balance between throttling the power in movement 
by providing too much organization and leaving followers to spin off into the tyranny of decentralization. ' 
Tarrow, S. 1998, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 201. 
6 Tarrow 1998,111. 
275 
collection boxes in the rain to solicit donations for SCF. 7 Actress Amanda Burton and a 
photo-journalist visited Tajikistan and publicized their experiences in the UK press. 8 These 
personal links created the impression of a social movement, however it was not 
contentious. It made no fundamental challenge to the authorities. Political power and the 
capacity to frame the relationship between donor and recipient was not transferred to the 
movement of individual SCIF supporters but remained within the governmental bodies that 
financed the agricultural inputs in the Tajikistan programme from 1995 onwards. 
The World Bank was confident that SCIF would deliver a safety net for children in poverty 
in pilot areas of Tajikistan. After all, by the end of the century SCIF had established a 
record of pioneering work in the field of child welfare. However, by consistently coding its 
achievements as welfare, both internally and externally, SCF had neglected their political 
significance, and distanced itself from the power that lies in contentious social movement. 
The organization persisted in coding its achievements as welfare despite the fact that, as 
Chapter 5 showed, it had become apparent to the people who Worked on behalf of SCF in 
the 1950s that engaging in welfarist policies did not address the structural violence 
endemic in society. 
This thesis has shown that the origins of SCIF lie not only in the movement for social 
reform but also in the anti-war movement. 'All wars, just or unjust, disastrous or 
victorious, are waged against the child' is one of Eglantyne Jebb's more frequently quoted 
7 Interview with Zainab Babaeva, Assistant Project Manager Bokhtar district, Tajikistan 1995. 
' Global Dialogue: SlaffNewsleffer, September 1998, SCF, 1. 
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statements in early SCIF publications. 9 The founding generation succeeded in making 
inroads into the way in which the issue of peace and war was thought about by people in 
positions of power within British society. This influence extended beyond Britain for 
example to the League of Nations and the Pope. At this stage in its development it drew 
upon several sources of power: the energy of individuals, the sense of historical purpose, 
and existing dense social networks. 
It was Dorothy Buxton who in 1915 first contested the meanings associated with peace and 
0 
war in her decision to publish accounts of the conditions in the 'enemy' countries. 'Notes 
from the Foreign Press' made no distinction between the suffering of children of enemy, 
neutral and allied countries. The articles were also concerned with the continuum between 
war and peace, and the consequences of actions at the time for the Europe of tomorrow. 
Lastly, it framed the issues in such a way as to contest government policy and construct 
public support for a project of lasting peace. Dorothy Buxton posed a challenge to the 
allied governments and all those who supported them. 
But it was Eglantyne Jebb who in 1919 transformed that contentious action into a sustained 
collective action and articulated the beliefs which provided a value-based rationale for the 
supporters of SCF. 
We need to remember that we are human beings first and the members of a 
particular nation afterwards [ ... ] There are certain fundamental duties which we 
See for example at the time of the Abyssinian crisis The World's Children, November 1935,23. 
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owe to mankind, and which, when they appear to clash (it is always in appearance 
only) with our duties to our National State, should nevertheless take precedence. ' 0 
Eglantyne Jebb anticipated that her most powerful opponents would be supporters of the 
'National Point of View'. An additional source of power was the founder's sense of 
historical destiny. Eglantyne Jebb presented herself as the torchbearer for a relay of such 
exemplary figures as*Johann. Pestalozzi and Edith Cavell, and she was convinced that she 
was part of the generation for whom success in eliminating the suffering caused to children 
by -war was within their grasp. Her invitation to others to join the movement for social 
change was compelling. She tapped into the emotional energy of individuals disturbed by 
child suffering, but also exercised her own charisma. 
She attracted people to her, and when recruiting for the SCIF she sometimes 
approached some practical stranger who was engaged in his or her profession and 
said 'Look, come along and join our organization, and they would do so'. " 
The two sisters were not alone in their conviction that patriotism could be combined with 
internationalism. The first chapter outlined how the movement drew strength from the 
dense social networks between the early supporters of SCF and the convergent beliefs of 
the anti-war movement. 
'0 Jebb, E., 'The World Policy of the Save the Children Fund' in Fuller 1928,564. 
" Save the Children Oral History, Interview with David Buxton, 83, nephew of Eglantyne Jebb, by Douglas 
Keay in Cambridge on 22 June 1993. 
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Succeeding chapters showed how within a generation, the influence of the constellation of 
beliefs, values and techniques of persuasion which held sway over the 1920s had waned. 
The paradigm that govemed the behaviour of the early supporters of SCF had been 
replaced by the 'National Point of View'. The younger generation were being brought up 
not as citizens of the world but as citizens of nation states. This shift in values may be most 
clearly seen in the narrow reinterpretation of the utilitarian role of young people. Whether 
it was in China, Gen-nany or Britain, the next generation was co-opted into the purposive 
life of the nation. By succumbing to the 'National Point of View', SCIF abandoned its 
contentious position. This is the point where it could be said the national organization 
suppressed the contentious social action, and cut itself off from international contacts 
which might have disturbed its newly found equilibrium. It became respectable and 
developed a comfortable relationship with the British government. Individuals who 
remained associated with SCF found other outlets for their contentious social action. For 
example, through the No More War Movement, and later the Oxford Committee for 
Famine Relief. 
As soon as the organization adopted a national rather than universal orientation, the 
coordinates of all its guiding principles shifted. In partict! lar the optimistic pacificism of 
the founding generation was replaced by pessimistic defencism. The extent of this 
transformation can be seen by the complete absence of SCF from the debates over 
disannament and the abuse of the anns trade during the Cold War. In 1928 Eglantyne Jebb 
had written: 
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The Save the Children movement would wish to be one of those agencies which 
may be of service at the present day to those who are seeking to find theirway back 
0 
to the true path of world evolution [ ... ] We are willing to spend a million pounds a 
day upon internecine destruction; when shall we be willing to spend a million 
pounds a day on rescuing the children who are at present left a prey to agony and 
despair? 12 
The values that Eglantyne Jebb upheld endured and found their expression throughout the 
Cold War in the movement for nuclear disarmament and the opposition to the arms trade, 
but they did not find their expression within SCF. It was not until after the Cold War that 
SCF would again deviate publicly from Foreign Office positions and question the supply 
of weapons from rich countries to poor countries. 
The last two chapters show SCIF beginning to realign itself with its original guiding 
principles. In Chapter 7 universalism was reasserted as a positive creed leading the 
organization to seize political opportunities to reach out to children from all sides. This 
approach was illustrated using the experience of SCIF in Lebanon where it was recognized 
that if SCIF had been politically neutral in Lebanon, it would have been paralysed. In 
Chapter 8 SCF began to gather evidence of the primacy attached to peace over economic 
development by war-affected people. This entailed a shift in emphasis from the 
development of children's capacity to cope with the consequences of war, towards peace- 
building. Although children in Afghanistan and Tajikistan were not significant protagonists 
in the conflict, elsewhere young people were beginning to frame the public discourse about 
12 Jebb, E., 'The World Policy of Save the Children Fund' in Fuller 1928,568. 
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war and the possibility of a peaceful future in terms of their active participation. 13 The 
central and highly visible role played by young people in conflicts as far apart as Palestine, 
and Sierra Leone, and the journeys of unaccompanied minors from war-affected parts of 
the world to the comparative peacýof Europe 14 were a powerful challenge to the prevailing 
understanding of childhood. These young people were obliging SCF to adopt a utilitarian 
perspective and affirm the dynamic role of young people in generating their own futures. 
This historical case study has mapped both the neglect and the rediscovery of the guiding 
principles of the founding generation. Is this of only academic value or is it of use to the 
practitioner, the person who, in the words of Olive Schreiner, labours in the domain of war 
with the aim of extinguishing it? ' 5 Writing in 1911 about the women's movement and the 
role women could play in ending the practice of settling differences through war, Olive 
Schreiner noted that: 
To the men and women taking part in that mighty movement during the long 
centuries of the past, probably nothing was quite clear, in the majority of cases, but 
their own immediate move. 16 
Her comment is applicable to the powerful movement founded in 1919 to save children. 
By the end of the century SCF had an annual expenditure of f 100 million and was working 
13 Child soldiers are the subject of much recent research, see for example Rachel Brett and Margaret 
McCallin 1996, Children: The Invisible Soldiers, Radda Barnen. 
14 The fastest growing group of unaccompanied asylum seekers in Oxfordshire is from Afghanistan. Personal 
observation 200 1. 
15 'It is our intention to enter into the domain of war and to labour there till in the course of generations we 
have extinguished it. ' Schreiner 1978,178, 
16 Schreiner 1978,137. 
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in more than seventy countries. 17 However, the question remains as to what bound the 
people, %vho worked on behalf of SCIF over the eighty years together? The early journals of 
SCIF testify to personal quests for spiritual and moral conversion which overlapped with a 
quest for social transformation. The sense of quest disappears from the records of 
succeeding generations and instead these emphasize each 'immediate move'. The people 
associated with SCIF appear vulnerable to the influence of rising constellations of beliefs, 
values and techniques of persuasion. If they were in fact part of a 'mighty movement' then 
how could SCIF best harness that power in movement? 
This thesis has highlighted the energizing role of individuals. The frequent citation of such 
long-serving staff such as Bridget Stevens, Mary Hawkins and Frances Moore, should not 
detract from the presence of many more short-term staff making a more immediate 
contribution and who were more detached from the organization. Writing about the SCF 
programme in Sri Lanka two years after the introduction of the GPS, Jonathan Goodhand 
noted that 'personalities have been critically important in the process of organisational 
change; either leading or skewing the organisation in different directions'. 18 For SCF to 
harness the power of individuals behind a common purpose then it is vital that it develops 
its organizational memory beginning with its foundation as a value-driven organization. 
The identification of compelling moral examples could serve to ensure that succeeding 
generations of staff make decisions in accordance with the nexus of values which make up 
the conscience of the organization. 
17 Through Children's Eyes, SCIF Annual Report 1999/2000. 
18 Goodhand, March 1999 (unpublished), 6. 
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The case study also points to the possibility of reinventing an organization in response to 
its external environment. The founders of SCF thought that it might last no longer than the 
Fight the Famine Council (1919-1922). They were provedwrong on this. In many other 
ways their work has proved far-sighted. Over the course of the last century a wide range of 
relief and development organizations have since emerged and adopted the value of 
0 
universalism, but SCIF continues to have an urgent mission to promote a utilitarian 
understanding of the role of young people and an optimistic belief in the possibility of 
peace. 
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Appendix I 
The Declaration of the Rights of the Child (1923) 
By the present Declaration of the Rights of the Child, commonly known as the 
'Declaration of Geneva', men and women of all nations, recognizing that Mankind owes to 
the Child the best that it has to give, declare and accept it as their duty that, beyond and 
above all considerations of race, nationality, or creed: 
THE CHILD must be given the means requisite for its normal development, both 
materially and spiritually. 
11. 
. 
THE CHILD that is hungry must be fed; the child that is sick must be nurse; the 
child that is backward must be helped; the delinquent child must be reclaimed; and 
the orphan and the Iwaif must be sheltered and succoured. 
III. THE CHILD must be the first to receive relief in times of distress. 
IV. THE CHILD must be in a position to earn a livelihood and must be protected 
against every fonn of exploitation. 
V. THE CHILD must be brought up in the consciousness that is talents must be 
devoted to the service of its fellow-men. 
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